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about the utility of emotions and emotion regulation in self-control success 
 
Summary 
High trait self-control predicts a successful, healthy, and happy life. 
Nonetheless, how people with high trait self-control succeed at self-control and attain 
these outcomes remains unclear. To date, a few studies have linked high trait self-
control with effective emotion regulation, and others have linked emotion regulation 
with enhanced self-control. Building on these insights, along with insights from 
instrumental emotion regulation, which holds that people regulate emotions to attain 
goals, this programme of research tests whether people higher in trait self-control use 
their emotions and emotion regulation to succeed at self-control. 
Two studies (Study 1: N = 253; Study 2: N = 306) first examined the relations 
between trait self-control and beliefs about the utility of emotions in everyday situations 
that varied in self-control type required. Three studies (Study 1: N = 415; Study 2: N = 
140; Study 3: N = 210) then explored the links between trait self-control, beliefs about 
the utility of emotions, and emotion regulation in performance contexts that varied in 
self-control demand, and how these factors influenced emotions and self-control 
performance. 
Convincing evidence was found that people higher, relative to lower, in trait 
self-control considered positive emotions more useful and negative emotions less useful 
across situations, although these beliefs did not translate into preferences or choice to 
regulate emotions. Modest evidence was found that people higher in trait self-control 
experienced more positive and less negative emotion following a regulatory task, and 
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that more positive and less negative emotion helped people higher in trait self-control to 
succeed at self-control. Thus, trait self-control predicts beliefs about the utility of 
emotions, but whether these beliefs translate into behavior depend on context.  
This research contributes to our understanding of how emotions and emotion 
regulation might shape self-control success and has the potential to inform the design of 
interventions to improve people’s self-control and help them to attain positive 
outcomes. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
You absolutely love delicious food but you also really want to get in shape? You 
have a hangover and you promise yourself that you will never drink this much again, 
yet at the next party you end up drinking too much anyway? You want to quit smoking, 
you know how bad this habit is for your health, and yet you cannot get yourself to stop 
smoking? These questions lie at the heart of self-control, which refers to the ability to 
“override impulses to act as well as the ability to make oneself initiate or persist in 
boring, difficult, or disliked activity” (Carver, 2010, p.766).  
Self-control research has a long history in psychology, with one classic example 
of this early work being Walter Mischel and colleagues research on children’s ability to 
delay gratification (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970; Mischel, Zeiss, & Ebbesen, 1972), and 
has been studied in many subdisciplines of psychology and other social sciences (Kross 
& Guevarra, 2015). To date, there is little doubt that the ability to self-control is 
associated with a wide range of positive outcomes, such as good physical and mental 
health, harmonious interpersonal relationships, and improved work and academic 
performance (Crescioni et al., 2011; Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Tangney, Baumeister, & 
Boone, 2004), whereas the inability to self-control is associated with numerous negative 
outcomes such as overeating, addictive and criminal behaviors, and financial and health 
problems (Moffitt et al., 2011; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). In light of this, advancing 
our understanding of how people succeed at self-control has invaluable implications, 
given that this knowledge may have the potential to improve self-control in people and 
help them to achieve positive life outcomes.  
This thesis aimed to contribute to our understanding of this issue. Specifically, 
drawing together research on emotions that has suggested that emotions can be used as 
tools to achieve self-control success (DeSteno, 2018), and research on instrumental 
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emotion regulation that has shown that people can regulate emotions to attain goals 
(Tamir, 2009a), along with research on self-control that has shown that people who are 
good at self-control regulate their emotions more effectively in laboratory settings and 
more often in real-life, as compared to people who are less good at self-control 
(Hennecke, Czikmantori, & Brandstätter, 2018; Hofmann et al., 2014; Paschke et al., 
2016), this thesis aims to understand whether people with good self-control use emotion 
regulation as a strategy to succeed at self-control.    
The present chapter introduces the reader to the theories, research, measurement 
techniques, and gaps in the literature that form the basis to this thesis, which consists of 
two multi-study empirical papers that test key predictions made by the instrumental 
theory of emotion regulation to enhance our understanding of whether people with good 
self-control use emotion regulation as a strategy to succeed at self-control. Following 
this initial orientation to the relevant research, the specific aims and predictions of each 
empirical paper are summarized.  
Self-control: an overview 
Today, the terms self-control, self-regulation, willpower, and self-discipline are 
often used interchangeably to refer to the same process. Herein, the term self-control is 
used, which, as stated above, refers to the ability to “override impulses to act as well as 
the ability to make oneself initiate or persist in boring, difficult, or disliked activity” 
(Carver, 2010, p.766). In other words, self-control is what stops us from eating our 
favorite chocolate to maintain a healthy weight, what makes us keep running on the 
treadmill even though it might be unpleasant, what helps us refrain from saying 
something hurtful when we are angry to maintain good relationships, and what makes 
us do our homework instead of playing computer games to earn a good grade. Even 
though many definitions of self-control have been proposed in the literature, this 
particular definition was chosen because it implies that self-control involves both 
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preventing and enacting behaviors, which is a key aspect of the current framework as 
we shall see in a later section.  
Self-control is thought to be closely related to other constructs such as 
impulsivity and Big Five conscientiousness (Friese & Hofmann, 2009; Tangney et al., 
2004), although these constructs are not entirely the same. That is, while impulsivity 
implies a lack of control over impulses, self-control is the ability to control impulses 
(Friese & Hofmann, 2009). Likewise, while conscientiousness can operate with or 
without impulses, self-control only operates in situations where there is a conflict 
between impulses and long-term goals (de Boer, van Hooft, & Bakker, 2011). 
Moreover, even though “lumping” self-control with related constructs such as 
conscientiousness has been successful in predicting various life outcomes, “splitting” 
self-control from these related constructs has been particularly successful in predicting 
certain outcomes such as achievement (Duckworth & Seligman, 2017). Thus, self-
control is typically studied as a separate construct.  
Moreover, self-control can be conceptualized as either state or trait self-control 
(Baumeister & Alquist, 2009; de Ridder, Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, & Baumeister, 
2012; Tangney et al., 2004). State self-control is the current behavior that varies across 
time and situations and may depend on factors such as previous self-control efforts 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), a shift in motivation (Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 
2014), environmental factors (Papies, 2016), and many others. Indeed, several lines of 
research has investigated the factors that disrupt state self-control to understand why 
people sometimes fail at self-control. One well-known model that attempts to explain 
this is the strength model of self-control (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 
1998). Broadly, this model holds that self-control is a limited resource and that exerting 
self-control reduces this resource and temporary impairs subsequent self-control (also 
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referred to as ‘ego depletion’). Thus, in this view, people fail at self-control because 
their self-control resources are depleted due to previous self-control efforts, and they are 
therefore unable to exert further self-control (though it is highly debated whether ego 
depletion exists: see Carter et al., 2015).  
An alternative view suggests that people fail at self-control due to shifts in 
motivation, attention, and emotion (Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014). Broadly, 
this view suggests that, after people pursue ‘have-to’ goals that require self-control 
exertion, they become more motivated to pursue enjoyable ‘want-to’ goals rather than 
pursuing more ‘have-to’ goals, and thus shift their attention and emotions toward ‘want-
to’ goals and away from ‘have-to’ goals. Hence, in this view, people fail at self-control 
because they want to do something enjoyable rather than controlling themselves further, 
not because they are unable to exert further self-control as indicated by the ego 
depletion model. However, while these models (and others) provide insights into why 
people fail at self-control, much less is known about how people succeed at self-control.  
One fruitful approach to enhance our understanding of this issue might be to 
study people high in trait self-control. As opposed to state self-control, trait self-control 
is the dispositional ability to self-control across time and situations, which tend to 
emerge early in life (Mischel, 2014). It is typically high trait self-control, rather than 
high state self-control, that has been linked with numerous positive life outcomes (de 
Ridder et al., 2012; Tangney et al., 2004). For example, longitudinal research has 
showed that higher levels of trait self-control at a young age predict numerous positive 
outcomes later in life including financial stability, reductions in crime, and physical 
health (Moffitt et al., 2011), which is assumed to be due to their stable ability to self-
control. Put differently, some people are inherently better than others at overriding 
impulses and to persist in disliked activity across time and situations, and these 
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differences in trait self-control are subsequently associated with success in various life 
domains.  
Nonetheless, only a few studies (e.g., Friese & Hofmann, 2009; Schmeichel & 
Zell, 2007) have actually tested whether the link between trait self-control and positive 
life outcomes stems from the ability to override impulses and to persist in disliked 
activity; that is, whether greater trait self-control predicts increased performance on 
behavioral measures of self-control. One exception is research conducted by 
Schmeichel and Zell (2007), who found that people higher in trait self-control were 
better at inhibiting the impulse to blink and to pull their hand out of iced water, as 
compared to people lower in trait self-control, providing initial evidence that greater 
trait self-control is indeed associated with enhanced performance on behavioral 
measures of self-control. 
Nevertheless, little is known about the specific strategies that people higher in 
trait self-control might use to succeed in situations that require them to use self-control 
and thus to achieve various goals and positive outcomes. That is, while some have 
suggested that people with high trait self-control succeed at achieving their goals 
because they actively avoid tempting situations (Ent, Baumeister, & Tice, 2010), 
experience fewer conflicting temptations overall (Hofmann, Baumeister, Förster, & 
Vohs, 2012), and establish adaptive habits (Adriaanse, Kroese, Gillebaart, & de Ridder, 
2014; Galla & Duckworth, 2015), this research does not enable us to draw conclusions 
about how they succeed when they are actually faced with a situation that requires them 
to use self-control. Thus, whether people with high trait self-control use any particular 
strategies to succeed at self-control is largely an open question. This thesis aims to close 
this gap by examining the mechanisms by which trait self-control might lead to self-
control success.  
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Measurement techniques in self-control research. This thesis aims to measure 
trait self-control, performance on behavioral measures of self-control, and to manipulate 
expected self-control demand, both in the lab and in real-life. Thus, below I first present 
common measures of trait self-control, followed by a description of common behavioral 
dependent measures of self-control performance used in the laboratory and in real-life. I 
then discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these methods, followed by a description 
of the measures included in the studies presented in this thesis.  
Measuring dispositional self-control. Although behavioral tasks such as delay 
of gratification tasks and the Go/No-Go task can be used to measure dispositional self-
control (Eigsti et al., 2006; see also Duckworth & Kern, 2011, for an overview), the 
most common method to measure dispositional self-control is through questionnaires, 
completed by the participant or an informant such as a family member (Duckworth & 
Kern, 2011). These questionnaires typically tap various behaviors that require self-
control such as the ability to override short-term temptations in favor of long-term 
goals, to sustain and direct attention, and to work effectively towards long-term goals.  
De Ridder et al. (2012) suggested that the three most common questionnaires 
that have been used to measure trait self-control are the 36-item (e.g., “I lose my temper 
too easily”) Self-Control Scale and its brief version (Tangney et al., 2004), the 30-item 
(e.g., “I do things without thinking”) Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton, Stanford, & 
Barratt, 1995), and the 24-item (e.g., “I often act on the spur of the moment without 
stopping to think”) Low-Self- Control Scale (Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, & Arneklev, 
1993). These questionnaires have showed significant small to medium relationships 
with actual behaviors, although the Self-Control Scale has showed the strongest 
relationships with behaviors and has been used more frequently than the two other 
scales to study a broader range of behaviors (De Ridder et al., 2012).  
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Even though using these questionnaires to measure dispositional self-control can 
be beneficial because they can be easily administered and because they are thought to be 
relatively valid measures of dispositional self-control, one obvious drawback with these 
questionnaires is that they may be biased by social desirability or demand 
characteristics. For example, being “good at self-control” is generally considered a 
desirable characteristic and people may therefore overreport on their dispositional 
ability to self-control.  
Measuring self-control outcomes in laboratory settings. Furthermore, a wide 
range of behavioral tasks have been used as dependent measures of self-control in 
laboratory settings. These include, but are not limited to, completing the Stroop task or a 
Stop-signal task, attempting to solve unsolvable anagrams, performing a pain tolerance 
task, crossing out letters, squeezing a handgrip, solving complex math problems, delay 
gratification tasks, and food and snack consumption tasks (Duckworth & Kern, 2011; 
Hagger, Wood, & Chatzisarantis, 2010). 
For example, the handgrip task is one common dependent measure of self-
control, particularly in research on ego depletion (see Hagger et al., 2010, for details). In 
this task, participants compress a handgrip with their dominant hand for as long as 
possible with a piece of paper held between the handles. The experimenter starts timing 
the participant once he or she holds the paper firmly between the handles and stops it 
when the paper slips, with more time spent squeezing the handgrip indicating better 
self-control (Muraven et al., 1998). Another common task used to measure self-control 
is a snack consumption task (Hagger et al., 2010). In this task, participants are, for 
example, left alone in the lab to work on an unrelated task with a bowl of snacks (e.g., 
chocolate) placed in front of them, which they are typically invited to consume. 
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Unbeknownst to the participants, the researchers then count how much snacks they 
consumed, with less consumption indicating better self-control (e.g., Tong et al., 2015).  
However, given that these behavioral tasks are very different from one another, 
it is debatable whether they measure the same construct. Indeed, Duckworth and Kern 
(2011) suggested that, even though these tasks have in common that they involve 
voluntary control in the service of greater goals, the diversity in these tasks reflect the 
many ways that self-control has been operationalized in the literature. Duckworth and 
Kern (2011) therefore examined the convergent validity of various self-control 
measures. They found that delay gratification tasks (e.g., snack or monetary delay tasks) 
were positively associated with other delay tasks (r = .21), as well as self-reported (r = 
.15) and informant-reported (r = .21) self-control questionnaires. This data suggests that 
delay tasks are relatively valid measures of self-control, though they may not measure 
the exact same construct given the small correlations. The researchers further found 
that, compared to delay gratification tasks, executive function tasks (e.g., Stroop task, 
Stop-signal task) had lower correlations with other executive function tasks (r = .15) 
and with self-reported (r = .10) and informant-reported (r = .14) self-control 
questionnaires. Broadly, these findings suggest that some lab-tasks (e.g., delay tasks) 
may be better measures of self-control than others (e.g., executive function tasks).  
From an applied viewpoint, it is also debatable whether these laboratory self-
control tasks actually require any self-control or whether they require self-control to the 
same extent as performing real-life self-control behaviors. For example, it is debatable 
whether squeezing a handgrip measures self-control per se, and whether performing this 
task requires self-control to the same extent as resisting dessert when dining out with 
friends, and whether people who perform well on the former necessarily succeed at the 
latter. Consistent with these speculations, Shenhav (2017) argued that there are 
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differences between how self-control choices (i.e., choosing between short-term and 
long-term gains) are made in the lab vs. in real-life, and that these differences make the 
lab situation lower in self-control demand. Specifically, he argued that choosing to eat a 
snack in the lab only affects a single calorie intake and is therefore relatively unharmful 
to a person’s long-term health goals, suggesting that choosing between eating or 
resisting the snack in this situation may require little self-control. Presenting 
participants with a snack task can therefore lead researchers to conclude that their 
participants lacked self-control (if they generally ate the snack) or that their participants 
were very self-controlled (if they generally resisted the snack) without actually 
requiring them to use self-control. Similarly, Barber and colleagues (2012) suggested 
that persistence, which is commonly used as an index of self-control, may indicate an 
inability to disengage from tasks when necessary and thus a sign of poor (rather than 
good) self-control. Together, this research raises the question whether certain lab-tasks, 
in fact, require self-control and whether they require self-control to the same extent as 
real-life self-control behaviors.  
Yet, laboratory task measures of self-control do yield interesting information 
about self-control, and there are many benefits associated with these task measures. For 
instance, performance on these tasks are more objectively measured than self-reported 
performance questionnaires, which can, as mentioned above, be vulnerable to social 
desirability (Duckworth & Kern, 2011). Furthermore, these laboratory task measures are 
also generally more convenient (e.g., simpler, faster) and typically cost less money than 
measuring self-control in naturally occurring environments and may therefore be 
suitable for researchers who have limited time and a limited research budget. Moreover, 
from a more general point of view, laboratory tasks such as these also allow researchers 
to control the environment in ways that would be impossible in naturally occurring 
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environments, ultimately allowing them to isolate the effects of interest and to test their 
predictions more precisely (Falk & Heckman, 2009). 
Measuring self-control outcomes in real-life. Researchers have also used real-
life behavioral outcomes as dependent measures of self-control, assessed through the 
experience sampling method (or similar approaches), self-reports, or other methods. 
These behavioral outcomes include behaviors such as dental care, smoking cessation, 
persistence in boring activities, unhealthy eating, physical exercise, alcohol and caffeine 
consumption, and study habits. It is generally assumed that these behaviors require self-
control and that a person who is able to resist undesirable behaviors (e.g., drinking 
alcohol) and who is able to engage in desirable behaviors (e.g., exercising) has good 
self-control. For example, Muraven (2010) argued that smoking cessation requires self-
control and therefore used a measure of abstinence from smoking as dependent measure 
of self-control (assessed through daily telephone calls and biochemically methods), and 
Oaten and Cheng (2006) used various measures such as junk food intake, smoking, 
caffeine and alcohol consumption, and healthy eating habits as dependent measures of 
self-control (assessed through self-reports at different points in time).  
Using real-life behaviors to measure self-control is beneficial given that this 
technique provides considerable ecological validity and reduced recall bias, particularly 
when the data is collected “in the moment” (see Scollon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003), 
allowing researchers to get access to aspects of people’s lives that would be difficult to 
assess in the laboratory. Nonetheless, even though it might seem obvious that behaviors 
such as studying and resisting delicious food require some degree of self-control, few 
studies have, to my knowledge, tested whether these behaviors, in fact, require self-
control. However, some important insights into this comes from Hofmann, Vohs, and 
Baumeister (2012) who demonstrated in an ESM study that people reported using self-
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control when they experienced short-term desires for sleep, sex, leisure, spending, and 
eating, suggesting that resisting these real-life behaviors require self-control.  
Hennecke et al. (2018) similarly asked participants in an ambulatory assessment 
study to rate the extent to which various activities that involve a self-regulatory 
challenge (e.g., working, attending lectures, studying) were unpleasant, physically and 
mentally effortful, emotionally challenging, and boring. They found that the greatest 
physical effort and boredom was experienced during housework, the greatest 
unpleasantness was reported for other activities such as standing in line, and the greatest 
mental effort was reported when studying. Although they did not measure self-control 
demand specifically, these findings might suggest that these real-life behaviors require 
self-control.  
In sum, dispositional self-control is often measured through questionnaires such 
as the Self-Control Scale. Even though this measure is thought to be an easily 
administered and valid measure of self-control, it may also be subject to biases such as 
social desirability. Moreover, many different behavioral lab-tasks have been used as 
dependent measures of self-control, with some tasks (e.g., delay tasks) being better 
measures of self-control than others (e.g., executive function tasks). These tasks are 
thought to objectively measure self-control performance, although there is an ongoing 
debate about whether these tasks, in fact, require self-control. Lastly, real-life 
behavioral outcomes have also been used as dependent measures of self-control (e.g., 
smoking cessation). These behavioral measures can provide ecological validity, 
although they can be relatively difficult to administer and only a few studies have tested 
whether these behaviors, in fact, require self-control.  
The current framework: self-control measurement techniques. Bearing in 
mind the strengths and weaknesses of the measurement techniques discussed above, this 
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section describes the particular measurements that are used in this thesis to measure trait 
self-control, performance on behavioral measures of self-control, and to manipulate 
expected self-control demand, both in the lab and in real-life. 
Measuring dispositional self-control. To measure trait self-control, a self-
reported questionnaire measure is employed. This method is preferred in this thesis over 
other methods that have been used to measure dispositional self-control (e.g., delay 
gratification task measures) because self-reported questionnaire measures of self-control 
have yielded stronger evidence of convergent validity than task measures of self-control 
(Duckworth & Kern, 2011).  
Specifically, the 13-item Brief Self-Control Scale is used to measure trait self-
control, which is a shorter version of the Self-Control Scale described above. The Brief 
Self-Control Scale is highly correlated with the full scale (r = .93), and is employed to 
measure trait self-control in this thesis because it has shown good reliability and 
validity, has been used in different populations and with various behavioral outcomes, 
and because it has been used more frequently in research studies than the full version 
(de Ridder et al., 2012; Tangney et al., 2004). The short version is particularly appealing 
in this thesis given that participants are asked to perform many other tasks in the studies 
presented herein, ultimately reducing their workload.   
Participants who complete this questionnaire rate their agreement with 
statements that tap self-control behaviors (e.g., “I am good at resisting temptation”) on a 
5-point scale where 1 = not at all like me and 5 = very much like me. All items are then 
used to calculate a mean trait self-control score (9 items are reverse scored), with higher 
scores indicating higher levels of trait self-control and thus greater dispositional ability 
to self-control. 
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Measuring self-control outcomes in laboratory settings. The work presented 
within this thesis also seeks to manipulate expected self-control demand and to measure 
performance on behavioral measures of self-control. To this end, three common self-
control tasks are used. First, because retyping text while breaking the habit of using 
certain keys requires self-control (Muraven, Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006), a retyping task 
is used to manipulate expected self-control demand (Study 1; Chapter 3). Second, 
because attempting to solve unsolvable anagrams is thought to require self-control 
(Muraven et al., 1998), an unsolvable anagram task is employed to measure self-control 
performance (Study 2; Chapter 3). Third, following prior research (Li, 2008; Tuk, 
Trampe, & Warlop, 2011), a delay discounting task is also used to measure self-control 
performance, in which participants choose between small-immediate and large-delayed 
rewards, knowing that they may receive one of their choices in the form of a payment 
(Study 3; Chapter 3).  
However, the retyping and anagram tasks are not only included in this thesis 
because they are commonly used in the self-control literature, but also because they may 
require more self-control than other common laboratory self-control tasks. That is, with 
the caveats in mind that certain laboratory self-control tasks may require little or no self-
control (Shenhav, 2017), in this thesis I also present findings from a supplemental study 
that was conducted to take precaution against the possibility of including tasks that do 
not require self-control and thus to ensure that the self-control tasks included herein are 
relatively high in self-control demand.  
Specifically, Chapter 3 briefly describes a supplemental study (N = 26) that was 
conducted to identify laboratory tasks that are high and low in self-control demand to be 
included in this thesis (Study 1 and 2; Chapter 3). In this supplemental study, 
undergraduates were presented with four potentially high self-control tasks that have 
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been used as dependent measures of self-control performance in the self-control 
literature, as well as four potentially low self-control tasks, and rated these tasks for 
their self-control demand. Among the potentially high self-control tasks, the retyping 
task and the anagram task received the highest self-control demand scores. Among the 
potentially low self-control tasks, another (easy) retyping task and a music task received 
the lowest self-control demand scores. Thus, these tasks are employed in this thesis to 
manipulate expected self-control demand or to measure self-control performance. 
In addition, the delay discounting task (Study 3; Chapter 3) is preferred over 
other task measures of self-control because it involves making real choices that are 
somewhat similar to how self-control choices are made in real-life (i.e., resisting short-
term desires in favor of long-term more beneficial choices). It is also preferred over 
other tasks because delay discounting tasks are more strongly associated with self-report 
and informant-report self-control questionnaires than other task measures of self-control 
(e.g., executive function tasks such as the Stroop task: Duckworth & Kern, 2011), 
suggesting that it is a relatively valid measure of self-control. Thus, because the validity 
of this task measure has been tested and confirmed in prior work, it was not included in 
the supplemental study described above. 
Measuring self-control outcomes in real-life. I also aim to test my hypotheses 
in real-life self-control situations. That is, even though I do not use real-life self-control 
behaviors as dependent measures of self-control in this thesis, I use these types of 
behaviors to simulate real-life scenarios that require people to perform self-control 
behaviors, and I ask participants to imagine themselves in these scenarios before 
responding to various questionnaires. Based on insights from self-control research that 
has suggested that imagined scenarios generally produce responses that are similar to 
peoples’ real-life reactions (e.g., McIntyre, Barlow, & Hayward, 2015), I argue that 
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using imagined self-control behaviors is a good starting point for testing my hypotheses 
in the context of everyday self-control.  
However, given that only a few studies have tested whether real-life self-control 
behaviors, in fact, require self-control, in this thesis I also present findings from three 
supplemental studies (in addition to the one described above) to ensure that the real-life 
self-control behaviors included herein are high in self-control demand. To achieve this, I 
first conducted a study that asked undergraduates (N = 60) to write about two personal 
events that required them to use a lot of self-control. This resulted in 120 potentially 
high self-control scenarios. I then conducted a second supplemental study that asked 
Mturk workers (N = 49) to imagine themselves in these scenarios and rate them for their 
self-control demand. This allowed me to select five scenarios that received high self-
control demand scores to be included in this thesis (Study 1; Chapter 2). Next, I 
conducted a third supplemental study aimed at identifying real-life behaviors that were 
high in self-control demand and that varied in initiatory and inhibitory self-control (a 
distinction that is introduced in the next section). In this supplemental study, Mturk 
workers (N = 384) rated 111 self-control behaviors that potentially varied in initiation 
and inhibition for their self-control demand. Among these behaviors, I selected 18 
behaviors that received high self-control demand scores and that could be classified as 
requiring initiation or inhibition (as determined by two trained coders) to be included in 
this thesis (Study 2; Chapter 2).  
In sum, based on prior work that has questioned whether laboratory task 
measures of self-control require self-control (Shenhav, 2017) and given that few studies 
have tested whether real-life behaviors that are often used to measure self-control, in 
fact, require self-control, this procedure allows me to account for these potential 
drawbacks and thus to ensure that the tasks and behaviors included herein are high in 
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self-control demand. Moreover, given that prior work has challenged whether lab-based 
self-control translate into real-life self-control (e.g., Miles et al., 2016), this procedure 
also allows me to assess the generalizability of my findings by testing my hypotheses in 
both laboratory and real-life self-control situations.  
Distinguishing between initiatory and inhibitory self-control. Thus far, I 
have introduced the concept of self-control and I have described common measurement 
techniques used in the self-control literature, and the ones included in this thesis. 
However, I have not yet considered that there might be different forms of self-control. 
Hence, in this section I introduce the idea that self-control may operate both as an 
inhibitory and an initiatory mechanism, and that it might be important to distinguish 
between these forms of self-control in order to capture the full spectrum of the self-
control construct.   
Most self-control researchers agree that good self-control leads to positive 
outcomes by inhibiting undesired behaviors (Tangney et al., 2004). This is evident in 
current definitions of self-control which often emphasize that self-control is an 
inhibitory mechanism. For example, Milyavskaya and Inzlicht (2017) defined self-
control as the ability to “restrain one’s impulses in the service of greater goals and 
priorities” (p.1), and Tangney and colleagues (2004) defined self-control as the capacity 
to “override or change one’s inner responses, as well as to interrupt undesired 
behavioral tendencies (such as impulses) and refrain from acting on them” (p. 274).  
This emphasis on self-control as an inhibitory mechanism is also apparent in the 
various measures that have been used to measure trait self-control and behavioral self-
control outcomes in the lab and in real-life. Specifically, it appears that the majority of 
these laboratory tasks and real-life behaviors tap inhibition (e.g., Stroop task, Stop-
signal task, delay gratification tasks, resist tempting food, abstinence from smoking and 
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alcohol). This trend is similarly reflected in questionnaire measures of trait self-control. 
For example, most of the items in the Self-Control Scale and its short version (Tangney 
et al., 2004) emphasize a person’s dispositional ability to inhibit impulses (e.g., “I am 
good at resisting temptation” and “I have a hard time breaking bad habits”; see de 
Ridder et al., 2011, for details). This suggests that self-control is typically 
conceptualized as an inhibitory process.  
Nonetheless, more recently, researchers have argued that self-control is not only 
an inhibitory mechanism. For example, Fujita (2011) suggested that there is more to 
self-control than just the inhibition of impulses and he therefore defines self-control 
more broadly as the “general process by which people advance abstract, distal over 
concrete, proximal motives in judgment, decisions, and behavior” (p. 362). Likewise, de 
Ridder and colleagues (2011) advised that, because self-control can also lead to positive 
outcomes by promoting desired behaviors, an initiatory component of self-control 
should be included in current definitions of self-control.  
In light of this, a few researchers have suggested that some laboratory tasks and 
real-life behaviors that have been used to measure self-control tap initiation. For 
example, Imhoff and colleagues (2014) argued that performance on an anagram task 
requires initiation and may therefore serve as a dependent measure of initiatory self-
control. Furthermore, behavioral outcomes such as exercising, studying, and healthy 
eating have been used as dependent measures of initiatory self-control, given that these 
behaviors may be unpleasant to perform in the short-term but have long-term desirable 
outcomes (Davisson, 2013; de Boer et al., 2011; de Ridder et al., 2011).  
A few researchers have similarly argued that current questionnaire measures of 
trait self-control include a few items (e.g., “I am able to work effectively toward long-
term goals”) that tap initiation (Davisson, 2013; De Ridder et al., 2011). As such, De 
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Ridder et al. (2011) examined a two factor structure of the Brief Trait Self-Control 
Scale and found evidence for two factors: one for trait inhibitory self-control and one 
for trait initiatory self-control, with people scoring high on the former being better at 
inhibiting self-control behaviors (e.g., resist smoking) than others, and people scoring 
high on the latter being better at initiating self-control behaviors (e.g., studying) than 
others. They further found that trait inhibition and trait initiation were related but yet 
somewhat distinct constructs (r = .68). 
These things considered, a distinction between inhibitory and initiatory self-
control has recently been proposed in the self-control literature (Davisson, 2013; de 
Ridder et al., 2011; de Boer et al., 2011; Haynes, Kemps, & Moffitt, 2016), both as 
traits and as behavioral outcomes. Inhibitory self-control is thought to primarily 
function to inhibit attractive but undesired behaviors (e.g., eating a cake) and initiatory 
self-control is thought to primarily function to promote unattractive but desired ones 
(e.g., going to the gym), although it is important to also point out that this distinction is 
not always clear-cut and that these self-control types may depend on each other such 
that a person may need to first inhibit a behavior (e.g., stop playing video games) in 
order to initiate another (e.g., go for a run; see also Davisson, 2013). However, even 
though these studies have contributed to our understanding of how self-control operates 
by emphasizing that self-control is both an inhibitory and initiatory mechanism, studies 
that distinguish between these self-control types are relatively scarce, and the specific 
strategies that people might use to succeed at initiating or inhibiting self-control 
behaviors is largely an open question. Thus, the work presented within this thesis 
provides an initial exploration of these questions. 
Hence, as mentioned previously, in this thesis self-control is defined as the 
ability to “override impulses to act as well as the ability to make oneself initiate or 
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persist in boring, difficult, or disliked activity” (Carver, 2010, p.766), given that this 
definition includes both inhibition and initiation components. Furthermore, even though 
I do not distinguish between initiatory and inhibitory self-control on the trait level 
(given the well-established validity of the Brief Trait Self-Control Scale used herein), I 
distinguish between behavioral outcomes that require initiatory vs. inhibitory self-
control in order to understand how people might succeed in these situations.  
Emotions: an overview 
Emotions can be defined as “experiential, physiological, and behavioral 
responses to personally meaningful stimuli” (Mauss & Robinson, 2009, p. 209), and can 
be classified according to various perspectives. For example, dimensional perspectives 
organize emotions according to their valence, contrasting positive emotions with 
negative emotions (e.g., happy vs. sad), or according to their arousal, contrasting high 
arousal emotions with low arousal emotions (e.g., surprised vs. quiet), whereas discrete 
perspectives typically contrast distinct emotions with other distinct emotions (e.g., anger 
vs. sadness; Mauss & Robinson, 2009). Furthermore, although emotions and moods are 
often used interchangeably, some researchers distinguish between these terms, with 
emotions being more intense, briefer and caused by specific events relative to moods 
(Beedie, Terry, & Lane, 2005). Researchers sometimes also distinguish between self-
conscious and basic emotions (e.g., guilt vs. fear), with the former requiring more self-
reflection and self-evaluation than the latter (Tangney, 2003). This thesis primarily 
focuses on the broad distinction between positive and negative emotional states, for 
reasons that will be explained in a later section.  
Measurement techniques in emotion research. To test the overarching aims of 
this thesis, I needed to both induce and measure experiences of emotional states. Hence, 
in this section I first describe various techniques, along with their strengths and 
weaknesses, that are commonly used to induce and measure emotional experiences in 
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research studies. I then provide a description of the measurement techniques used within 
this thesis.  
Emotion inductions. To assess how emotions influence various outcomes in 
experimental settings, researchers typically induce emotions in participants. Common 
examples of emotion inductions include film/pictures elicitations, priming, imagination, 
autobiographical recall, Velten elicitations, music elicitations, and reading text 
(Gerrards-Hesse & Spies, 1994; Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011; Westermann et al., 
1996). Moreover, the procedure for these different emotion induction tasks are 
relatively similar, such that participants are typically instructed to engage with the 
emotional stimuli for an allotted time (e.g., watching a film intended to increase anger 
for 5 minutes), and the emotions participants experience after engaging with the stimuli 
are typically compared to the emotions they experienced before engaging with the 
stimuli to test whether the emotion induction successfully induced emotions.  
Although the vast majority of these emotion inductions have proven to be 
effective in eliciting the emotions of interest to the researchers (Gerrards-Hesse & 
Spies, 1994; Lench et al., 2011; Westermann et al., 1996), these tasks are associated 
with various advantages and disadvantages. For example, in music inductions, which 
are generally effective in inducing emotions (particularly positive vs. negative 
emotions), participants listen to an assigned music clip for an allotted time. The 
advantages of this task are that the music clips are standardized across participants (i.e., 
participants in the same condition listen to the same music) and that researchers can 
choose from existing music clips that have been developed to effectively induce 
emotional states in research studies. Some disadvantages are that it may be difficult to 
ensure that participants effectively engage with the music (they may, for example, wear 
the earphones without listening) and that most music clips that researchers can choose 
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from tend to be classical music which may not be representative of people’s choice of 
music in real-life (particularly among students: Lench et al., 2011).  
Measuring emotional experiences. Emotional experiences in response to an 
emotion induction (or emotional experiences in general) can be measured in many ways 
and it has been suggested that there is no “gold standard” measure of emotions. 
Measurement techniques of emotional experiences include autonomic nervous system 
measures (e.g., sweat glands and blood circulatory system responses), self-report 
measures of emotional experiences, behavioral measures (e.g., facial behaviors judged 
by observers), and others (Mauss & Robinsson, 2009).  
One of the most common measures of positive and negative emotions in 
response to an emotion induction is self-reported questionnaires. This measure is 
thought to be a relatively valid measure of current emotional experiences, though one 
possible drawback with this measure is that some people are unwilling to report on their 
emotional states, particularly when these emotional states are negative in valence 
(Mauss & Robinsson, 2009). One of the most widely used scales to measure emotions is 
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, which has yielded good psychometric 
properties (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Nonetheless, this measure is 
actually thought to measure positive and negative activation (i.e., high arousal) given 
that the emotion terms in this scale refers to activated positive and negative emotions 
(e.g., alert, attentive; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999), rather than common 
positive and negative emotion terms (e.g., joyful, angry), that are not always positive or 
negative in valence, respectively (e.g., a person can feel alert and attentive in a 
threatening situation; Harmon-Jones, Bastian, & Harmon-Jones, 2016).  
Another common technique aimed at measuring emotions is autonomic nervous 
system measures, in which researchers typically measure bodily responses such as skin 
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conductance level, heart rate, or blood pressure (Mauss & Robinsson, 2009). These 
measurement techniques are beneficial because they indirectly measure emotions even 
when participants are unwilling to report on their emotional states (Lobbestael, Arntz, & 
Wiers, 2008). In contrast, possible disadvantages of these measurement techniques are 
that researchers who use them cannot be sure whether the bodily responses they observe 
reflect emotional responses per se or whether they reflect other bodily responses that the 
autonomic nervous system regulates (e.g., digestion, effort: Mauss & Robinsson, 2009). 
In sum, there are many different techniques that can be used to induce and 
measure emotions, and each of these techniques are associated with various advantages 
and disadvantages. Given that most emotion inductions and emotion measurements are 
effective in inducing and measuring emotions, the best way to choose methods might 
therefore be for practical reasons. For example, it might be practical to use inductions 
such as autobiographical recall in online studies, given that this induction offers insights 
into how well participants engage with the emotional stimuli (as observed in the 
writings). In contrast, it might be suitable to use music inductions in lab-studies because 
the experimenter has control over starting and stopping the music and can thus ensure 
that the participants are listening to the music. Furthermore, because people may be 
unwilling to report on their negative emotions, it may be practical to use an indirect 
measure when the key interest is to measure negative emotions (e.g., neuroimaging 
methods), whereas it might be practical to use self-reports or behavioral measures when 
the main focus is to measure positive emotions. Of course, methods that involve 
neuroimaging or bodily responses are expensive and may therefore not be an option, in 
which self-reported questionnaires might be best.  
The current framework: Emotion measurement techniques. Considering the 
advantages and disadvantages of the measurement techniques reviewed above, in this 
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section I describe the particular measures that will enable me to induce states of positive 
and negative emotions in participants and to measure their subsequent emotional 
experiences in the studies presented within this thesis.  
Emotion inductions. In this thesis, autobiographical recall is used as the 
emotion induction. This emotion induction is preferred over other emotion inductions 
because it is a common and effective way to induce emotions (Lench et al., 2011), 
because this procedure has been used to induce emotions in numerous studies that are 
similar in scope to the studies presented herein (as described in the next section), and 
because this particular emotion induction may be more suitable for online studies than 
other emotion inductions. That is, in emotion inductions that involve watching a video 
or listening to music it may be difficult to know if participants effectively engage with 
the emotional stimuli (i.e., if they are actually watching the video or listening to the 
music), whereas autobiographical recall offers some insights into participants’ 
engagement with the task as indicated by their written responses and time spent writing. 
I therefore argue that this particular emotion induction is suitable for the program of 
research presented in this thesis.     
Measuring emotional experiences. The studies within this thesis employs self-
report measures of emotional experiences to assess changes in emotions after vs. before 
the autobiographical recall, which is a relatively valid measure of current emotions as 
discussed above (Mauss & Robinsson, 2009). In particular, the modified Differential 
Emotions Scale (mDES; Fredrickson et al., 2003) is used to measure positive and 
negative emotions, mainly because this scale includes a wider set of common emotion 
terms, particularly positive emotions, than other scales like the PANAS. I argue that it is 
particularly important to use a scale that encompass common emotion terms in the 
studies within this thesis given that participants are asked about their beliefs and 
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preferences for various emotions and it is therefore crucial that they can relate to the 
emotions they are asked about.  
The mDES is also preferred over other scales because it allows for analyzing 
both discrete emotions (e.g., amusement, anger) and aggregated subscales of positive 
and negative emotions and has proven to yield high reliability and validity (Fredrickson, 
2013; Galanakis et al., 2016). That is, even though the main focus in this thesis is to 
compare aggregated subscales of positive vs. negative emotions, I initially also wanted 
the option to explore distinct emotions. This particular scale allows me to do that. The 
mDES asks participants to rate how strongly they experience 10 positive and 10 
negative emotions (though a trio of emotion adjectives is used to capture each emotion) 
on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely), although a 7-point Likert scale 
is typically employed in this thesis given that 7-point scales are often more desirable 
than 5-point scales, particularly when people are able to differentiate between feeling 
slightly, moderately, and extremely (Krosnick & Presser, 2010).  
Combining emotion and self-control research 
Researchers have been interested in examining how emotions influence many 
aspects of the human condition including cognition, physiology, and behavior. The 
work presented in this thesis generally concentrates on how emotions influence 
behavior. According to prior research, emotions can lead to a strong desire to act in 
certain ways, and researchers often link certain emotions to specific action tendencies 
(Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). For example, negative emotions such as anger leads to 
the urge to approach and attack whereas fear leads to withdrawal and escape, and 
positive emotions such as interest leads to the urge to explore and learn new skills 
whereas joy leads to the desire to play and socialize (Fredrickson, 2001). Thus, these 
lines of research suggest that emotions function both to initiate and inhibit various 
behaviors (see also Zhu & Thagard, 2002). 
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Given that emotions function to engender behavior, researchers have similarly 
been interested in examining how emotions influence self-control, and it is generally 
assumed that positive emotions facilitate self-control behaviors relative to negative 
emotions (see Aspinwall, 1998, for a review), both when these emotions are induced in 
the laboratory (Garg, Wansink, & Inman. 2007; Raghunathan & Trope, 2002; Winterich 
& Haws, 2011), and when they are naturally experienced in real-life (Niermann et al., 
2016; Vinci et al., 2017). The beneficial effects of positive emotions on self-control 
have also been observed on a wide range of self-control behaviors (e.g., food and 
caffeine consumption, exercising, smoking), providing robust evidence that positive 
emotions are more adaptive for self-control than negative emotions (though this effect 
may vary by context: Aspinwall, 1998). Research has similarly shown that positive 
emotions can counteract ego depletion. Indeed, Tice and colleagues (2007) found that 
depleted participants (i.e., those who performed an initial self-control task) who 
experienced positive emotions due to an induction performed as good on subsequent 
self-control tasks as non-depleted participants and better than those who experienced 
negative or neutral emotions.  
In addition, even though most of these studies have focused on investigating 
how current emotional states, and particularly how changing these emotional states, 
influence self-control behaviors, a few studies have also investigated how anticipated 
emotions (i.e., the emotions a person expects to feel in the future) influence self-control 
behaviors (Patrick et al., 2009; Winterich & Haws, 2011). For example, research has 
demonstrated that participants instructed to think about how much pride they would feel 
as a result of not eating a cheesecake ate significantly less cake than controls and 
participants instructed to think about how much shame they would feel as a result of 
eating the cake (Patrick et al., 2009). These findings suggest that thinking about the 
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future positive emotions that you may experience if you succeed at inhibiting your 
impulses help you to resist these impulses and to achieve self-control success. However, 
even though it seems important to consider the role of anticipated emotions in self-
control success, studies investigating this link are currently scarce. Thus, in this thesis I 
focus on whether current states of positive and negative emotions, and particularly 
whether changing these emotional states through emotion regulation (described in a 
later section), can facilitate self-control. It is, however, also important to point out that 
the distinction between anticipated and current emotions may not always be clear-cut as 
a person may, for example, think about how happy they will feel in the future if they 
succeed at self-control, also making them feel happy now. 
Furthermore, specific positive or negative emotions may be particularly helpful 
or harmful for self-control. For example, Patrick et al. (2009) found that participants 
who experienced pride consumed less cake and had fewer tempting thoughts than 
controls and participants who experienced shame, and Winterich and Haws (2011) 
found that participants who experienced hope consumed less unhealthy food than 
participants who experienced happiness, suggesting that pride and hope might be 
particularly helpful for self-control (see also DeSteno, 2018; Katzir, Eyal, Meiran, & 
Kessler, 2010; Williams & DeSteno 2008, for effects of pride on self-control). 
Similarly, all negative emotions may not be equally harmful to self-control; for 
example, Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, and Fitzsimons (2007) found that participants 
primed with guilt spent less money on an indulgent choice than participants primed with 
sadness, indicating that guilt may have some positive influences on self-control.  
Even though these findings suggest that some emotions such as pride and hope 
might facilitate self-control more than other positive emotions, and that guilt facilitate 
self-control relative to other negative emotions under certain circumstances, there are no 
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studies, to my knowledge, that have found that positive emotions are significantly less 
beneficial to self-control than negative emotions, suggesting that positive emotions 
generally improve self-control relative to negative emotions. Thus, as mentioned 
previously, this thesis first and foremost aims to contrast the effect of states of positive 
emotions with states of negative emotions on self-control, though I also test how certain 
distinct emotions that have been experimentally linked to self-control in prior studies 
(e.g., pride, hope) influence self-control.  
Mechanisms underlying the effects of positive emotions on self-control. Why 
would positive emotions enhance self-control relative to negative emotions? One 
possible explanation for this comes from the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson 
2001). This theory holds that positive, compared to negative, emotions broaden people’s 
repertoires of attention, thoughts, and actions, and, in doing so, help them to build new 
resources (e.g., physical, intellectual, social), that help them to overcome challenges. 
Applying this to the context of self-control, a person who experiences positive emotions 
and who is faced with a self-control dilemma such as choosing between buying 
chocolate vs. sticking to their diet and thus resist the chocolate, might consider a variety 
of strategies that might help them to meet this challenge (i.e., the “broaden” aspect of 
the theory) and then use these strategies (i.e., the “build” aspect of the theory) to 
overcome this challenge. For example, they might decide to avoid the candy aisle in the 
shop or distract themselves by calling a friend, ultimately helping them to resist buying 
chocolate and thus to succeed at self-control.   
Delving further into why positive emotions enhance self-control, the mood-
maintenance theory suggests that people who experience positive emotions are 
motivated to protect these emotions and therefore refrain from actions that may reduce 
them (Andrade, 2005; Clark & Isen, 1982). That is, a person who experiences positive 
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emotions and who is choosing between buying chocolate vs. sticking to their diet and 
thus resisting buying chocolate may want to maintain these positive emotions and 
therefore decide not to buy the chocolate because, even though eating the chocolate 
might make them feel good in the present moment, it may also make them experience 
negative emotions (e.g., regret, guilt) as a result of failing to stick to their diet. Thus, to 
protect their positive emotional state, they may choose not to buy the chocolate, 
indicating self-control success. In contrast, if this person experienced negative 
emotions, they may be motivated to engage in behaviors that will make them feel good 
as fast as possible and thus choose to eat the chocolate, indicating self-control failure. 
Other theories that also favor the idea that positive emotions benefit self-control 
but that are less central to this thesis are the dynamic model of affect (DMA; Zautra et 
al., 2001), which holds that positive emotions are a resource that aid in managing 
stressful situations, and others have similarly argued that episodes of positive emotions 
add up to a storage of positive emotions that serve as a buffer in stressful times 
(Hobfoll, 1989), suggesting that people who experience positive emotions are 
particularly resistant to stressful situations. Thus, assuming that self-control situations 
might be stressful, it is possible that positive emotions serve as a buffer in these 
situations and thus help people to choose the virtuous choice, indicating self-control 
success.  
Thus, given the consistent evidence that positive emotions improve self-control 
relative to negative emotions and that this can be explained by a number of 
psychological mechanisms, it seems plausible that people should be able to “make use 
of” these emotions to succeed at self-control, either by strategically making themselves 
experience these emotions in self-control situations, and/or by incidentally experiencing 
these emotions in self-control situations. Some tentative evidence that people may be 
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able to harness these emotions to succeed at self-control comes from research showing 
that people higher in trait self-control, who tend to succeed at self-control and achieve 
their goals, tend to experience high levels of positive emotions and low levels of 
negative emotions in their daily lives, as compared to people lower in trait self-control 
(Hofmann et al., 2014). These data might suggest that, consistent with research showing 
that positive emotions facilitate self-control whereas negative emotions have the 
opposite effect, these emotional experiences might help people higher in trait self-
control to achieve self-control success, although it is unclear whether people with high 
trait self-control make themselves experience these emotions to achieve self-control 
success, or whether they experience these emotions spontaneously, which might then 
facilitate their self-control success.  
Hence, this thesis proposes to investigate whether people higher, relative to 
lower, in trait self-control make themselves experience higher levels of positive 
emotions and lower levels of positive emotions in self-control situations, and whether 
higher levels of positive emotions and lower levels of negative emotions help people 
higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control to achieve self-control success.  
Instrumental Emotion regulation: an overview 
One way to change or “make use of” these emotions might be through emotion 
regulation. Emotion regulation refers to the process by which individuals alter which 
emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express them 
(Gross 1998, 2015). While most emotion regulation efforts aim to decrease negative 
emotions and to increase positive ones (English, Lee, John & Gross, 2017; Gross, 
Richards, & John, 2006; Larsen, 2000), the theory of instrumental emotion regulation 
holds that emotion regulation efforts aim to strategically change current emotional states 
in ways that facilitate performance and goal pursuit, independent of the valence of these 
emotions (Tamir, 2009a). Specifically, this view holds that people regulate emotions to 
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increase the emotions they believe will enhance their performance. For example, people 
who believe that experiencing positive emotions will help them to get off the couch and 
go to the gym might engage in regulatory attempts to increase their positive emotions in 
this situation, perhaps by watching a comedy or looking at photos that evoke positive 
memories.  
Even though most research on instrumental emotion regulation has focused on 
emotion utility beliefs, this view further holds that, when faced with a challenging 
situation, people regulate emotions to increase the emotions that they typically 
experience as part of their personality. For example, people who tend to experience 
negative emotions and who await a difficult exam might engage in regulatory attempts 
to increase their negative emotions, perhaps by thinking about a negative experience or 
listening to sad music. Researchers that have tested this theory have repeatedly found 
evidence that the emotions people believe to be useful, along with the emotions they 
typically experience, predict their regulatory attempts to increase these emotions in a 
particular performance context, and that these regulatory attempts lead to increased 
experiences of these emotions that then are useful to their performance in this context 
(Tamir, 2005; Tamir, 2009b; Tamir & Ford, 2012; Tamir et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, the instrumental theory of emotion regulation is consistent with 
early expectancy-value theories of self-regulation (e.g., Atkinson, 1957; Feather, 1982; 
see also Tamir & Ford, 2012; Tamir et al., 2015, for more details about these theories), 
which generally holds that people are motivated to behave in ways they expect will be 
useful to their goal pursuit. For example, people may be motivated to train consistently 
for a triathlon if they expect that this training will be useful to their performance on the 
race day, suggesting that people perform behaviors depending on the expected utility of 
these behaviors, and that these behaviors may facilitate their goal pursuit. Thus, as 
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described above, the instrumental theory of emotion regulation similarly suggests that 
people regulate emotions depending on the expected utility of these emotions, and that 
emotion regulation can lead to improvements in performance and facilitate goal pursuit 
(see Figure 1.1, for an overview of this theory).  
 
Figure 1.1. Key variables of the instrumental model of emotion regulation. A = beliefs 
about expected utility of emotions; B = regulatory attempts; C = performance. This 
model holds that the more people believe that an emotion will be useful to them in a 
particular performance context, the more likely they are to engage in regulatory 
attempts to increase that emotion in this context, and that these regulatory attempts lead 
to improvements in performance in this context.  
In this thesis, I take an instrumental approach to emotion regulation to 
understand whether the expected utility of emotions in the context of self-control may 
lead to attempts to regulate emotions in this context, and whether emotion regulation 
may lead to improvements in self-control performance specifically, and whether these 
effects are moderated by trait self-control. 
Measurement techniques in instrumental emotion regulation research. 
Following the instrumental theory of emotion regulation, this thesis aims to test which 
emotions people consider useful and attempt to regulate in the context of self-control, 
and whether this is moderated by trait self-control. To achieve this, I adopt various 
measurement techniques from research on instrumental emotion regulation. As such, in 
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this section I first describe common measurement techniques used in this research area, 
and I then describe the measures used in the studies presented within this thesis.  
Measuring beliefs about the expected utility of emotions. Researchers who take 
an instrumental approach to emotion regulation often assess the extent to which 
participants believe that various emotions will be useful to them in different 
performance contexts, given that these ratings predict participants' subsequent attempts 
to regulate these emotions, and because the emotions participants consider useful in a 
particular situation actually are useful to them in this situation. Put differently, because 
beliefs about the utility of emotions predict actual emotion regulation and subsequent 
performance, researchers often measure beliefs about the utility of emotions as an index 
of emotion regulation. For example, Tamir and Ford (2012) measured ‘expected 
usefulness of emotions’ by asking participants to rate how successful they expected to 
be in a negotiation task when experiencing different emotions (e.g., angry, happy), and 
Netzer and colleagues (2015) measured ‘perceived utility of emotions’ by asking 
participants to rate the extent to which they expected various emotional experiences  
(e.g., fearful, cheerful) to improve the game performance of another person. Thus, even 
though researchers use different terms to refer to this measure, they are essentially 
referring to the same construct. In this thesis, I refer to this construct as ‘beliefs about 
the utility of emotions’.  
Measuring regulatory attempts. However, even though researchers often 
measure beliefs about the utility of emotions as an index of emotion regulation, this 
measure does not allow researchers to measure how people actually regulate emotions. 
Therefore, research into instrumental emotion regulation also tend to measure 
regulatory attempts in performance contexts. Specifically, prior research into 
instrumental emotion regulation has typically asked participants to either rate the degree 
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to which they prefer to engage in activities intended to increase various emotions, or to 
pick activities intended to increase these emotions. Examples include asking participants 
to rate the extent to which they prefer to listen to music, recall a personal event, watch 
film clips, and read articles, that vary by emotion. More examples include asking 
participants to pick a personal event to recall or to pick music clips to listen to, that also 
vary by emotion (Tamir, 2005; Tamir, 2009b; Tamir & Ford, 2012; Tamir et al., 2015; 
Tamir, Mitchell, Gross, 2008).  
One key feature here is that participants are told beforehand that they will 
engage in their preferred or chosen emotion-eliciting activity right before completing a 
task, making their preferences and choice an indicator of their attempts to regulate their 
emotions in this situation, given that these activities do induce emotions in participants. 
Another key feature is that participants are typically instructed to engage in their 
preferred or chosen emotion-eliciting activity (although they are sometimes randomly 
assigned to engage in an emotion-eliciting activity), which then leads to increases in the 
preferred or chosen emotion. To illustrate, a person who picks to listen to happy-
inducing music in a certain situation is thought to have made this choice in an attempt to 
increase their happiness and, if they then get to listen to their chosen happy-inducing 
music, this leads to increases in happiness. Crucially, this measure therefore serves as 
an indicator of participant’s attempts to regulate emotions and as an emotion induction.  
To summarize, researchers who take an instrumental approach to emotion 
regulation often measure people’s beliefs about the utility of emotions in performance 
contexts, which may serve as an index of emotion regulation. However, because this 
measure does not measure actual emotion regulation, researchers also measure 
regulatory attempts in performance contexts, as measured by people’s preferences or 
choice to engage in emotion-eliciting activities that vary by emotion (e.g., happy vs. 
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angry music clips). In studies where participants engage with the emotion-eliciting 
activities, this measure serves both as an index of regulatory attempts and as an emotion 
induction.  
The current framework: instrumental emotion regulation measurement 
techniques. This thesis measures both beliefs about the utility of emotions and 
regulatory attempts in the laboratory and everyday self-control situations described 
previously. To measure beliefs about the utility of emotions, participants in this thesis 
are asked to rate the extent to which they believe that different emotions (emotion terms 
adapted from the mDES discussed above) can help them to succeed in laboratory and 
everyday self-control situations, using a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(extremely). 
Furthermore, to measure regulatory attempts (and to induce emotions), 
participants in this thesis are asked to rate the extent to which they prefer to recall 
various personal events on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely), and/or to pick one 
event to recall, that vary in emotion (emotion terms are typically adapted from the 
mDES). As mentioned previously, autobiographical recall was chosen because this task 
is one of the most widely used measure of regulatory attempts in research on 
instrumental emotion regulation, because it is a common and effective way to induce 
emotions (Lench et al., 2011), and because it is suitable for online studies given that it 
allows researchers to ensure that the participants engage with the task. Thus, 
participants in this thesis who, for example, choose to recall a past personal event that 
made them feel angry is thought to have made this choice in an attempt to increase their 
anger and that, if they then get to write about their chosen event, this should lead to 
increases in anger.  
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Combining instrumental emotion regulation and self-control research 
As yet, no research into instrumental emotion regulation has tested predictions 
made by the instrumental theory of emotion regulation in the context of self-control, 
and no prior studies on instrumental emotion regulation have measured trait self-
control. Building on evidence showing that people can regulate emotions to enhance 
their performance and to attain goals (Tamir, 2009a), it seems plausible that people 
should also be able to regulate emotions to enhance their self-control performance, and 
that people with high trait self-control might be especially likely to do so given their 
enhanced ability to effectively regulate emotions and their tendency to succeed at self-
control. In particular, if positive emotions are adaptive and negative emotions are 
maladaptive for self-control, and if people can harness these emotions to achieve self-
control success as discussed above, it seems reasonable to argue that one way to harness 
these emotions might be by regulating these emotions instrumentally to achieve self-
control success. That is, people should be able to regulate emotions to increase their 
positive and to decrease their negative emotions to achieve self-control success, and 
people higher in trait self-control should be especially likely to do this. 
This is, however, not to say that emotion regulation and self-control are two 
entirely distinct processes. Indeed, emotion regulation and self-control are sometimes 
thought to conceptually overlap, and emotion regulation is sometimes considered one 
form of self-control (e.g., Paschke et al., 2016). This claim is also evident in certain 
definitions of self-control that include an emotion component. For example, Kross and 
Guevarra (2015) defined self-control as “the capacity to alter one’s thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors to align them with one’s goals” (p.1). This definition firstly suggests that 
being able to change one’s emotions is an important aspect of being able to self-control, 
and, secondly, that being able to change one’s emotions can facilitate goal pursuit. 
Thus, based on these insights along with the plethora of research showing that people 
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can regulate emotions to attain goals (Tamir, 2009a) and that emotion regulation can 
facilitate self-control outcomes as we shall see next (Juergensen & Demaree, 2015), 
emotion regulation seems to be a form of self-control and a tool that can be used to 
facilitate self-control outcomes. In this thesis, I focus on the aspect of the self-control 
definition that suggests that being able to change one’s emotions can facilitate goal 
pursuit and I take an instrumental approach to emotion regulation by conceptualizing 
emotion regulation as a tool that can be used to improve self-control outcomes.  
Consistent with this, a few studies have indeed linked emotion regulation with 
enhanced self-control. For example, one study found that instructing participants to use 
emotion regulation to downregulate their negative emotional states in the lab helped 
them to resist unhealthy snacks (Juergensen & Demaree, 2015), and another study 
showed that people who regulated their emotions when faced with daily aversive 
situations were more likely to succeed in these situations than those who did not 
regulate their emotions in these situations (Hennecke et al., 2018). These findings 
suggest that people can use emotion regulation to change their current emotional states 
in order to achieve self-control success, both in experimental settings and in real-life. 
More evidence that links emotion regulation with enhanced self-control comes from 
studies linking high trait self-control with effective emotion regulation, showing that 
people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control regulate their emotions more 
effectively in the lab (Paschke et al., 2016) and that they are more likely to use emotion 
regulation strategies when facing aversive activities in real-life (though emotion 
regulation does not mediate the link between trait self-control and self-reported success 
in such activities: Hennecke et al., 2018). Nonetheless, important to the aims of this 
thesis, these data do not reveal whether people higher in trait self-control regulate their 
emotions differently from those lower in trait self-control in the context of self-control 
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performance per se, and whether this regulation and subsequent emotions leads to 
improvements in self-control performance. The overarching aim of this thesis is 
therefore to investigate exactly that.   
Summary and overview of empirical chapters 
To date, there has been relatively little research into how people higher in trait 
self-control succeed at self-control and achieve various goals and positive outcomes. 
This is an important area of research given its potential to inform the design of 
interventions to improve self-control in people who often fail at self-control and thus 
help them to achieve more favorable outcomes. For example, if upregulating positive 
emotions help people with high trait self-control to achieve self-control success, 
developing interventions aimed at teaching people regulatory skills that would increase 
these emotions might help them to also achieve self-control success. The overarching 
aim of this thesis is therefore to contribute to our understanding of the strategies that 
people higher in trait self-control might use to succeed at self-control. Specifically, this 
work bridges research into self-control, emotions, and instrumental emotion regulation 
to examine whether people higher in trait self-control regulate their emotions differently 
from those lower in trait self-control in the context of self-control, and whether this 
regulation and subsequent emotions leads to improvements in self-control.  
To test these central hypotheses, I designed a systematic programme of research 
consisting of five preregistered key studies, along with four supplemental studies, that 
are organized into two multi-study empirical papers. Each of these studies draw on 
insights and various methods from research on instrumental emotion regulation to 
provide converging evidence for these central hypotheses. That is, throughout this work, 
I test key predictions made by the theory of instrumental emotion regulation by means 
of self-reports, behavioral measures, and experimental methods. I also test these 
hypotheses in different types of self-control situations and in one performance situation 
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that does not require self-control. I argue that this approach will allow me to test the 
robustness and generalizability of my findings. An overview of the empirical papers 
included in this thesis are provided below (see also Figure 1.2). 
Building on the substantial evidence that people’s beliefs about the utility of 
emotions predict their regulatory attempts to increase these emotions (Ford & Gross, 
2018), the primary aim of Chapter 2 was to examine which emotions that people higher 
in trait self-control consider useful in everyday situations that vary by the type of self-
control they require, and thus to provide a starting point for understanding how people 
higher in trait self-control might regulate their emotions in these situations, as compared 
to people lower in trait self-control. Specifically, Chapter 2 reports findings from two 
preregistered key studies (Study 1: N = 253; Study 2: N = 306), along with three 
supplemental studies (N = 60; N = 49; N = 384, respectively), that examine the emotions 
that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control consider useful in everyday 
situations that require them to use initiatory and inhibitory self-control, with the first 
study consisting of both exploratory and confirmatory analyses, and the second 
consisting of confirmatory analyses aimed at replicating the findings of the first study. 
The focus of Chapter 2 is therefore on beliefs about the utility of emotions in two types 
of everyday self-control situations that have rarely been studied in the self-control 
literature: those that require initiatory and inhibitory self-control.  
Nonetheless, even though Chapter 2 provides important insights into how people 
higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control might regulate their emotions in everyday 
situations by assessing their beliefs about the utility of emotions in these situations, this 
data does not allow me to draw any conclusions about how they actually regulate 
emotions in self-control situations, and whether this leads to improvements in self-
control. The empirical paper in Chapter 3 accounts for this by examining the emotions 
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that people higher in trait self-control consider useful and prefer to regulate in the 
context of self-control, and whether these beliefs and preferences translate into 
improvements in self-control. Assessing emotion regulation and self-control 
performance is crucial to fully test my overall hypotheses that people higher, relative to 
lower, in trait self-control regulate their emotions differently in the context of self-
control, and that this regulation and subsequent emotions then facilitate their self-
control performance.  
Importantly, the ‘context’ in Chapter 3 pertains to laboratory self-control 
situations rather than everyday self-control situations. I argue that it is critical to test my 
hypotheses both in everyday and laboratory self-control situations, given the notion that 
everyday self-control might operate differently from laboratory self-control both in 
terms of how people make self-control decisions in these situations and in terms of the 
extent to which these situations require self-control (Shenhav, 2017). Additionally, the 
‘context’ in Chapter 3 varies by self-control demand (i.e., whether the situations are 
high or low in self-control demand) rather than the type of self-control they require (i.e., 
whether the situations require initiatory or inhibitory self-control), allowing me to 
assess whether my findings are specific to self-control situations or whether they 
generalize to another performance situation that does not require self-control.  
Thus, Chapter 3 reports findings from three preregistered studies, along with one 
supplemental study (N = 26), that each uses a different method from research on 
instrumental emotion regulation to examine whether people higher, relative to lower, in 
trait self-control regulate their emotions differently in laboratory performance contexts 
that are high and low in self-control demand, and whether this regulation and 
subsequent emotions lead to improvements in self-control performance. Broadly, Study 
1 (N = 415) first employs self-reported questionnaires to examine whether trait self-
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control predicts beliefs about the utility of emotions in performance contexts that are 
high and low in self-control demand, and whether these beliefs translate into 
preferences to regulate these emotions. Study 2 (N = 140) then employs behavioral 
measures to examine whether these beliefs and regulatory preferences translate into 
actual regulatory choice and self-control performance by examining whether trait self-
control predicts choice to regulate emotions in these contexts, and whether their choice 
and subsequent emotions lead to improvements in self-control performance. Finally, to 
test whether the findings of Study 2 replicate in a carefully controlled environment and 
when using a different self-control task, Study 3 (N = 210) utilizes experimental 
methods to investigate whether trait self-control predicts self-control performance when 
participants are randomly assigned to a condition where they receive instructions to 
either upregulate positive or negative emotions, and this time also including a neutral 
control condition. 
In sum, this programme of research tests whether people higher in trait self-
control regulate their emotions differently from people lower in trait self-control in the 
context of self-control, and whether this regulation and subsequent emotions help them 
to succeed at self-control. To achieve this, I use a rigorous methodology including self-
reports, behavioral measures, and experimental methods, and I also test my hypotheses 
in three different types of self-control contexts (i.e., in real-life contexts that require 
initiatory self-control, in real-life contexts that require inhibitory self-control, and in a 
laboratory context that is high in self-control demand) and in one performance context 
that requires little self-control. I also test my hypotheses using different types of tasks to 
measure self-performance, in laboratory environments that vary from moderately to 
carefully controlled, and using two different populations (undergraduate students and 
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MTurk workers). Overall, this research approach allows me to achieve rigor and to test 
the robustness and generalizability of my findings.  
 
Table 1.1. Overview of the empirical chapters and studies included in this thesis 
 
Chapter 
 
Key aims 
Chapter 2: 
Study 1 and 2  
Investigate the emotions that people higher, relative to lower, in TSC 
consider useful in everyday situations that vary by self-control type 
(initiation, inhibition). 
 
Chapter 3: 
 
Examine the emotions that people higher, relative to lower, in TSC 
consider useful and prefer to regulate in laboratory performance 
contexts that vary by self-control demand (high, low), and whether 
these beliefs and preferences translate into enhanced self-control. 
 
     Study 1 Assess the emotions that people higher, relative to lower, in TSC 
consider useful in these situations, and whether these beliefs translate 
into regulatory preferences. 
 
     Study 2 Test how people higher, relative to lower, in TSC choose to regulate 
emotions in these situations, and whether their choice and subsequent 
emotions lead to improvements in self-control performance. 
 
     Study 3 Investigate whether TSC predicts self-control performance when 
participants are randomly assigned to either a positive, negative, or 
neutral emotion regulation condition. 
Note. In addition to the listed key variables, trait self-control was included as a key 
variable in all studies. TSC = trait self-control. 
Finally, in Chapter 4 I present an overview of the key findings from the present 
thesis, I discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings, I address 
potential limitations and discuss interesting ideas for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Paper 1 – Trait self-control and beliefs about the utility of emotions 
for initiatory and inhibitory self-control 
 
 
Reference: 
Tornquist, M., & Miles, E. (manuscript under review). Trait self-control and beliefs 
about the utility of emotions for initiatory and inhibitory self-control.  
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Abstract 
People with good self-control enjoy positive life outcomes. Nonetheless, how 
they achieve these outcomes remains unclear. We propose that people regulate their 
emotions to increase the emotions they consider useful for self-control, and that this 
might depend on the self-control type required and trait self-control. Two preregistered 
studies examined people’s beliefs about the utility of emotions in initiatory or inhibitory 
everyday self-control situations, and whether these beliefs varied by trait self-control. 
Results showed that participants considered positive emotions more useful for self-
control than negative emotions, but that this effect was moderated by situational and 
individual factors. Specifically, participants considered positive emotions more useful 
for initiatory than inhibitory self-control, whereas the opposite was found for negative 
emotions. Also, participants with high trait self-control considered negative emotions 
less useful and positive emotions more useful for both self-control types. This research 
might suggest that people can regulate emotions to achieve everyday self-control 
success. 
Keywords: self-control, trait self-control, emotion, emotion regulation, initiatory 
self-control, inhibitory self-control 
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Introduction 
Self-control refers to the capacity to “override impulses to act as well as the 
ability to make oneself initiate or persist in boring, difficult, or disliked activity” 
(Carver, 2010, p.766). Many studies have shown that the ability to exert self-control 
leads to a happy, healthy, and successful life (de Ridder, Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, 
& Baumeister, 2012). Nonetheless, how people with good self-control achieve these 
positive outcomes remains unclear. Drawing together research demonstrating that 
emotions can facilitate self-control (DeSteno, 2018), that people with good self-control 
are able to regulate emotions more effectively (Paschke et al., 2016), and that people 
regulate emotions to experience the emotions they consider useful (Tamir, 2009a), we 
propose that adaptive regulation of emotions may be one strategy people with good self-
control use to achieve their goals.  
Moreover, we propose that the most adaptive way to regulate emotions might 
differ depending on the type of self-control required. While successful self-control is 
often equated with the ability to inhibit undesired behaviors (Tangney, Baumeister, & 
Boone, 2004), recent theorizing suggests that successful self-control also involves the 
ability to initiate desired behaviors (de Ridder, de Boer, Lugtig, Bakker, & van Hooft, 
2011). In two preregistered studies, we explore these hypotheses by examining the 
emotions people consider useful for inhibitory and initiatory self-control, and how these 
beliefs differ as a function of trait self-control. 
Emotions and self-control 
Research has generally demonstrated that positive emotions facilitate self-
control relative to negative emotions. For example, Winterich and Haws (2011) found 
that participants who read a positive story reported lower preferences for unhealthy 
snacks than those who read a negative story. Similarly, Garg, Wansink, and Inman 
(2007) found that participants consumed more popcorn while watching sad movies than 
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while watching happy movies. Studies which have measured, rather than manipulated, 
positive and negative affect have observed similar effects. For example, Wertheim and 
Schwarz (1983) found that people higher in depression had a greater tendency to choose 
immediate rewards over delayed rewards, and Niermann and colleagues (2016) found 
that higher positive affect predicted more time spent exercising that day, whereas the 
reverse was true for negative affect. Some research has found specific positive or 
negative emotions to be particularly helpful or harmful for self-control. For example, 
pride and hope have been found to be particularly beneficial for self-control (Patrick et 
al. 2009; Winterich and Haws (2011), and guilt may have some positive effects on self-
control (Hofmann & Fisher, 2012; Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, & Fitzsimons, 2007; see 
also Onwezen, Bartels, & Antonides, 2014), suggesting that not all negative emotions 
are equally harmful.  
These studies demonstrate that our emotions can influence our self-control 
success, and generally support the hypothesis that positive emotions boost self-control 
relative to negative emotions, in both experimental settings and real-life (although the 
effects of positive affect also depend on context: Aspinwall, 1998; Wenzel, Conner, & 
Kubiak, 2013). Thus, increasing positive and decreasing negative emotions might 
improve self-control performance. 
Emotion regulation and self-control 
Emotion regulation is often considered one form of self-control (Muraven, Tice, 
& Baumeister, 1998; Paschke et al., 2016), which specifically refers to the attempts to 
alter which emotions we have, when we have them, and how we experience and express 
them (Gross, 1998, 2015). While people often attempt to maximize positive and 
minimize negative emotions (e.g., Larsen, 2000), people also regulate emotions to help 
them attain goals (Tamir, 2009a). Specifically, people prefer to experience emotions 
that are useful or trait-consistent during goal pursuit. For example, Tamir and Ford 
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(2012) found that participants instructed to confront (vs. collaborate) in a negotiation 
task rated anger as more useful, were more likely to choose pre-negotiation activities 
that would increase their anger, and that, consistent with their beliefs, anger improved 
their negotiation performance. Similarly, Tamir (2005) found that highly neurotic 
people, for whom negative emotions are trait-consistent, preferred to feel worried in 
demanding situations, and that worry subsequently enhanced their performance. These 
findings suggest that people’s emotional goals are determined by the emotions they 
consider useful; that they regulate emotions accordingly; and that these emotions have 
actual beneficial effects on their performance.  
Therefore, emotion regulation is both a type of self-control and a strategy which 
could be used to improve other types of self-control. Consistent with the idea that 
emotion regulation facilitate self-control, people higher in trait self-control are better 
able to regulate their emotions in response to negative stimuli (Paschke et al., 2016), 
demonstrate greater inhibition of daily affective expressions (Zabelina, Robinson, & 
Anicha, 2007), and have greater emotional stability (Tangney et al., 2004). While these 
data are correlational, experimental research has shown that emotion regulation can be 
used to enhance self-control. For example, Juergensen and Demaree (2015) found that 
participants who were instructed to regulate emotions when viewing tempting images 
were more likely to resist unhealthy snacks than those who simply viewed the images. 
Together, these findings suggest that regulating emotions might help people to succeed 
at self-control.  
Emotions and initiatory and inhibitory self-control 
The most adaptive way to regulate emotions, however, might depend upon the 
demands of the situation. While most self-control research assumes that self-control 
involves inhibition of attractive but undesired behaviors (e.g., snacking), self-control 
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also comprises initiation of unattractive but desired behaviors (e.g., exercising). 
Therefore, conceptual distinctions between initiatory and inhibitory self-control have 
been proposed (Davisson, 2013; de Ridder et al., 2011; de Boer, van Hooft, & Bakker, 
2011; Haynes, Kemps, & Moffitt, 2016). Similarly, it has been argued that emotions 
function to both initiate and inhibit behaviors (Zhu & Thagard, 2002). Emotions might 
therefore influence initiatory and inhibitory self-control in different ways.  
The body of research demonstrating that positive emotions benefit self-control 
relative to negative emotions includes both initiatory and inhibitory behaviors (Garg et 
al., 2007; Niermann et al., 2016), and we are not aware of any research examining how 
the effect of emotions is moderated by the type of self-control required. There is, 
however, indirect evidence to suggest that positive emotions may be particularly 
beneficial for initiating behaviors, while negative emotions might be more useful for 
inhibiting behaviors. For example, evidence generally suggests that positive and 
negative affect are related to approach and avoidance behaviors, respectively (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998), although specific positive and negative emotions may sometimes be 
related to avoidance and approach behaviors, respectively (Carver & Scheier, 2011). 
Similarly, studies have found positive links between positive affect and the Behavioral 
Activation System (BAS), and between negative affect and the Behavioral Inhibition 
System (BIS; Carver & White, 1994; Elliot & Thrash, 2002), which are conceptually 
similar to initiatory and inhibitory self-control, respectively (de Ridder et al., 2011). 
Cross-sectional data also suggests that increased positive affect is related to greater 
initiatory self-control, although increased negative affect does not seem to predict 
greater inhibitory self-control (in fact, the opposite may be true; De Boer et al., 2011).  
Other research has further demonstrated that positive emotions enhance 
performance when paired with action concepts (e.g., go, doing), whereas negative 
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emotions enhance performance when paired with inaction concepts (e.g., stop, pause; 
Albarracin & Hart, 2011), again providing evidence to link positive emotions with 
initiation and negative emotions with inhibition. Additional theoretical support comes 
from Fredrickson’s (2001) broaden-and-build theory, which proposes that positive 
emotions spark the urge to initiate new activities. Consistent with this, Cunningham 
(1998) found that experiencing positive emotions after a mood induction predicts 
intentions to engage in social, physical, and leisure activities.  
Thus, there is strong theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that positive 
emotions might be particularly beneficial for initiatory self-control (e.g., going to the 
gym), with more mixed evidence in support of a beneficial effect of negative emotions 
for inhibitory self-control (e.g., avoiding late-night snacking). Taken together, these 
different lines of research underline the conceptual distinction between initiatory and 
inhibitory self-control and suggest that positive and negative emotions may influence 
initiatory and inhibitory self-control in different ways.    
Present Studies 
Drawing together these strands of research, we suggest that instrumental 
emotion regulation can help people to succeed at self-control, and that people with good 
self-control (i.e., people high in trait self-control; Tangney et al., 2004) may be 
especially likely to use this strategy, given their superior ability to adaptively regulate 
emotions (Paschke et al., 2016). We conducted two studies to provide supporting 
evidence for our hypothesis that people higher in trait self-control use emotion 
regulation as a tool to succeed in self-control situations. Drawing on research showing 
that people regulate the emotions they consider useful for the task at hand (Tamir, 
2009a), we examine the emotions people consider useful for self-control and how these 
vary according to individual differences in trait self-control. Given that people’s beliefs 
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about the utility of emotions predict their regulatory behaviors during goal pursuit 
(Tamir, 2009a), the emotions people higher in trait self-control consider useful in self-
control situations should be a starting point for understanding the role of emotion 
regulation in successful self-control.  
We also explore whether the emotions people consider useful in self-control 
situations vary depending on whether the situation requires initiatory vs. inhibitory self-
control, and how this is moderated by trait self-control. Given evidence that people 
higher in trait self-control are better at both initiating and inhibiting behaviors (e.g., 
exercising: Wills, Isasi, Mendoza, & Ainette, 2007; binge eating: Tangney et al., 2004), 
the emotions they consider useful for initiatory and inhibitory self-control may give us 
insight both into which emotions facilitate self-control, and under what circumstances 
they do so. 
We examined these hypotheses in two preregistered studies which progress from 
exploratory to confirmatory evidence. In Study 1, our preregistered prediction was that 
people higher in trait self-control would consider positive emotions more useful for 
their self-control success, in particular pride and hope, and that they would consider 
negative emotions less useful for their self-control success, as compared to people with 
lower levels of trait self-control. In other words, we predicted that they would better 
recognize the beneficial effects of positive emotions and harmful effects of negative 
emotions on self-control.  
In Study 1 we did not make any preregistered predictions about how these 
effects would vary as a function of inhibitory or initiatory self-control. Our exploratory 
analyses of the emotions people considered useful for inhibitory and initiatory self-
control situations, and how these beliefs varied by trait self-control, led us to make 
preregistered predictions about these effects in Study 2. Study 1 therefore includes both 
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exploratory and confirmatory analyses, whereas Study 2 includes only confirmatory 
analyses, aimed at replicating the findings of Study 1. We used this approach to 
improve the quality, reproducibility, and reliability of our findings (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015). 
Study 1: Initial Evidence 
Method 
A study overview, materials, and data can be found via the Open Science 
Framework (https://osf.io/zvtsa/?view_only=61b80a8f1dc548df90001e8e074beefe).1  
Participants 
Participants (N = 253) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) and received $0.75 cents (Mage = 41.53 years, SDage = 12.81; 155 females; 79% 
White, 10% Asian/Asian American/Asian European, 8% Black/African 
American/African European, 1% Hispanic/Latino, and 2% Other). Adults living in the 
USA participated; all participants reported being fluent in English. This study was 
approved by the local Ethics Committee. 
The required sample size for testing our key effects (design: emotion x self-
control type + trait self-control as a covariate) was N = 128 (assuming power = .80, 
alpha = .05, effect size f = .25). We set a target sample size of 250 based on the amount 
of money we were able to spend on this study. Our final sample exceeded our target 
sample because 3 additional people voluntarily completed our study via MTurk. 
Materials  
Scores on the following scales were averaged to form one composite score for 
each scale/subscale, with higher scores indicating higher levels of that construct.  
Trait Self-Control. Trait self-control was measured using the Brief Self-Control 
Scale (Tangney et al., 2004). Participants rated 13 items (e.g., “I say inappropriate 
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things”) on a scale of 1 (not at all like me) to 5 (very much like me). The scale was 
reliable (9 reversed scored; Cronbach’s α = .88).  
 Self-control vignettes. Participants read five vignettes that described self-control 
situations that varied in self-control type,2 with three describing inhibitory self-control 
(e.g., resisting sweets) and two describing initiatory self-control (e.g., start exercising; 
see Appendix 1).3  
Expected Emotion Utility. Following Tamir (2005), we assessed how useful 
participants thought different emotions would be to their self-control success in each of 
the situations described. Emotions were chosen from the Modified Differential 
Emotions Scale (Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003). Participants indicated 
how much they thought four positive (Cronbach’s α = .91; hope, joy, pride, and 
serenity) and four negative (Cronbach’s α = .87; sadness, guilt, anxiety, and anger) 
emotions could help them to succeed. Each emotion was defined by three adjectives 
(e.g., joy: joyful, glad, or happy) to ensure the same understanding of these constructs 
among the participants. For example, they rated the statement “To what extent do 
you think feeling hopeful, optimistic, or encouraged would help you succeed in the 
situation described?” on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).4  
Procedure 
Participants answered questions about demographics (age, gender, ethnicity) and 
completed the Brief Self-Control Scale. They were then presented with the 5 self-
control vignettes, one at a time, and asked to imagine themselves in each situation and 
provide their expected emotion utility ratings before moving on to the next vignette. 
Expected emotion utility items and vignettes were presented in a random order. The 
study was completed through Qualtrics.   
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Results and Discussion 
Data Analysis strategy 
To assess both our preregistered and exploratory hypotheses, we conducted a 2 
(emotion: positive, negative) x 2 (self-control type: initiation, inhibition) within-subjects 
ANOVA; following Tamir (2005, 2009b), emotion and self-control type were within-
subjects factors, trait self-control (centered) a covariate, and utility ratings the 
dependent variable, allowing us to examine interactions between our within-subjects 
variables and trait self-control without dichotomizing trait self-control. To examine our 
preregistered hypotheses concerning whether trait self-control predicted utility ratings 
for pride and hope specifically, we conducted individual simple regressions.  
Preregistered hypothesis tests 
Do people with higher trait self-control consider positive emotions to be 
more useful in self-control situations, and negative emotions to be less useful? The 
key test of this hypothesis was the interaction between emotion and trait self-control. 
The analysis first revealed a significant main effect of emotion, F(1, 251) = 507.70, p < 
.001, 
2
p  = .67, indicating that participants generally considered positive emotions (M = 
4.54, SE = .07) as more useful for self-control than negative emotions (M = 2.30, SE = 
.06), and a non-significant main effect of trait self-control, F(1, 251) = 0.93, p = .34, 
2
p  
= .004, indicating that people with higher trait self-control did not believe that emotions 
were generally more or less useful for self-control than people with lower trait self-
control. The emotion x trait self-control interaction was significant, F(1, 251) = 4.35, p 
= .038, 
2
p  = .02. Consistent with our predictions, people higher (+1 SD) in trait self-
control considered negative emotions less useful for self-control (estimated M = 2.18) 
than people lower (-1 SD) in trait self-control (estimated M = 2.45), β = -.15, p = .02. 
However, contrary to our predictions, people higher (+1 SD) in trait self-control did not 
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consider positive emotions more useful for self-control (estimated M = 4.57) than 
people lower (-1 SD) in trait self-control (estimated M = 4.46), β = .05, p = .42.  
Do people with higher trait self-control consider pride and hope to be more 
useful in self-control situations? Inconsistent with our predictions, simple regressions 
demonstrated that people higher in trait self-control did not consider pride (β = .11, p = 
.079) or hope (β = .10, p = .11) more useful for self-control than people lower in trait 
self-control, although the beta coefficients were positive in both cases. This is, however, 
unsurprising given our finding that trait self-control was a non-significant predictor of 
utility ratings for positive emotions overall.  
Thus far, our findings provide evidence that people generally believe that 
positive emotions are more useful for their self-control success than negative emotions, 
consistent with the findings of experimental studies on the link between emotions and 
self-control. We also find evidence that these beliefs differ as a function of trait self-
control, but only for negative and not positive emotions, partially supporting our 
predictions. 
Exploratory analyses 
Which emotions do people consider useful in initiatory and inhibitory self-
control situations? To explore this question, we focused on the interaction between 
emotion and self-control type. The main effect of self-control type was not significant, 
F(1, 251) = 1.80, p = .18, 
2
p  = .007, suggesting that people consider emotions equally 
useful for both self-control types. However, the interaction between emotion and self-
control type was significant, F(1, 251) = 19.43, p < .001, 
2
p  = .07. Exploratory post hoc 
tests revealed that people rated positive emotions as more useful for situations involving 
initiation (M = 4.64, SE = .08) than situations involving inhibition (M = 4.43, SE = .07), 
t(252) = 4.27, p < .001, d = .27. In contrast, people rated negative emotions as more 
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useful for situations involving inhibition (M = 2.37, SE = .06) than situations involving 
initiation (M = 2.22, SE = .06), t(252) = 3.29, p = .001, d = -.21 (See Table 2.1). These 
findings suggest that, while people generally believe that positive emotions are more 
useful for self-control than negative emotions, this effect is moderated by the type of 
self-control required; people believe that positive emotions are more useful for 
situations involving initiatory self-control than situations involving inhibitory self-
control, with the opposite pattern for negative emotions. This provides preliminary 
evidence that people view these self-control types differently, which might suggest that 
they also regulate their emotions differently in these situations. 
Does trait self-control moderate the effects of emotions and self-control type 
on utility ratings? The interaction between self-control type and trait self-control was 
non-significant, F(1, 251) = 0.61, p = .44, 
2
p  = .002, suggesting that people higher and 
lower in trait self-control provided similar utility ratings of emotions for initiatory and 
inhibitory self-control. Moreover, the emotion x self-control type x trait self-control 
interaction was also non-significant, F(1, 251) = 3.26, p = .07, 
2
p  = .01. While this 
interaction did not reach significance, we conducted exploratory follow-up analyses to 
examine whether the significant moderation effects observed in our earlier preregistered 
analyses were particularly driven by one type of self-control.  
Specifically, two ANOVAs were conducted to examine the interaction between 
self-control type and trait self-control on utility ratings for each emotion separately. The 
self-control type x trait self-control interaction was significant for negative emotions, 
F(1, 251) = 4.23, p = .04, 
2
p  = .02. People higher in trait self-control considered 
negative emotions less useful for initiatory self-control than people lower in trait self-
control, β = -.19, p = .002, but people higher and lower in trait self-control provided 
similar utility ratings of negative emotions for inhibitory self-control, β = - .10, p = .12. 
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The self-control type x trait self-control interaction was not significant for positive 
emotions, F(1, 251) = 1.24, p = .27, 
2
p  = .005, but this is unsurprising given that people 
higher and lower in trait self-control provided similar utility ratings of positive emotions 
for initiatory self-control, β = .08, p = .24, and inhibitory self-control, β = .03, p = .63 
(see Figure 2.1). These preliminary findings suggest that people higher in trait self-
control believe that negative emotions are especially unhelpful for initiatory self-
control.  
Study 2: Confirmatory Evidence 
Study 2 was designed as a confirmatory test of Study 1’s findings. The method 
was identical except that we modified the length and number of the self-control 
vignettes to allow us to more closely investigate our hypotheses concerning initiatory 
and inhibitory self-control. Specifically, whereas Study 1 asked participants to consider 
five descriptions of self-control situations, with only two describing initiation, Study 2 
asked participants to consider 18 self-control behaviors, with 10 describing initiation. 
These changes were made to ensure that Study 2 had a sufficient number of events 
representing each self-control type to allow us to draw generalizable conclusions 
concerning initiatory and inhibitory self-control.  
Based on the findings of Study 1, we predicted that people would consider 
positive emotions more useful for initiatory than inhibitory self-control, and negative 
emotions more useful for inhibitory than initiatory self-control. We also predicted that 
people with higher trait self-control would consider negative emotions less useful for 
self-control, particularly in situations involving initiatory self-control. 
Method 
Study overview, materials, and data can be found at 
https://osf.io/97395/?view_only=5004af39783d466383caa115009d53dc.  
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Participants 
Participants (N = 306) were recruited through MTurk and received $0.75 cents 
(Mage = 38.21 years, SDage = 12.35; 169 females; 70% White, 16% Asian/Asian 
American/Asian European, 9% Black/African American/African European, 3% 
Hispanic/Latino, 1% Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and 1% Other). Adults living in 
the USA participated; all participants reported being fluent in English. This study was 
approved by the local Ethics Committee. 
Based on our a priori power analysis5, we planned to recruit 300 participants. 
Our final sample exceeded this because 6 additional people voluntarily completed the 
study through MTurk.  
Materials 
Trait Self-Control. Participants completed the same trait self-control scale 
(Cronbach’s α = .89) as in Study 1.  
Self-control behaviors. Participants read 18 short descriptions of self-control 
behaviors (See Appendix 2) that varied in self-control type. Ten described initiatory 
self-control (e.g., initiating healthy food choices) and eight inhibitory self-control (e.g., 
resist late-night eating).6 
Expected Emotion Utility. The utility scale was the same as in Study 1, with 
one minor change. To ensure that the question was suitable for behaviors rather than 
situations, participants rated how much they thought various emotions would help them 
to do each behavior successfully (e.g., “To what extent do you think feeling hopeful, 
optimistic, or encouraged would help you to do this behavior successfully?”). The 
scales were reliable for positive (Cronbach’s α = .98) and negative (Cronbach’s α = .98) 
emotions.  
 
68 
Procedure  
The procedure was identical to Study 1.  
Results and Discussion 
Data Analysis strategy 
The goal of Study 2 was to confirm Study 1’s findings. Therefore, we conducted 
the equivalent analyses as in Study 1.  
Preregistered hypothesis tests 
Do people with higher trait self-control consider positive emotions to be 
more useful in self-control situations, and negative emotions to be less useful? Here 
we were interested in the interaction between emotion and trait self-control. Consistent 
with Study 1, the ANOVA first revealed a significant main effect of emotion, F(1, 304) 
= 792.55, p < .001, 
2
p  = .72, indicating that people rated positive emotions (M = 4.86, 
SE = .06) as more useful for self-control than negative emotions (M = 2.32, SE = .06), 
and a non-significant effect of trait self-control, F(1, 304) = 1.06, p =.30, 
2
p  = .003. 
The interaction between emotion and trait self-control was significant, F(1, 304) = 
25.24, p < .001, 
2
p  = .08. Consistent with our predictions, people higher (+1 SD) in trait 
self-control considered negative emotions as less useful for self-control (estimated M = 
2.05) than people lower (-1 SD) in trait self-control (estimated M = 2.58), β = -.26, p < 
.001. In contrast to Study 1, people higher (+1 SD) in trait self-control also considered 
positive emotions more useful for self-control (estimated M = 5.05) than people lower (-
1 SD) in trait self-control (estimated M = 4.68), β = .17, p = .003, although we did not 
preregister a hypothesis concerning this relationship in Study 2 given the lack of 
association between trait self-control and utility ratings for positive emotions in Study 1.  
These findings suggest that people higher in trait self-control believe that negative 
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emotions are less useful, and positive emotions more useful, for self-control than people 
lower in trait self-control.  
Do people with higher trait self-control consider pride and hope to be more 
useful in self-control situations? In contrast to Study 1, trait self-control positively 
predicted utility ratings for both pride (β = .17, p = .003) and hope (β = .22, p < .001), 
suggesting that that people with higher trait self-control consider pride and hope more 
useful for self-control relative to people with lower trait self-control.7  
Which emotions do people consider useful in initiatory and inhibitory self-
control situations? The key test of this hypothesis was the interaction between emotion 
and self-control type. The main effect of self-control type was significant, F(1, 304) = 
13.56, p <.001, 
2
p  = .04, such that people rated emotions as more useful for initiatory 
(M = 3.62, SE = .04) than inhibitory (M = 3.56, SE = .04) self-control. Consistent with 
our predictions, the interaction between emotion and self-control type was significant, 
F(1, 304) = 91.01, p < .001, 
2
p  = .23. As in Study 1, people rated positive emotions as 
more useful for situations involving initiation (M = 5.00, SE = .06) than for situations 
involving inhibition (M = 4.72, SE = .07), t(305) = 9.41, p < .001, d = .29, and negative 
emotions as more useful for situations involving inhibition (M = 2.40, SE = .06) than for 
situations involving initiation (M = 2.23, SE = .06), t(305) = 6.78, p < .001, d = .38 (See 
Table 2.1). These findings support the hypotheses that people would consider positive 
emotions more useful for initiatory than inhibitory self-control, and that they would 
consider negative emotions more useful for inhibitory than initiatory self-control. 
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics for utility ratings of positive and 
negative emotions for initiatory and inhibitory self-control 
  
STUDY 1 
 
STUDY 2 
 Initiation Inhibition Initiation Inhibition 
 M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
Positive Emotions 4.64(1.22) 4.43(1.18) 5.00(1.06) 4.72(1.23) 
Negative Emotions 2.22(1.00) 2.37(1.00) 2.23(1.03) 2.40(1.09) 
Note. All measures are on 7-point scales. 
 
Does trait self-control moderate the effects of emotions and self-control type 
on utility ratings? Our preregistered prediction was that self-control type would 
moderate our earlier finding that people higher in trait self-control considered negative 
emotions to be less useful for self-control; we expected this to be particularly true in 
situations involving initiatory self-control. Overall, our results did not support this 
hypothesis. The interactions between self-control type and trait self-control, F(1, 304) = 
0.85, p = .36, 
2
p  = .003, and between emotion, self-control type, and trait self-control, 
F(1, 304) = 0.22, p = .64, 
2
p  = .001, were not significant. However, we also conducted 
the same follow-up analyses as in Study 1 to examine our specific hypotheses 
concerning trait self-control, negative emotions, and initiatory self-control. The self-
control type x trait self-control interaction was not significant for negative emotions, 
F(1, 304) = 0.007, p = .93, 
2
p  = .00. People higher in trait self-control considered 
negative emotions less useful for both initiatory self-control, β = -.26, p < .001, and 
inhibitory self-control, β = -.25, p < .001, as compared to people lower in trait self-
control. 
 The self-control type x trait self-control interaction was not significant for 
positive emotions, F(1, 304) = 0.67, p = .41, 
2
p  = .00. That is, people higher in trait 
self-control considered positive emotions more useful for both initiatory self-control, β 
= .17, p = .003, and inhibitory self-control, β = .14, p = .01, as compared to people 
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lower in trait self-control. Together, these findings suggest that people with high trait 
self-control believe that negative emotions are unhelpful and positive emotions helpful 
for situations involving initiatory and inhibitory self-control. Figure 2.1 shows the 
plotted estimated means for both two-way interactions (at +1 SD) based on these 
regression equations.  
 
Figure 2.1. Estimated mean expected utility ratings of positive and negative emotions in 
initiatory and inhibitory self-control situations for participants higher (+1 SD) and lower 
(-1 SD) in trait self-control in Study 1 (Panel A) and Study 2 (Panel B). 
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General Discussion 
 In two preregistered studies, we examined the emotions that people considered 
useful for inhibitory and initiatory self-control, and how these beliefs differed as a 
function of trait self-control. Our results showed that people generally believed that 
positive emotions would be more helpful in everyday situations that involved self-
control, but that this effect was moderated by the type of self-control required and by 
individual differences in trait self-control. Thus, our findings suggest that, contrary to 
how self-control is often conceptualized in the literature, people are sensitive to whether 
a situation requires enacting or preventing a behavior and view the demands of these 
situations differently; and also suggest that people with good self-control may pursue 
different emotions to help them succeed in these situations.     
 Specifically, relative to people lower in trait self-control, people higher in trait 
self-control believed that negative emotions would be less useful for their success in 
everyday self-control situations (across Studies 1 and 2), with some evidence that they 
also believed that positive emotions would be more useful for their success in everyday 
self-control situations, in particular pride and hope (Study 2). Importantly, because 
people upregulate the emotions they consider useful for the task at hand (e.g., Ford & 
Gross, 2018; Tamir, Bigman, Rhodes, Salerno, & Schreier, 2015), our findings are 
likely to have implications for regulatory behaviors and self-control success in real-life 
situations. That is, based on our findings regarding people’s beliefs about the utility of 
emotions, we speculate that people might upregulate positive and downregulate 
negative emotions accordingly in self-control situations, and that people with higher 
trait self-control might be more likely to do this than people lower in trait self-control.   
 Given that many studies have found that positive emotions facilitate self-control 
relative to negative emotions (e.g., Winterich & Haws, 2011), our findings might 
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suggest both that people’s beliefs about the utility of emotions for self-control are 
generally accurate, and that people with high trait self-control might possess a more 
accurate understanding of how emotions might help or hinder self-control. While future 
research is needed to demonstrate that these beliefs translate into differences in emotion 
regulation and subsequent improvements in self-control performance, prior research 
suggests that beliefs about the utility of emotions do predict actual regulation and 
improved performance (e.g., Tamir & Ford, 2012; see also Ford & Gross, 2018). Thus, 
our findings provide tentative evidence that people with good self-control might use 
emotion regulation as a strategy to succeed at self-control and achieve their goals.    
 Furthermore, our findings add to self-control research by showing that people 
believed that positive emotions would be more useful for initiatory than inhibitory self-
control, whereas negative emotions would be more useful for inhibitory than initiatory 
self-control (across Studies 1 and 2). These findings suggest that people distinguish 
between situations that require them to enact or prevent behaviors in their everyday 
lives. Participants’ beliefs are also consistent with research demonstrating links between 
positive emotions and action and between negative emotions and inaction in 
performance contexts (Albarracin & Hart, 2011). Thus, while positive emotions 
generally seem to be more useful for self-control than negative emotions, it is possible 
that the link between emotions and self-control performance depends upon the demands 
of the situation. Specifically, people who experience positive emotions might be 
particularly likely to succeed at initiating a self-control behavior (e.g., studying) than at 
inhibiting a self-control behavior (e.g., resisting alcohol at a party), and that the reverse 
might be true for those who experience negative emotions. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
 Our study was designed to assess beliefs about how emotions influence self-
control, but we did not investigate the actual effect of emotions on self-control. Our 
conclusions about how these beliefs might translate into improvements in self-control in 
situations requiring the initiation or inhibition of behaviors are therefore speculative, 
and research is needed to confirm how emotions influence performance in these 
situations (e.g., by inducing or measuring positive or negative emotions and assessing 
how these emotions influence inhibitory and initiatory self-control performance). 
Similarly, although previous evidence suggests that people choose to regulate the 
emotions they consider useful (Tamir et al., 2015), we did not assess whether 
participants’ beliefs influenced how they regulated their emotions. Future studies should 
examine not only whether people with high trait self-control are especially likely to 
upregulate positive emotions, but also which strategies they might use to do so (see 
Quoidbach, Berry, Hansennea, & Mikolajczak, 2010, for potential strategies). 
Understanding how people who are successful at self-control achieve this success could 
inform the design of interventions to help others achieve their goals. This approach has 
great potential given that many existing interventions that are designed to improve self-
control often fail (e.g., Miles et al., 2016).  
 Moreover, we focused on measuring the extent to which people believe that 
positive emotions are more or less useful for self-control than negative emotions (for 
example, participants rated: “To what extent do you think feeling hopeful would help 
you to do this behavior successfully?”), and we did therefore not measure whether 
people believe emotions to be useful for their self-control success at all. Thus, future 
studies could include items that ask participants more directly whether they, in fact, 
believe that emotions can help them to succeed in various self-control situations. 
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Researchers could, for example, ask participants to imagine themselves in different self-
control situations and ask them to rate their agreement with statements such as: 
“Emotions could help me to succeed in this situation”, and “Experiencing emotions 
could enhance my performance in this situation”. That is, rather than assessing whether 
people consider positive emotions to be more or less useful for self-control than 
negative emotions we did in the current studies, this procedure would allow us to assess 
the extent to which people consider emotions to be useful for self-control at all (see 
Karnaze & Levine, 2017, for items that similarly measure people’s broad beliefs about 
whether emotions help vs. hinder). 
 We also took a broad approach in comparing beliefs about how positive 
emotions benefit self-control relative to negative emotions (see Aspinwall, 1998, for a 
review), limiting our analysis of specific emotions to those that have been 
experimentally linked to self-control performance (pride and hope; Patrick et al., 2009; 
Winterich & Haws, 2011). We chose to do so because much less is known about how 
other specific emotions (e.g., awe, anger) influence self-control, and thus we did not 
have any a priori hypotheses about the utility of these emotions. Future research could 
take a more nuanced perspective on the exact emotions people prefer to feel in different 
self-control situations. Moreover, we did not consider the intensity of emotions, which 
may moderate the link between emotions and self-control. While we argue that positive 
emotions generally benefit self-control, some research suggests that extreme positive 
emotions can impair self-control; for example, positive urgency (i.e., the tendency to act 
rashly when experiencing extreme positive affect) predicts impulsive behaviors (e.g., 
problem drinking; Cyders & Smith, 2007), particularly in people with bipolar disorder 
(Muhtadie et al., 2014). Future research could examine whether people’s emotion utility 
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beliefs, their regulatory attempts in self-control situations, and their subsequent 
behavior are moderated not only by emotions but by the intensity of those emotions.  
Conclusions 
 We conclude that, although people generally believe that positive emotions can 
help them succeed at self-control relative to negative emotions, these beliefs vary as a 
function of the specific self-control situation and individual differences in self-control. 
Specifically, people believe that positive emotions are more useful in initiatory than 
inhibitory self-control situations, whereas they have the opposite beliefs regarding 
negative emotions, and people with higher trait self-control recognize negative emotions 
as less useful and positive emotions as more useful for their success in both types of 
self-control situations. Because beliefs about the utility of emotions influence emotion 
regulation and ultimately behavior, this research contributes to our understanding of 
how emotions and emotion regulation might shape everyday self-control success. 
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Footnotes 
1 As stated in our preregistration documents, in Study 1, we also collected data 
on how people generally want to feel (measure available at 
https://osf.io/zvtsa/?view_only=61b80a8f1dc548df90001e8e074beefe). Consistent with 
suggestions made by Ford and Tamir (2014), we found that the emotions people 
considered useful were also the emotions they generally wanted to experience in their 
everyday lives (positive emotions: r = .30, p < .001; negative emotions: r = .46, p < 
.001). The exploratory findings of Study 1 led us to focus our confirmatory Study 2 on 
people’s beliefs about the utility of emotions and how these beliefs varied by self-
control type and trait self-control, and to leave the question of why people believe that 
certain emotions are helpful or unhelpful for their self-control success for future 
research. However, data for this measure and all other measures can be found online.  
2 To ensure that our findings were generalizable across life domains, the self-
control descriptions varied in life domain (Tsukayama, Duckworth, & Kim, 2013). 
Study 1’s vignettes described self-control situations in the relationship, food, sex, 
exercise, and work domains, one vignette for each domain. Study 2’s behaviors 
described self-control behaviors in the food, work, relationship, sleep, and exercise 
domains, four behaviors for each domain (except the exercise domain, which included 
two initiatory and no inhibitory behaviors given that people do not typically seek to 
inhibit exercise behaviors). 
3 The five vignettes used in Study 1 were selected by asking undergraduates (N 
= 60) to write about two personal self-control events. Mturk workers (N = 49) then 
imagined themselves in these events and rated them for self-control demand (i.e., “To 
what degree do you think this event would require you to use self-control?”) on a 
continuous slider scale from 0 (no self-control at all) to 100 (a lot of self-control). The 
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five events that received the highest self-control demand scores (each receiving a mean 
above 67) were included in this study. Mean self-control demand for these five events 
was 72.87 (SD = 20.40). A dependent sample t-test revealed that the initiatory (M = 
69.17, SD = 24.42) and inhibitory (M = 69.80, SD = 23.19) self-control events did not 
significantly differ in self-control demand, t = .15, p = .88. 
4 To ensure data quality on MTurk (Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014), we 
included three instructional attention checks (available at 
https://osf.io/zvtsa/?view_only=61b80a8f1dc548df90001e8e074beefe) embedded 
within the other surveys (Study 1-2). Participants who failed to follow these instructions 
were immediately thanked and dismissed (Study 1: N = 37; Study 2: N = 92). That is, 
they did not complete the remaining tasks and their provided data was immediately 
disregarded.  
5 A priori power analysis (G*power: Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) 
indicated that a sample size of 128 (assuming power = .80, alpha = .05, effect size f = 
.25) would be sufficient for testing our most central effects (design: emotion x self-
control type + trait self-control as a covariate). However, a second power analysis 
estimated a required sample size of 290 participants (assuming power =.80, alpha = .05, 
effect size f = .25) for detecting the effects of the more complex interactions that we 
intended to explore (e.g., specific emotion x self-control type + trait self-control as a 
covariate). We rounded up this target sample size and decided to recruit 300 
participants. The effect size (f = .25; medium effect; Cohen, 1998) was based on our 
exploratory study (Study 1), and data from our other similar studies, which generally 
demonstrated effect sizes ranging from small to medium, with some large effects.   
6 The 18 behaviors were selected by first asking Mturk workers (N = 384) to pre-
rate 111 self-control behaviors for their self-control demand (i.e., How much self-
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control do you think you would you need to use to do this behavior successfully?) on a 
continuous slider scale of 0 (no self-control at all) to 100 (a lot of self-control). Some 
behaviors were adapted from previous studies (Davisson, 2013; Tsukayama et al., 
2013), although most were new. We selected 18 behaviors that received high self-
control demand ratings (each receiving a mean above 50) and that could be classified as 
involving either initiation or inhibition (as determined by two trained coders). Mean 
self-control demand for these behaviors was 55.37 (SD = 20.64). A dependent sample t-
test revealed that the initiatory (M = 54.93, SD = 23.65) and inhibitory (M = 54.91, SD = 
24.72) self-control behaviors did not significantly differ in self-control demand, t = .01, 
p = .99.  
7 While we preregistered that we were interested in exploring the link between 
trait self-control and utility ratings for pride, we did not state any directional hypotheses 
regarding this relationship in Study 2. Moreover, even though we did not preregister an 
interest in hope specifically, we explored the link between trait self-control and utility 
ratings for hope in order to be consistent with Study 1’s analyses.  
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Chapter 3: Paper 2 – The role of beliefs about the utility of emotions and 
emotion regulation in self-control performance among people higher and lower 
in trait self-control 
 
 
Reference: 
Tornquist, M., & Miles, E. (manuscript in preparation). The role of beliefs about the 
utility of emotions and emotion regulation in self-control performance among people 
higher and lower in trait self-control.  
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Abstract 
How do people with high trait self-control succeed at self-control? Three 
preregistered studies (Study 1: N = 415; Study 2: N = 140; Study 3: N = 210) aimed to 
test this by examining whether people with high trait self-control use emotions and 
emotion regulation to succeed at self-control. Study 1 first examined whether trait self-
control predicts beliefs about the utility of emotions in performance contexts that varied 
in self-control demand, and whether these beliefs translate into preferences to regulate 
these emotions. Study 2 then examined whether trait self-control predicts choice to 
regulate emotions in these contexts, and how this choice and subsequent emotions 
influenced self-control performance. Finally, Study 3 investigated whether trait self-
control predicts self-control performance when participants are randomly assigned to 
regulate emotions. Results showed that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-
control considered positive emotions more useful and negative emotions less useful 
across situations, although these beliefs did not translate into preferences or choice to 
regulate emotions. Modest evidence was found that people higher in trait self-control 
experienced more positive and less negative emotion after a regulatory task, and that 
these emotional experiences helped them to succeed at self-control. This research 
contributes to our understanding of how emotions and emotion regulation might 
facilitate self-control. 
Keywords: self-control, trait self-control, emotion, emotion regulation, self-
control performance 
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Introduction 
Past work has established that people with good self-control enjoy a wide range 
of positive life outcomes (de Ridder, Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, & Baumeister, 
2012; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004), and that they experience increased 
happiness, positive moods, and life satisfaction (Cheung, Gillebaart, Kroese, & de 
Ridder, 2014; Hofmann, Luhmann, Fisher, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2014). As such, good 
self-control is considered a blessing (Baumeister & Alquist, 2009), and some have 
argued that the ability to self-control is “one of the most powerful and beneficial 
adaptations of the human psyche” (Tangney et al., 2004, p. 272). Nonetheless, how 
people with good self-control succeed in situations that require self-control remains an 
open question.  
This research sought to enhance our understanding of this issue. Because 
evidence suggests that people with good self-control believe that positive emotions can 
help them to succeed at self-control (Tornquist & Miles, 2018), that they regulate 
emotions more effectively in the lab (Paschke et al., 2016), and that they are more likely 
to regulate emotions in their daily lives (Hennecke, Czikmantori, & Brandstätter, 2018), 
as compared to people who are less good at self-control, we propose that people with 
good self-control use their emotions and emotion regulation as tools to succeed in 
situations that require self-control exertion.  
Specifically, in three preregistered studies we test the proposition that people 
higher in trait self-control regulate their emotions differently from those lower in trait 
self-control in the context of self-control, and that this regulation and subsequent 
emotions facilitate their self-control. Thus, we seek to extend prior work that has shown 
that people higher and lower in trait self-control differ in their beliefs about which 
emotions that can help them to succeed at self-control (Tornquist & Miles, 2018) by 
83 
examining whether these beliefs translate into emotion regulation and self-control 
performance, and whether these beliefs generalize to a laboratory self-control situation.   
What is self-control? 
Self-control is the ability to “override impulses to act as well as the ability to 
make oneself initiate or persist in boring, difficult, or disliked activity” (Carver, 2010, 
p.766). In other words, self-control is what stops us from lying and cheating to maintain 
a romantic partner, what makes us go to the gym instead of watching TV, what helps us 
choose a side salad instead of a side of fries, and what makes us stay home and study 
instead of going out with friends. It is not surprising, then, that the ability to self-control 
leads to numerous positive outcomes such as better physical health, good personal 
relationships, and improved work and academic performance (Crescioni et al., 2011; 
Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Tangney et al., 2004), whereas the inability to self-control 
leads to various negative outcomes such as substance abuse, financial problems, 
criminal offenses, and health problems (Moffitt et al., 2011). Thus, the ability to self-
control seems to serve as a key to human flourishing.   
Moreover, although self-control ability may fluctuate due to situational factors 
(e.g., previous self-control efforts: Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; shift in motivation: 
Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014), people tend to differ in self-control ability, and 
self-control is therefore considered a stable personality trait, with people higher in trait 
self-control generally being better able to self-control than people lower in trait self-
control, and therefore enjoy its benefits more (de Ridder et al., 2012; Tangney et al., 
2004). Furthermore, even though only a few studies have directly tested whether trait 
self-control predicts self-control ability (i.e., the ability to override impulses and to 
persist in disliked activity), Schmeichel and Zell (2007) found that people higher, 
relative to lower, in trait self-control were better at inhibiting the impulse to blink and to 
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pull their hand out of iced water, and Friese and Hofmann (2009) found a link between 
low (but not high) trait self-control and increased snacking in a taste-and-rate task, 
providing evidence that people higher in trait self-control are better able to self-control 
than people lower in trait self-control (though the link between trait self-control and 
self-control ability depends on context: Imhoff, Schmidt, & Gerstenberg, 2014). 
Providing this self-control success, studying people with high trait self-control forms a 
promising avenue for understanding which strategies and techniques that people can use 
to succeed at self-control.  
Do people with high trait self-control use their emotions to succeed at self-control? 
Consistent with prior work (DeSteno, 2018; Tornquist & Miles, 2018), the 
current framework suggests that certain emotions are adaptive for self-control and that 
people can harness these emotions to achieve self-control success. Specifically, we 
argue that people with high trait self-control regulate their emotions instrumentally to 
experience more of these adaptive emotions in the context of self-control, and that this 
regulation and changes in emotions then facilitate their self-control. In what follows, we 
first present evidence showing that some emotions are particularly adaptive for self-
control, and that people with high trait self-control might be particularly likely to 
harness these emotions. We then discuss potential mechanisms underlying these effects.  
Several lines of research suggest that some emotions are more adaptive for self-
control than others, with positive emotions generally facilitating self-control relative to 
negative emotions, both in laboratory settings and in real-life (as reviewed in Tornquist 
& Miles, 2018; see also Aspinwall, 1998, for a review). Other research has linked high 
trait self-control with increased and decreased daily experiences of positive and 
negative emotions, respectively (Hofmann et al., 2014), which might suggest that 
people higher in trait self-control make use of these emotions, perhaps by regulating 
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these emotions, to succeed at self-control. Consistent with this idea, recent evidence 
suggests that people higher in trait self-control believe that positive emotions can help 
them succeed at self-control, whereas they believe that negative emotions have the 
opposite effect (Tornquist & Miles, 2018). Thus, because the emotions people consider 
useful in a particular context are useful to them in this context (Ford & Gross, 2018), 
these findings might suggest that positive emotions help people with high trait self-
control to succeed at self-control.  
It has further been suggested that certain emotions such as pride and hope might 
be particularly beneficial for self-control relative to other positive emotions, and there is 
also some evidence to suggest that guilt sometimes facilitate self-control relative to 
other negative emotions (also reviewed in Tornquist & Miles, 2018). Nonetheless, we 
are not aware of any studies showing that positive emotions are less beneficial to self-
control than negative emotions, suggesting that positive emotions generally enhance 
self-control compared to negative emotions.  
One possible explanation for this comes from Fredrickson’s (2001) “broaden-
and-build” theory. In this view, contrary to negative emotions, positive emotions inhibit 
automatic responses and facilitate peoples’ creativity, flexible thinking, and problem-
solving ability, allowing a person to consider a range of actions to meet a challenge. 
Relating this to self-control, when faced with a self-control dilemma that requires 
choosing between an immediate and long-term reward, it is possible that people who 
experience positive, compared to negative, emotions are better able to inhibit the 
automatic response to choose the immediate reward and instead consider various 
strategies that might help them to resolve the self-control dilemma and, as a result, 
choose the long-term reward, indicating self-control success.  
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Another theory that favors the idea that positive emotions benefit self-control is 
the mood-maintenance theory. In this view, people who experience positive emotions 
are motivated to maintain these emotions by refraining from performing behaviors that 
may reduce them (Andrade, 2005; Clark & Isen, 1982). Linking this to self-control, 
because people who experience positive emotions should be more motivated to maintain 
these emotions than people who experience negative emotions, they may be more likely 
to refrain from choosing an immediate reward (e.g., watching tv) because, even though 
this choice feels good now, it may also come at the cost of negative emotions (e.g., 
regret). Thus, people who feel positive emotions may choose the long-term reward (e.g., 
go to the gym) to be sure to maintain these emotions, indicating self-control success.  
Do people with high trait self-control use emotion regulation to succeed at self-
control?  
If positive emotions enhance self-control, it seems plausible that people should 
be able to upregulate (i.e., increase) positive emotions to succeed at self-control, and 
that people higher in trait self-control might be particularly likely to do this given their 
tendency to succeed at self-control. In this section, we first introduce the concepts of 
emotion regulation and instrumental emotion regulation, which holds that people 
regulate emotions to attain goals. We then present evidence that people can regulate 
emotions to succeed at self-control specifically, and that people higher in trait self-
control might be particularly likely to do this. 
Emotion regulation involves altering which emotions we have, when we have 
them, and how we experience and express them (Gross 1998, 2015), and is sometimes 
assumed to be one form of self-control (e.g., Paschke et al., 2016). Even though people 
generally regulate emotions for hedonic reasons (i.e., to feel good; Gross, Richards, & 
John, 2006; Larsen, 2000), the theory of instrumental emotion regulation holds that 
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people regulate emotions for instrumental reasons (i.e., to attain goals; Tamir, 2009a). 
Specifically, this theory holds that people regulate emotions to increase the emotions 
they believe to be useful in a particular performance context, or the emotions they 
typically experience as part of their personality, and that these emotions then are useful 
to their performance in this context (Tamir, 2009a; Tamir, 2009b; Tamir et al., 2015; 
see also Tornquist & Miles, 2018). Thus, increased beliefs about the utility of emotions 
in a performance situation predict greater attempts to upregulate these emotions in that 
situation, and these regulatory attempts then lead to enhanced performance.  
Based on these insights, people should similarly be able to regulate emotions to 
achieve self-control success. Consistent with this, research has shown that adaptive 
emotion regulation leads to improved self-control, both in the lab (i.e., less food 
consumption: Evers et al., 2010; Juergensen & Demaree, 2015) and in everyday life 
(i.e., greater success in aversive activities: Hennecke et al., 2018). In a related vein, 
research has linked trait self-control with adaptive emotion regulation, demonstrating 
that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control more effectively regulate their 
emotions in the lab (Paschke et al., 2016) and that they are more likely to use emotion 
regulation strategies in their everyday lives (Hennecke et al., 2018). Together, these 
findings suggest that people can regulate emotions to succeed at self-control, that people 
with high trait self-control might be particularly likely to regulate emotions, and that 
people with high trait self-control regulate emotions in adaptive ways, although whether 
this regulation contributes to their self-control success remains an open question.  
Some indicative evidence suggests that this might be the case. That is, Tornquist 
and Miles (2018) found that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control believe 
that positive emotions can help them to succeed at everyday self-control. Thus, given 
that there is consistent evidence to suggest that people regulate their emotions to 
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increase the emotions they believe to be useful in a particular context, and that these 
emotions then are useful to them in this context (Tamir & Ford, 2012; Ford & Gross, 
2018), these findings provide initial evidence that people higher in trait self-control 
regulate their emotions to increase positive emotions in the context of self-control, 
which might then result in higher levels of positive emotions that facilitate their self-
control performance.  
Present Studies 
Building on our previous study which showed that people higher and lower in 
trait self-control differ in their beliefs about which emotions they consider useful for 
their self-control success (Tornquist & Miles, 2018), we aimed to investigate whether 
these beliefs translate into actual regulation of these emotions, and whether this 
regulation leads to emotions that facilitate self-control. Thus, in the current investigation 
we test whether people higher in trait self-control regulate their emotions differently 
from those lower in trait self-control in the context of self-control. We also test whether 
this regulation and subsequent emotions leads to improvements in self-control 
performance.  
To test these central hypotheses, we designed a programme of research 
consisting of three preregistered studies, with each study drawing on different methods 
to provide converging evidence for these hypotheses. Broadly, Study 1 examines the 
emotions that people higher in trait self-control consider useful in performance contexts 
that are high vs. low in self-control demand, and whether these beliefs translate into 
preferences to regulate these emotions. Study 2 extends this work by examining whether 
these beliefs and emotion regulation preferences translate into actual choice to regulate 
emotions in these situations, and whether this regulatory choice and subsequent 
emotions facilitate self-control. Finally, to test whether the findings of Study 2 replicate 
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in a carefully controlled environment and when using a different self-control task, Study 
3 investigates whether trait self-control predicts self-control performance when 
participants are randomly assigned to a condition where they receive instructions to 
regulate emotions, this time also including a neutral control condition. Thus, we test 
whether people higher and lower in trait self-control regulate emotions differently using 
self-reports (Study 1), behavioral measures (Study 2), and controlled experimental 
methods (Study 3), and we assess how emotion regulation influence self-control 
performance using two different self-control tasks (Study 2 and 3).  
Study 1 examines the emotions that people higher in trait self-control consider 
useful in performance contexts that are high vs. low in self-control demand, and 
whether these beliefs translate into preferences to regulate these emotions in these 
situations. Our key measures are therefore people’s beliefs about the utility of emotions 
and their preference to regulate emotions, in which half of the participants respond to 
the former whereas the other half respond to the latter. Study 1 aimed to extend prior 
work showing that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control consider positive 
emotions more useful and negative emotions less useful for their everyday self-control 
success (Tornquist & Miles, 2018) in several ways. First, Tornquist and Miles (2018) 
only assessed the emotions people consider useful, but we also assess whether these 
beliefs translate into preferences to regulate emotions by including a measure of 
people’s regulatory preferences. Second, because real-life self-control might operate 
differently from lab-based self-control (Imhoff et al., 2014; Miles et al., 2016), we test 
whether these beliefs about emotions transfer to laboratory self-control situations. 
Lastly, we include a low self-control demand condition to assess whether these beliefs 
and regulatory preferences generalize to a performance context that is low in self-
control demand. This approach allowed us to test the aspect of the instrumental account 
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of emotion regulation that holds that beliefs about the utility of emotions and regulatory 
preferences should be greatest in highly demanding situations (in this case, the high 
self-control demand context). 
Study 2 then examines whether beliefs about the utility of emotions and emotion 
regulation preferences translate into actual choice to regulate emotions, and how this 
influence self-control. Specifically, Study 2 examines how people higher in trait self-
control choose to regulate their emotions in performance contexts that are high vs. low 
in self-control demand, and whether this choice and subsequent emotions facilitate self-
control performance. Thus, while Study 1 provide initial insights into how people 
higher in trait self-control might regulate emotions in the context of self-control, Study 
2 allows us to determine how they actually regulate emotions in this context, and 
whether this leads to emotions that help them to succeed at self-control. Study 2 
therefore introduces a behavioral measure of regulatory choice, asks participants to 
regulate their emotions consistent with this choice by recalling personal events, and then 
measures their emotions and self-control performance. 
Finally, Study 3 investigates whether randomly assigning participants higher and 
lower in trait self-control to regulate positive, negative, and neutral emotions result in 
changes in emotions that facilitate self-control. Although Study 2 and Study 3 use 
similar methodological approaches, the key differences are that participants in Study 3 
are randomly assigned to a regulatory condition and that we add a neutral control 
condition. We made these changes to complement Study 2 on some potential issues. As 
such, because allowing participants to select themselves into a regulatory group can lead 
to some biases (e.g., participants who share certain characteristics may choose the same 
regulatory task due to these characteristics), Study 3 aims to ensure that our regulatory 
groups are equal at the outset and thus to eliminate these possible biases by randomly 
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assigning participants to regulatory conditions. Also, following recommendations that 
the effect of an emotion on various outcomes should be compared with other emotions 
and neutral groups (Lench et al., 2011), we add a neutral control condition in Study 3. 
This allows us to compare how positive and negative emotions influence self-control 
relative to a baseline control group. Lastly, to ensure that our findings are generalizable 
across self-control tasks, we use a different self-control task in Study 3, which requires 
participants to choose between immediate and delayed rewards. An advantage of this 
task is that it approximates how self-control might operate in real-life, given that 
participants are told that they may receive one of their choices, making the decision 
between immediate and delayed rewards real. These changes allow us to test our 
hypotheses in a more tightly controlled environment than previously and thus to isolate 
the effects of emotion regulation, emotions and trait self-control on self-control 
performance. 
Study 1 
Consistent with Tornquist and Miles (2018) our preregistered hypotheses in 
Study 1 were that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control would (1) 
consider positive emotions more useful to their performance on both the high and low 
self-control demand tasks, but that this effect would be (2) moderated by self-control 
demand such that they would consider positive emotions particularly useful in the case 
of the high self-control task. Crucially, we also expected that these beliefs would 
translate into preferences to regulate emotions and we therefore further predicted that 
people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control would demonstrate (3) greater 
regulatory preferences to increase their positive emotions when expecting to perform 
both the high and low self-control demand tasks, but that this effect would be (4) 
moderated by self-control demand such that these preferences would be stronger in the 
case of the high self-control task.  
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Moreover, because prior research has emphasized the emotions that people 
consider helpful and therefore upregulate in performance contexts, and less is known 
about the emotions they consider unhelpful and therefore downregulate, we 
preregistered that we would explore the link between trait self-control and utility ratings 
for negative emotions, and the link between trait self-control and regulatory preferences 
for negative emotions in Study 1, rather than stating directional hypotheses. As such, 
Study 1 explores whether people higher in trait self-control consider negative emotions 
less useful, and demonstrate lower preferences to regulate these emotions, in 
performance contexts that are high and low in self-control demand.  
Method 
A study overview, materials, and data can be found via the Open Science 
Framework (https://osf.io/nhkcu/?view_only=a7cb29bd8dcb4df4a6f0a24ae40ba38e). 
We made one change to our preregistered analysis plan, which did not affect the key 
conclusions in this study. As described on the OSF website, we initially planned to 
include current affect as a covariate. Nonetheless, in hindsight we realized that using a 
single-item survey to measure a construct (in this case, current affect) can be 
problematic given the amount of measurement error it typically contains (Westfall & 
Yarkoni, 2016), and we therefore decided to conduct our analyses without current affect 
as a covariate. Thus, all results reported in this study are without controlling for current 
affect. Excluding current affect as a covariate from our analyses did not change any of 
our key conclusions.1  
Participants 
Participants (N = 415) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (i.e., 
MTurk) in exchange for $0.75 (Mage = 36.20 years, SDage = 12.14; 265 females; 73% 
White, 14% Asian American, 7% African American, 1% Native Hawaiian or Pacific 
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Islander, and 5% other). To motivate performance in MTurk, all participants were told 
that they could win a $25 Amazon Gift Card if they performed well on the tasks. Adults 
living in the USA participated; all participants reported being fluent in English. This 
study was approved by the local Ethics Committee. 
The required sample size for testing our key effects (design: emotion x self-
control demand condition + trait self-control as a covariate), with emotion utility ratings 
as the dependent variable, was N = 128 (assuming power = .80, alpha = .05, effect size f 
= .25). Similarly, the required sample size for testing our key effects (design: emotion x 
self-control demand condition + trait self-control as a covariate), with regulatory 
preference ratings as the dependent variable, was N = 128 (assuming power = .80, alpha 
= .05, effect size f = .25), requiring a total sample of N = 256 for testing our key effects. 
We set a target sample size of 400 based on the amount of money we were able to spend 
on the study. Our final sample exceeded our target sample because 15 additional people 
voluntarily completed our study via MTurk, resulting in a final sample of N = 415. Out 
of these 415 participants, 212 participants were assigned to complete the expected 
emotion utility questionnaire, whereas 203 participants were assigned to complete the 
regulatory preferences questionnaire. 
Materials 
Current emotions. Participants rated “How are you feeling right now?” on a 7-
point scale (1 = very bad, 7 = very good). 
Trait self-control. Trait self-control was measured using the Brief Trait Self-
Control Scale (Tangney et al., 2004). Participants rated 13 items (e.g., “Sometimes I 
can’t stop myself from doing something, even if I know it is wrong”) using a scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all like me) to 5 (very much like me). Final scores are the mean of 
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the 13 items (9 items are reverse scored; Cronbach’s α = .89), and higher scores indicate 
greater trait self-control.  
Manipulation of expected self-control demand. Participants were randomly 
assigned to expect to perform a task that was either high or low in self-control demand. 
Based on self-control research suggesting that retyping text while breaking the habit of 
using certain keys require an individual to use inhibitory self-control (e.g., Muraven, 
Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006), we used a retyping task as our high self-control demand 
task. Specifically, participants assigned to the high self-control demand condition were 
told that they were going to be presented with two paragraphs (each consisting of 
approximately 150 words) taken from a chemistry textbook, and that they would be 
expected to retype as much text as possible from these paragraphs in five minutes while 
following several rules. That is, they were instructed that they would retype the 
paragraphs without typing a, e or t or hitting the space bar. To ensure that the 
participants understood that the upcoming task would require self-control exertion, they 
were presented with two sentences taken from a graduate chemistry textbook and were 
asked to practice the task by retyping these sentences into a textbox while applying the 
above rules.  
In contrast, participants assigned to the low self-control demand condition were 
told that they were going to be presented with a short paragraph (consisting of five 
sentences) taken from a children’s science book, and that they would be expected to 
retype as much text as possible from the paragraph in five minutes. To ensure that the 
participants understood that the upcoming task would require little or no self-control, 
they were presented with two sentences taken from a children’s book and were asked to 
practice the task by retyping the sentences into a textbox. Participants in both conditions 
were told that the sentences were taken from the longer paragraphs and that they would 
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retype the remining text later in the experiment. Thus, participants in both conditions 
received almost identical instructions, with only the self-control demands of the tasks 
being manipulated. Importantly, a supplemental study (N = 26) showed that participants 
judged the high self-control typing task to involve significantly more self-control 
demand than the low self-control typing task.2 
Expected Emotion Utility. Following prior work (Tamir, 2005, 2009b; 
Tornquist & Miles, 2018), we assessed how useful participants thought different 
emotions would be to their success on their assigned typing task. Emotions were chosen 
based on the Modified Differential Emotions Scale (Fredrickson et al., 2003), and each 
emotion was defined by three adjectives (e.g., joy: joyful, glad, or happy). Participants 
rated how much they thought positive (α = .91; hope, inspired, joy, gratitude, love, 
interest, pride, awe, amusement, and serenity) and negative (α = .94; fear, hate, sadness, 
embarrassment, guilt, disgust, shame, anxiety, anger, and contempt) emotions could 
help them to succeed on their assigned typing task (e.g., “To what extent do you think 
feeling hopeful, optimistic, or encouraged will help you to succeed on the typing task?”) 
on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Scores were averaged to form one composite 
score for positive emotions, and one for negative emotions. Higher scores indicate 
greater utility for that emotion.  
Regulatory preferences. Following Tamir (2005, 2009b), to assess participant’s 
regulatory preferences, participants rated the extent to which they wanted to recall 
various personal events that differed in their emotional tone. This served as our measure 
of preferences to regulate emotions given that autobiographical recall is a common and 
effective way to induce emotions in participants (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011) and 
because, when people wish to regulate their emotions, they choose to engage in 
activities that will increase these desired emotions (Tamir 2009b). In addition to 
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providing these ratings, participants also wrote a short description of each personal 
experience. To illustrate, participants were first instructed to “Write a short description 
of a recent personal event that made you feel hopeful, optimistic, or encouraged”. After 
writing their description into a textbox, they rated the statement “Before you take part in 
the typing task, to what extent would you like to spend 10 minutes writing about the 
personal event you just described?” on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). 
Participants completed this procedure for the same positive (α = .93; hope, inspired, joy, 
gratitude, love, interest, pride, awe, amusement, and serenity) and negative (α = .93; 
fear, hate, sadness, embarrassment, guilt, disgust, shame, anxiety, anger, and contempt) 
emotions as for the expected emotion utility survey. Scores were averaged to form one 
composite score for positive emotions, and one for negative emotions. Higher scores 
indicate greater preferences to increase (upregulate) that emotion.3 
Procedure 
Participants answered questions about basic demographics (age, gender, 
ethnicity), current affect, and trait self-control. Participants were then instructed that 
they would complete a typing task and were randomly assigned to either the high or low 
self-control control demand condition. Participants in both conditions were told that 
they would practice their task by retyping two sentences taken from the longer 
paragraphs before proceeding to the next part of the study. Participants then practiced 
retyping their respective sentences for approximately five minutes.  
Following this manipulation, participants were instructed that they would 
complete a questionnaire before retyping the remaining text. To reduce participants 
workload, half of the participants were assigned to complete the expected emotion 
utility questionnaire, whereas the other half were assigned to complete the regulatory 
preferences questionnaire. Participants assigned to complete the utility questionnaire 
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rated how much they thought various emotions could help them succeed on the typing 
task. Participants assigned to complete the regulatory preferences survey rated how 
much they wanted to recall various emotional events before retyping more text and were 
told that they would spend 10 minutes writing about one of their highest-rated events 
right before completing the typing task. After completing their respective questionnaire, 
all participants were told that they had been assigned to the control condition and that 
they did not need to complete the remaining tasks (i.e., retype more text and/or write 
about a personal event for 10 minutes).4 Participants then rated their current affect, and 
were thanked and dismissed. Demographics and questions were presented to the 
participants via Qualtrics software, and the study took about 20 minutes to complete.5 
Results and Discussion 
Data analysis  
To test our preregistered and exploratory hypotheses, we conducted two 
2(emotion: positive, negative) x 2(self-control demand condition: high, low) Mixed 
Factorial ANOVAs; the first with utility ratings as the dependent variable, and the 
second with regulatory preference ratings as the dependent variable. Following Tamir 
(2005, 2009b), emotion was the within-subjects factor, self-control demand condition 
the between-subjects factor, and trait self-control (centered) a covariate, allowing us to 
examine interactions between our within-subjects variables and trait self-control without 
dichotomizing trait self-control.  
Expected Emotion Utility 
Preregistered hypotheses. Here, we test the hypotheses that people higher, 
relative to lower, in trait self-control would consider positive emotions more useful to 
their performance on both the high and low self-control demand tasks, but that they 
would consider positive emotions particularly useful to their performance on the high 
self-control demand task. Thus, the key tests of these hypotheses were the interactions 
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between emotion and trait self-control, and between emotion, trait self-control, and self-
control demand condition.  
The analysis first revealed a significant main effect of emotion, F(1, 208) = 
926.74, p < .001, 
2
p  = .82; participants considered positive emotions (M = 5.05, SE = 
.08) more useful to their performance than negative emotions (M = 1.75, SE = .07). This 
finding is consistent with prior work (Tornquist & Miles, 2018) and suggests that 
people generally consider positive emotions more useful to their task performance than 
negative emotions. The main effect of self-control demand condition was significant, 
F(1, 208) = 6.63, p = .01, 
2
p  = .03; participants rated emotions as generally more useful 
for the task low in self-control demand (M = 3.54, SE = .077) than the task high in self-
control demand (M = 3.26, SE = .08), suggesting that people consider emotions more 
useful when performing a task low in self-control demand, as opposed to a task high in 
self-control demand.  
Furthermore, the interaction between emotion and self-control demand condition 
was not significant, F(1, 208) = 1.40, p = .24, 
2
p  = .007, suggesting that participants 
considered positive emotions more useful than negative emotions, independent of 
whether the task was high or low in self-control demand. These findings suggest that 
people believe that positive emotions are more useful to their performance on tasks that 
are both high and low in self-control demand, as compared to negative emotions (see 
Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1. Mean expected utility ratings of positive and negative emotions for tasks 
that are high and low in self-control demand. Each error bar represents mean + standard 
error. 
The main effect of trait self-control was not significant, F(1, 208) = 0.07, p = 
.79, 
2
p  = .00, suggesting that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control did 
not consider emotions in general to be more useful to their task performance. The 
interaction between self-control demand condition and trait self-control was also not 
significant, F(1, 208) = 0.00, p = .98, 
2
p  = .00, suggesting that participants considered 
emotions more useful to their performance on the low than the high self-control demand 
task, independent of their level of trait self-control. However, the predicted interaction 
between emotion and trait self-control was significant, F(1, 208) = 28.26, p < .001, 
2
p  
= .12. That is, consistent with our predictions, people higher (+1 SD) in trait self-control 
considered positive emotions more useful for their task performance (estimated M = 
5.02) than people lower (-1 SD) in trait self-control (estimated M = 4.66), β = .23, p = 
.001. Moreover, even though we did not preregister a directional hypothesis regarding 
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the relationship between trait self-control and utility ratings for negative emotions, 
exploratory analyses showed that people higher (+1 SD) in trait self-control also 
considered negative emotions less useful for their task performance (estimated M = 
2.06) than people lower (-1 SD) in trait self-control (estimated M = 2.59), β = -.28, p < 
.001. Thus, consistent with Tornquist and Miles (2018), these data demonstrate that 
people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control consider positive emotions more 
useful and negative emotions less useful for their task performance. These data also add 
to this work by showing that these beliefs are not only true for everyday self-control 
situations, but that they are also true for lab-based performance situations.  
The interaction between emotion, trait self-control, and self-control demand 
condition was not significant, F(1, 208) = 0.09, p = .76, 
2
p  = .00, suggesting that people 
higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control believed that positive emotions would be 
more useful and negative emotions would be less useful for their performance on both 
the high and low self-control demand tasks. These findings do therefore not support our 
prediction that people higher in trait self-control would consider positive emotion 
particularly useful for their performance on the high self-control demand task. 
Hence, our findings demonstrate that people higher in trait self-control consider 
positive emotions more useful and negative emotions less useful for their success on 
lab-based tasks that are both high and low in self-control demand. Thus, these findings 
replicate the findings of Tornquist and Miles (2018) and also extend this work by 
showing that people’s beliefs about the utility of emotions in the context of self-control 
transfer to lab-based self-control situations, and that these beliefs also extend to another 
performance situation which was not high in self-control demand. 
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Regulatory Preference Ratings 
Preregistered hypotheses. Here, we test the predictions that people higher, 
relative to lower, in trait self-control would demonstrate greater regulatory preferences 
to increase their positive emotions, both when expecting to perform high and low self-
control demand tasks, but that these preferences would be stronger in the case of the 
high self-control demand task. Thus, we were mainly interested in the interactions 
between emotion and trait self-control, and between emotion, trait self-control, and self-
control demand condition. 
First, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of emotion, F(1, 199) = 
205.64, p < .001, 
2
p  = .51, such that participants preferred to recall positive events (M = 
4.28, SE = .10) more than negative events (M = 3.03, SE = .10), suggesting that they 
preferred to regulate their emotions to increase their positive emotions more than their 
negative emotions. The main effect of self-control demand condition, F(1, 199) = 0.09, 
p = .77, 
2
p  = .00, and the interaction between emotion and self-control demand 
condition, F(1, 199) = 1.69, p = .20, 
2
p  = .008, were not significant, suggesting that 
people preferred to regulate their emotions to increase their positive emotions more than 
their negative emotions, independent of whether they expected to perform a high or low 
self-control demand task (see Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2. Mean regulatory preference ratings of positive and negative emotions for 
tasks that are high and low in self-control demand. Each error bar represents mean + 
standard error. 
Moreover, the main effect of trait self-control, F(1, 199) = 0.66, p = .42, 
2
p  = 
.003, the interactions between emotion and trait self-control, F(1, 199) = .02, p = .88, 
2
p  = .00, self-control demand condition and trait self-control, F(1, 199) = .20, p = .66, 
2
p  = .001, and between emotion, self-control demand condition, and trait self-control, 
F(1, 199) = 0.21, p = .64, 
2
p  = .001, were not significant. Thus, inconsistent with our 
prediction that people higher in trait self-control would demonstrate greater preferences 
to upregulate positive emotions than people lower in trait self-control, and that this 
would be particularly true for the high self-control demand task, we found that trait self-
control was unrelated to preferences for recalling emotional events, independent of 
valence of emotion and self-control demand of the task.6  
The findings of Study 1 suggest that people generally believe that positive, 
compared to negative, emotions are more useful to their performance on tasks that are 
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high and low in self-control demand, and that people demonstrate greater preferences to 
regulate their emotions to increase their positive, compared to their negative, emotions 
in these situations. These data support the view that people regulate emotions to 
increase the emotions they consider useful in a particular context (Ford & Gross, 2018), 
although these data do not support the idea that these beliefs and regulatory preferences 
should be particularly evident in situations that are highly demanding.  
One possible explanation for why self-control demand failed to moderate these 
beliefs and regulatory preferences could be due to the nature of the expected self-control 
task. That is, given that participants who practiced this task were instructed to retype a 
paragraph without typing a, e or t or hitting the space bar (or to simply retype text if 
they were assigned to the low self-control demand condition), it is possible that this task 
is a better measure or manipulation of concentration and focused attention than of self-
control demand. If this is true, people may have recognized that emotions could disrupt 
their concentration and impair their performance on this task, resulting in relatively low 
and similar ratings of emotion utility beliefs and regulatory preferences for the high and 
low self-control demand tasks. Consistent with this idea, prior work has linked high 
levels of negative emotions (e.g., anxiety) with disruptions in concentration in certain 
performance contexts (see McCarthy, Allen, & Jones, 2013), suggesting that it might 
have been better to use another self-control task that requires less concentration and 
attention in Study 1.  
Notably, our findings suggest that these beliefs vary by trait self-control; people 
higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control consider positive emotions more useful and 
negative emotions less useful to their performance on tasks that are both high and low in 
self-control demand. These findings are consistent with Tornquist and Miles (2018) and 
also extend this work by showing that these beliefs generalize to a lab-based self-control 
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situation and to a performance situation that is low in self-control demand. However, 
these differences in beliefs between those higher and lower in trait self-control do not 
seem to translate into differences in preferences to regulate emotions in these situations, 
as trait self-control failed to predict regulatory preferences.  
Study 2 
The findings of Study 1 replicate the findings of Tornquist and Miles (2018) that 
people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control consider positive emotions more 
useful and negative emotions less useful for their everyday self-control success, and 
also extend this work by showing that these beliefs transfer to lab-based performance 
contexts that are high and low in self-control demand. However, despite these 
differences in beliefs, Study 1 found no evidence that people higher and lower in trait 
self-control differed in their preferences to regulate emotions in these situations, 
suggesting that their beliefs about the utility of emotions do not translate into 
preferences to regulate emotions. These findings are puzzling given previous 
demonstrations that people regulate emotions to increase the emotions they consider 
useful in a particular context (e.g., Tamir & Ford, 2012). Thus, given that people higher 
in trait self-control considered positive emotions more useful, they should also have 
reported greater regulatory preferences to increase positive emotions.  
One possible explanation for why people higher in trait self-control did not 
report greater regulatory preferences to increase positive emotions may be that self-
reported regulatory preferences may not be a valid index of people’s actual attempts to 
regulate emotions. Consistent with this claim, Tamir and Ford (2012) suggested that 
preferences may not always correspond with real choices and they therefore conducted 
tests of both regulatory preferences and regulatory choices.  
In light of this, we conducted Study 2, which used a behavioral measure of 
people’s actual regulatory choice, which should more closely approximate people’s true 
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regulatory attempts than the self-reported measure of regulatory preference ratings in 
Study 1. Specifically, following our preregistration, Study 2 examines whether people 
higher and lower in trait self-control differ in their choice to regulate emotions in the 
context of laboratory self-control, and whether regulatory choice and subsequent 
emotions then facilitate self-control performance. Study 2 therefore also extends Study 
1 by testing how regulatory choice and emotions influence self-control performance.  
As described in our preregistration, our broad hypotheses in Study 2 were that, 
when expecting to perform a task high in self-control demand, people higher, relative to 
lower, in trait self-control would choose to regulate their emotions in (adaptive) ways 
that would lead to improvements in self-control performance. In other words, we 
expected to find that the effect of self-control demand condition (high, low) on 
regulatory choice would vary by trait self-control, such that trait self-control would 
predict regulatory choice when expecting to perform a task high in self-control demand. 
We further expected to find that the effect of regulatory choice on self-control 
performance would vary by trait self-control, such that people higher, relative to lower, 
in trait self-control would choose to regulate their emotions in ways that would lead to 
improvements in self-control performance. However, we did not preregister any 
directional hypotheses regarding these effects.  
Method 
A study overview, materials, and data can be found via the Open Science 
Framework (https://osf.io/9r8jn/?view_only=a4c31dbba96646a3bea23e419e525b43).  
Participants  
Psychology undergraduate students (N = 140) participated in exchange for 
course credit (Mage = 21.61 years, SDage = 7.16, Range = 18-60 years; 121 females; 86% 
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White, 7% Asian/Asian British, 4% Mixed/Multiple ethnic groups, 3% Black/Black 
British, and 1% Other). This study was approved by the local Ethics Committee.  
A priori power analysis (Gpower: Faul et al., 2009) indicated that a sample size 
of 92 (power criterion = .80; alpha significance criterion = .05; effect size f2 = .15) 
would be sufficient for testing our key hypotheses (i.e., the multiple regression 
including trait self-control, regulatory choice, and their cross-products as predictors, 
with self-control performance as the outcome). Based on our available resources (i.e., 
time, assistance with data collection), we decided to recruit 150 participants during two 
academic terms. We did, however, not reach this target during our data collection time 
frame, and we decided to stop data collection with a final sample of 140.  
Materials 
Herein, our target emotions were pride, hope, serenity, joy, anger, guilt, and 
anxiety. We chose these emotions because, as reviewed in the introduction, they have 
been of interest in previous self-control and performance studies, and to obtain a set of 
emotions that differ in valence and arousal, to be combined to form aggregated 
subscales of positive and negative emotions.  
Current emotions. Emotions were chosen from the Modified Differential 
Emotions Scale (Fredrickson, et al., 2003). Each emotion was defined by three 
adjectives (e.g., joy: joyful, glad, or happy) to ensure the same understanding of these 
constructs among the participants. Participants rated how much they currently 
experienced four positive emotions (α = .81; proud, serene, hopeful, joyful) and three 
negative emotions (α = .59; angry, guilty, anxious; e.g., “Right now, to what extent are 
you feeling proud, confident, or self-assured?”), which was rated on a scale of 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (extremely). To avoid drawing participants’ attention to the emotions of 
interest, participants also rated two filler items (i.e., tired, concentrated) that were 
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embedded with the other emotions (Tamir & Ford, 2012). Scores were averaged to form 
one composite score for positive emotions and one for negative emotions, with higher 
scores indicating greater experiences of that emotion.  
Trait self-control. Participants completed the same trait self-control scale (α = 
.83) as in Study 1.  
Manipulation of expected self-control demand. Participants were told that 
they would be assigned to a music (i.e., low self-control demand) condition or an 
anagram (i.e., high self-control demand) condition, but that they would be expected to 
practice both tasks first. We included this practice task to ensure that the participants 
understood the level of self-control demand that the tasks required, which should allow 
participants to make more informed judgments about the self-control demand of their 
assigned task when choosing how to regulate their emotions, as opposed to if we simply 
told them that they were going to perform a difficult or easy task later in the study. 
Specifically, all participants listened to a neutral music clip (i.e., Baby Sweetcorn 
(Come Here) by Howie B; adapted from Tamir & Ford, 2012) for 30 seconds, and were 
told that they would listen to a longer music clip later in the study if they were assigned 
to the music condition. Participants also practiced the anagram task, which asked them 
to generate words from two anagrams (e.g., OPOER; Calef et al., 1992) that were, 
unbeknownst to the participants, unsolvable, while following a number of rules. That is, 
the words they generated needed to be real English words and consist of all letters, and 
no letters could be used twice. Participants were instructed to click the ‘next page’ 
button when they decided they could no longer generate new words or if they wanted to 
continue the experiment. Participants were instructed that they would solve more 
anagrams later in the study if they were assigned to the anagram condition. As part of 
this manipulation, after practicing both tasks, half of the participants were told that they 
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had been assigned to listen to more music (low self-control demand condition), whereas 
the other half were told that they had been assigned to solve more anagrams (high self-
control demand condition).  
Emotion regulation paradigm. This paradigm consisted of three tasks in which 
participants indicated their preferences for completing different emotion inductions, 
chose one of these inductions to complete, and completed their chosen emotion 
induction. The emotion regulation paradigm is described in detail below.  
Regulatory preferences. As in Study 1, we measured people’s preferences for 
regulating their emotions. Although our key interest in Study 2 was people’s actual 
regulatory choice (as described below), we included this measure to protect against the 
possibility that all participants would choose to regulate the same emotion, allowing us 
to, at the very minimum, replicate Study 1’s findings using a different (and slightly 
more difficult) self-control task. Participants were presented with seven short 
descriptions of everyday events, each event associated with a specific emotion (i.e., 
pride, serenity, joy, hope, guilt, anxiety, and anger; see Appendix 3), and were asked to 
write a short description of a personal event that matched each of these descriptions. 
Using pride as an example, rather than explicitly asking participants to write a short 
description about an event that made them feel proud as we did in Study 1, participants 
in Study 2 were asked to write a short description of a personal event in which they 
succeeded at something that they had worked hard for (descriptions adapted from 
Gilead et al., 2016). Participants were presented with descriptions rather than the actual 
emotions given that we only included seven emotions in Study 2 (as opposed to 20 in 
Study 1) and thus to avoid drawing participants attention to the emotions of interest. 
Participants were asked to write short personal descriptions that matched the 
descriptions of everyday events to ensure that they considered events from their 
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personal lives before they proceeded to the next task, which involved choosing one 
event to describe in detail. Similar to Study 1, participants rated how much they wanted 
to spend 10 minutes writing about each of the seven events in detail before completing 
their assigned task (e.g., “Before solving the anagrams, to what extent would you like to 
spend 10 minutes writing about the personal event you just described?”) on a scale of 1 
(not at all) to 7 (extremely). Scores were averaged to form one composite score for 
positive emotions (α = .63: pride, serenity, joy, and hope) and one for negative emotions 
(α = .40; guilt, anxiety, and anger). 
The events associated with pride, serenity, joy, anger, and guilt were adapted 
from Gilead et al. (2016), who found that participants experienced more of the target 
emotion after writing about each event (e.g., participants felt more proud after writing 
about the event associated with pride compared to before). The event associated with 
hope was adapted (but shortened) from Winterich and Haws (2011), who showed that 
participants felt more hope after writing about this event. The event associated with 
anxiety was new.  
Regulatory choice. After providing their regulatory preference ratings, 
participants were presented with a list of the personal events that they wrote about in the 
previous part (and that were associated with either pride, serenity, joy, hope, guilt, 
anxiety, or anger), and were asked to select the one event that they wanted to write 
about in detail before solving more anagrams or listening to more music. Choosing 
pride, serenity, joy, or hope was considered a positive regulatory choice, and choosing 
guilt, anxiety, or anger was considered a negative regulatory choice. 
Emotion induction. Given that personal recall is frequently used to elicit 
emotions in experimental studies (Lench et al., 2011), participants regulated their 
emotions by recalling a past personal event. Specifically, after making their regulatory 
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choice, participants were asked to vividly imagine themselves in that situation and to 
write about the event in as much detail as possible for 5 to 10 minutes (see Appendix 
4).7 
Self-Control Performance. Based on prior research that has suggested that 
attempting to solve unsolvable anagrams requires self-control (Muraven, Tice, & 
Baumeister, 1998), and particularly the use of initiatory self-control (Imhoff et al., 
2014), we used an anagram task to measure self-control performance. Specifically, 
participants were asked to generate as many words as possible from seven anagrams, 
while following the rules described above. Unbeknownst to the participants, five of the 
anagrams were unsolvable (e.g., RATKN), whereas two were solvable (e.g., AHTRE), 
so as not to make the task seem impossible. The anagrams were adapted from Calef and 
colleagues (1992), and time spent on the task (i.e., persistence in the face of failure; 
Muraven et al., 1998), as opposed to number of words generated, was our measure of 
self-control performance. That is, we operationalized self-control performance as 
persistence on the anagram task. Average time spent on the anagram task in the current 
sample was 6.06 minutes (SD = 3.32). 
Importantly, a supplemental study showed that participants (N = 26) judged the 
anagram task to involve significantly more self-control demand than the music task.8 
The anagram task was chosen over the typing task used in Study 1 because the anagram 
task allowed us to measure self-control performance (i.e., persistence), which the 
retyping task did not. 
Procedure 
After reading and signing the consent form, participants answered questions 
about demographics (age, gender, ethnicity, native language), current emotions, and 
trait self-control. Participants were then instructed that they would be assigned to either 
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solve anagrams or listen to music later in the study, but that they would practice both 
tasks first. Thus, after practicing solving the anagrams and after listening to a short 
instrumental music clip (in that order), half of the participants were randomly assigned 
to the high self-control demand condition and were told that they were going to solve 
more anagrams, whereas the other half were randomly assigned to the low self-control 
demand condition and were told that they were going to listen to more music. 
Participants in both conditions were instructed that they would complete a writing task 
before solving more anagrams or listening to more music. Hence, they next completed 
the three-part emotion regulation paradigm. As outlined above, participants first 
provided descriptions of personal events before rating how much they would prefer to 
write about each one (regulatory preferences), they then selected the event that they 
wanted to describe in detail (regulatory choice), and then spent 5-10 minutes writing 
about their selected event in detail (emotion induction). A timer was displayed above 
the textbox to remind the participants of the time. To ensure that the emotion induction 
was successful, participants next rated their current emotions.  
Participants who were assigned to the low self-control demand (i.e., music) 
condition were then told that a change had occurred and that they had been assigned to 
solve the remaining anagrams instead of listening to more music. They were told to 
click the ‘next page’ button if they accepted the change, or to inform the experimenter if 
they wished to stop the experiment or if they had any questions. All participants chose 
to continue the experiment despite this change.9 Thus, all participants then performed 
the self-control task. Participants were instructed to click the ‘next page’ button when 
they decided they could no longer generate new words or if they simply wanted to stop 
the task and continue the experiment. Once they clicked ‘next page’, participants 
advanced to a new screen which informed them that they had completed the experiment. 
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Participants were debriefed, thanked and dismissed. All tasks were completed through 
Qualtrics on a desktop computer and took up to one hour to complete. Figure 3.3 
demonstrates all measures and tasks administered at the various stages during the 
experiment.  
 
Figure 3.3. Flowchart demonstrating measures and tasks administered at various stages 
during the experiment. TSC = trait self-control. The emotion regulation paradigm 
consisted of the measure of regulatory preferences, the measure of regulatory choice, 
the emotion induction, and the measure of current emotions (in that order).  
Results and Discussion 
In what follows, we first conduct a logistic regression to examine how people 
choose to regulate emotions in performance contexts that are high and low in self-
control demand, and whether trait self-control moderates this effect. We then perform a 
MANCOVA to examine how people’s regulatory choice influences their subsequent 
emotions (i.e., manipulation check), as well as exploratory multiple regressions to 
examine how regulatory choice influences the emotions of people higher and lower in 
trait self-control specifically. Lastly, we conduct multiple regressions to examine how 
people’s regulatory choice and subsequent emotional experiences influence self-control 
performance, and whether these effects are moderated by trait self-control.  
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Preregistered analyses 
How did people generally choose to regulate emotions? A chi-square test first 
showed that participants were generally more likely to choose positive recall (74%) than 
negative recall (26%), χ2(1) = 31.11, p < .001.   
How did people choose to regulate emotions when they expected to perform 
a task that was high vs. low in self-control demand, and was this moderated by 
trait self-control? To test whether trait self-control predicted regulatory choice when 
expecting to perform a task high in self-control demand, we conducted a logistic 
regression where self-control demand condition (high, low), trait self-control (centered), 
and their cross-product were the predictors, and regulatory choice (positive, negative) 
was the outcome.  
The model was not significant, Nagelkerke R2 = .04, χ2(3) = 3.64, p = .30. That 
is, the simple effects of self-control demand condition, χ2(1) = 2.10, p = .15, Exp(B) = 
1.78, and trait self-control, χ2(1) = .81, p = .37, Exp(B) = 1.46, and their cross-product, 
χ2(1) = 0.05, p = .83, Exp(B) = 1.16, did not predict regulatory choice. Figure 3.4 shows 
descriptive statistics of participants' choice to regulate positive and negative emotions in 
the two conditions.  
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Figure 3.4. Regulatory choice (positive recall, negative recall) in the high and low self-
control demand conditions.  
Together, these findings suggest that participants were more likely to choose to 
recall positive events than negative events, both when they expected to perform a task 
that was high and low in self-control demand, which might suggest that they were more 
likely to attempt to regulate their emotions to increase their positive, compared to their 
negative, emotions in these situations. Our findings further suggest that trait self-control 
does not moderate these effects, suggesting that people higher in trait self-control do not 
differ from those lower in trait self-control in their choice to regulate emotions in these 
situations. These data are inconsistent with our prediction that trait self-control would 
predict regulatory choice when they expected to perform a task high in self-control 
demand. 
Manipulation check: how did regulatory choice influence subsequent 
emotions? To examine how people’s regulatory choice influence their subsequent 
emotions, we conducted a two-way MANCOVA where self-control demand condition 
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(high, low) and regulatory choice (positive, negative) were between-subject factors, 
baseline positive and negative emotions were covariates, and positive and negative 
emotions experienced after the emotion induction were dependent variables.  
The multivariate effect of regulatory choice was significant, F(2, 133) = 33.77, 
Wilks’ λ= .66, p < .001, 
2
p  = .34; participants who chose positive recall reported more 
positive emotions (M = 4.47, SE = .09) than participants who chose negative recall (M = 
3.10, SE = .16), F(1, 134) = 55.46, p < .001, 
2
p  = .29, and participants who chose 
negative recall reported more negative emotions (M = 2.46, SE = .11) than participants 
who chose positive recall (M = 1.64, SE = .07), F(1, 134) = 38.05, p < .001, 
2
p  = .22, 
suggesting that the emotion inductions were successful. The effect of self-control 
demand condition, F(2, 133) = 0.88, Wilks’ λ= .99, p = .42, 
2
p  = .01, and the regulatory 
choice x self-control demand condition interaction, F(2, 133) = 1.17, Wilks’ λ= .98, p = 
.31, 
2
p  = .02, were not significant, indicating that the emotion inductions influenced 
participant’s emotions similarly in the two conditions.   
Did trait self-control moderate the effect of regulatory choice on subsequent 
emotions? We preregistered that we would explore how regulatory choice influenced 
the subsequent emotions of people higher and lower in trait self-control. If people 
higher and lower in trait self-control regulate their emotions differently in the context of 
self-control as suggested in this article, it seems plausible that they also experience 
emotions differently after taking part in a regulatory task and when expecting to 
perform a self-control task. We conducted exploratory multiple regressions to test this; 
trait self-control, self-control demand condition, regulatory choice, and their cross-
products were predictors; baseline positive and negative emotions were covariates; and 
experiences of either positive or negative emotions after the recall were outcomes. We 
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chose not to enter trait self-control into the MANCOVA above because that analysis 
only allows us to enter trait self-control as a continuous covariate and would therefore 
not generate the interactions of interest. Thus, to avoid repeating the results from the 
analysis above, here we concentrate on the effects that involve trait self-control.  
Positive emotions. The multiple regression was significant, R2 = .55, F(9, 130) = 
17.84, p < .001. That is, greater trait self-control predicted increased experiences of 
positive emotions, β = .18, p = .048, while controlling for baseline emotions. However, 
trait self-control did not interact with self-control demand condition, β = -.14, p = .12, or 
with regulatory choice, β = .05, p = .58, to predict positive emotions, and the interaction 
between trait self-control, self-control demand condition, and regulatory choice was also 
not significant, β = -.008, p = .93. These data suggest that people higher in trait self-
control experience more positive emotions than people lower in trait self-control after 
completing a regulatory task, when controlling for their baseline emotions, independent 
of the self-control demands of the expected task and their regulatory choice.  
Negative emotions. The multiple regression was significant, R2 = .48, F(9, 130) 
= 13.14, p < .001. That is, trait self-control did not predict negative emotions, β = -.08, p 
= .42, and trait self-control did not interact with self-control demand condition, β =-.03, 
p = .78, but trait self-control interacted with regulatory choice to predict negative 
emotions, β = -.28, p = .002, while controlling for baseline emotions; people higher in 
trait self-control experienced less negative emotion than people lower in trait self-
control after recalling negative events, β = -.32, p = .029, but not after recalling positive 
events, β = -.09, p = .27. Importantly, these effects were qualified by a significant 
interaction between trait self-control, self-control demand condition, and regulatory 
choice, β = .19, p = .035. That is, for participants who chose negative recall, the 
interaction between trait self-control and self-control demand condition approached 
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significance, β = .33, p = .066, such that greater trait self-control predicted less negative 
emotion in the high self-control demand condition, β = -.61, p = .002, but not in the low 
self-control demand condition, β = .06, p = .82. In contrast, for participants who chose 
positive recall, trait self-control did not interact with self-control demand condition to 
predict negative emotions, β = .03, p = .77. These data suggest that people higher in trait 
self-control experience less negative emotion than people lower in trait self-control after 
completing a regulatory task intended to increase negative emotions, but only when the 
expected task is high (but not low) in self-control demand.10 
How did regulatory choice influence self-control performance, and was this 
moderated by trait self-control? A bivariate correlation first showed that greater trait 
self-control was related to increased self-control performance in the entire sample, r = 
.17, p = .04. However, here we were mainly interested in testing the predicted effect that 
the influence of regulatory choice on self-control performance would vary by trait self-
control. To test this, we entered self-control demand condition (high, low), regulatory 
choice (positive, negative), trait self-control (centered), and their cross products into 
multiple regression to predict self-control performance.  
The multiple regression was not significant, R2 = .04, F(6, 133) = 1.00, p = .43. 
That is, self-control demand condition, β = .06, p = .52, regulatory choice, β = .02, p = 
.85, trait self-control, β = .17, p = .21, and the interactions between self-control demand 
condition and trait self-control, β = .07, p = .61, regulatory choice and trait self-control, 
β = -.11, p = .93, and between self-control demand condition, regulatory choice, and 
trait self-control, β = -.09, p = .45, were not significant. These findings suggest that 
regulatory choice does not influence self-control performance, and that this relationship 
does not vary by trait self-control. These findings are inconsistent with the prediction 
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that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control would choose to regulate their 
emotions in ways that would lead to improvements in self-control performance.  
How did emotional experiences influence self-control performance, and was 
this moderated by trait self-control? Notably, the above analyses are based on the 
assumption that people who chose to recall a positive event experienced increased 
positive emotions after the recall, and that people who chose to recall a negative event 
experienced increased negative emotions after the recall, but our exploratory analyses 
showed that people higher and lower in trait self-control differed in their emotional 
experiences after the regulatory task, suggesting that it might be important to also 
consider whether people’s emotional experiences after the recall, rather than their 
regulatory choice, influence self-control performance, and whether this effect varies by 
trait self-control.  
Moreover, because people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control 
experienced more positive emotions after the regulatory task, independent of their 
regulatory choice and the self-control demands of the expected task, and that they 
experienced less negative emotions after the negative recall when the expected task was 
high in self-control demand, we were particularly interested in whether these particular 
emotional experiences enhanced the self-control performance of people with high trait 
self-control. These analyses are consistent with our preregistration as we expressed an 
interest in exploring how subsequent emotions (i.e., emotions experienced after the 
regulatory tasks) influence the self-control performance of people higher, relative to 
lower, in trait self-control.  
Thus, we conducted exploratory analyses to test whether the effects of positive 
and negative emotions on self-control performance are moderated by trait self-control. 
That is, these analyses test the same research question as above, although in these 
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analyses we used experiences of positive and negative emotions as predictors, rather 
than regulatory choice, to predict self-control performance. Specifically, we entered 
self-control demand condition (high, low), experiences of either positive or negative 
emotions (centered), trait self-control (centered), and their cross products 
simultaneously into exploratory multiple regressions to predict self-control 
performance, while controlling for baseline positive and negative emotions. 
Positive emotions. The multiple regression was significant for positive 
emotions, R2 = .11, F(8, 131) = 2.08, p = .04. The simple effects of self-control demand 
condition, β = .10, p = .22, positive emotions, β = -.11, p = .30, and trait self-control, β 
= .16, p = .16, and the interaction between self-control demand condition and trait self-
control, β = -.001, p = .99, did not predict self-control performance, but the interaction 
between positive emotions and trait self-control approached significance, β = .17, p = 
.07. Simple slope tests showed that people higher in trait self-control demonstrated 
better self-control performance (estimated M = 6.98) than people lower in trait self-
control (estimated M = 5.67) when they experienced high levels of positive emotions 
(+1 SD), β = .24, p = .038. In contrast, people higher in trait self-control did not 
demonstrate better self-control performance (estimated M = 6.86) than people lower in 
trait self-control (estimated M = 6.36) when they experienced low levels of positive 
emotions (-1 SD), β = .09, p = .42. The interaction between self-control demand 
condition, positive emotions, and trait self-control was not significant, β = -.16, p = 
.087. These findings suggest that people higher in trait self-control demonstrate better 
self-control performance than people lower in trait self-control when they experience 
high (but not low) levels of positive emotions, independent of whether they initially 
expected this task to be high or low in self-control demand.   
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Negative emotions. The multiple regression was significant for negative 
emotions, R2 = .10, F(8, 131) = 2.34, p = .02. The simple effects of self-control demand 
condition, β = -.14, p = .12, negative emotions, β = - .15, p = .17, and trait self-control, 
β = .06, p = .64, and the interaction between self-control demand condition and trait 
self-control, β = .05, p = .69, were not significant. However, there was a significant 
interaction between negative emotions and trait self-control, β = -.26, p = .03, such that 
people higher in trait self-control demonstrated better self-control performance than 
people lower in trait self-control when they experienced low levels of negative emotions 
(-1 SD), β = .21, p = .07, although this effect only approached significance, but they did 
not demonstrate better self-control performance when they experienced high levels of 
negative emotions (+1 SD), β = .02, p = .88. However, these effects were qualified by a 
significant interaction between self-control demand condition, negative emotions, and 
trait self-control β = .19, p = .02.   
That is, there was a significant interaction between negative emotions and trait 
self-control in the high self-control demand condition, β = -.36, p = .01. Simple slope 
tests showed that people higher in trait self-control demonstrated better self-control 
performance (estimated M = 8.29) than people lower in trait self-control (estimated M = 
6.51) when they experienced low levels of negative emotions (-1 SD), β = .32, p = .025. 
In contrast, people higher in trait self-control did not demonstrate better self-control 
performance (estimated M = 2.42) than people lower in trait self-control (estimated M = 
4.31) when they experienced high levels of negative emotions (+1 SD), β = - .34, p = 
.12. In the low self-control demand condition, the interaction between negative 
emotions and trait self-control was not significant, β = .13, p = .33, suggesting that 
lower levels of negative emotions did not enhance the self-control performance of 
people higher in trait self-control when they initially expected this task to be low in self-
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control demand. These findings suggest that, when expecting to perform a task high in 
self-control demand, people higher in trait self-control demonstrate better self-control 
performance on this task than people lower in trait self-control when they experience 
low (but not high) levels of negative emotions.  
So far, these data suggest that people higher in trait self-control generally 
experience more positive emotions than people lower in trait self-control after 
completing a regulatory task, while controlling for baseline emotions, with one potential 
explanation being that they are more likely to upregulate these emotions during the task, 
independent of whether they chose to recall a positive or negative event. These data 
further suggest that these increased experiences of positive emotions then help people 
higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control to succeed at self-control, such that people 
higher in trait self-control perform better on a self-control task than people lower in trait 
self-control when they experience high (but not low) levels of positive emotions.  
These findings further suggest that people higher in trait self-control experience 
less negative emotions than people lower in trait self-control after completing a 
regulatory task intended to increase negative emotions, but only when expecting to 
perform a task high (but not low) in self-control demand, with one potential explanation 
being that people with high trait self-control are more likely to downregulate these 
emotions during the task, and that they do so in the context of self-control specifically. 
In addition, these findings also suggest that these decreased experiences of negative 
emotions then help people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control to succeed at 
self-control, such that people higher in trait self-control perform better on a self-control 
task than people lower in trait self-control when they experience low (but not high) 
levels of negative emotions. These findings are discussed in more detail in the General 
Discussion.11 
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Study 3 
Study 3 aims to investigate how assigning participants to various emotion 
regulation conditions influence self-control. Specifically, Study 3 investigates whether 
randomly assigning participants to either a positive, negative, or a neutral emotion 
regulation condition, leads to changes in emotions that help them to succeed at self-
control, and whether this effect is moderated by trait self-control. We preregistered two 
sets of hypotheses, using two different predictors, to test this overarching research 
question. Specifically, using emotion regulation condition as the predictor, we 
hypothesized that the effect of emotion regulation condition on self-control performance 
would vary by trait self-control, such that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-
control would demonstrate increased self-control performance after taking part in the 
positive-inducing task, as compared to the negative-inducing task. We did not make any 
hypotheses regarding the neutral control condition given that Study 3 is the first herein 
to include a neutral control condition. Furthermore, using actual emotions as predictors, 
we also hypothesized that the effects of positive and negative emotions on self-control 
performance would vary by trait self-control, such that people higher, relative to lower, 
in trait self-control would demonstrate increased self-control performance when they 
experienced high levels of positive emotions, and low levels of negative emotions. 
Thus, even though these hypotheses are just different approaches to test our 
research questions, the first hypothesis focuses on the effects of the emotion induction 
condition on self-control, whereas the latter emphasizes the effects of actual emotions 
(experienced immediately after the emotion inductions and thus right before performing 
a self-control task) on self-control. This is because Study 2 showed that trait self-control 
predicted differences in emotions after completing the regulatory tasks, and that these 
emotional experiences predicted their self-control performance. Therefore, we 
preregistered that, if Study 3 similarly shows that trait self-control predicts differences 
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in emotions after the emotion inductions, we would test both sets of the hypotheses 
stated above (otherwise we would test the first hypothesis). However, in hindsight we 
realized the importance of being consistent with Study 2’s analyses in order to fully 
contrast the results of the two studies and we therefore decided to test both sets of 
hypotheses independent of whether trait self-control predicts differences in emotions 
after the inductions.  
Method 
A study overview, analysis plan, and all materials used in this study can be found 
via the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/s7k2d/?view_only=f8e639f9a28c4c418a26389565f4b203).  
Participants 
Participants (N = 210) were recruited through MTurk in exchange for a small 
reward (Mage = 42.04 years, SDage = 13.58; 134 females; 82% White, 9% African 
American, 5% Asian American, 4% Hispanic/Latino, and 1% Other). Adults living in 
the USA and who were fluent in English were eligible to participate.  
Our sample size was determined by a priori power analysis (Gpower: Faul et al., 
2009), which indicated that a sample size of 204 (assuming alpha = beta = .05; effect 
size f = .10) would be sufficient for testing our key hypotheses. Nonetheless, in our 
preregistration we stated that we planned to recruit 100 participants in each condition, 
resulting in a target sample of 300 participants. However, after collecting data from 300 
participants, we discovered that several participants had completed the study more than 
once (as discovered by identical IP addresses and demographics), and that people 
reported that they lived in the USA when they lived in other parts of the world (as 
discovered by latitudes and longitudes of locations not being in the USA). Thus, 
because we were concerned about the validity of the data provided by these participants 
124 
(e.g., duplicate responses may lead to Type 1 and Type 2 errors, participants who 
respond falsely about one aspect of the study may also respond falsely about other 
aspects, which could have a large impact on the validity of the study), we decided to 
delete these participants (N = 90) prior to conducting any analyses, resulting in a final 
sample of 210 participants.  
Materials 
Current emotions. To assess participants’ current emotions, we used the same 
scale and list of positive (hope, joy, pride, serenity) and negative (guilt, anxiety, anger) 
emotions as in Study 2, although we added sadness to our list of negative emotions to 
ensure an equal number of positive and negative emotions.  
Trait self-control. Participants completed the same trait self-control scale as in 
Study 1 and Study 2.  
Emotion induction. As in Study 2, emotions were induced by asking 
participants to recall a personal event. However, rather than allowing participants to 
choose which type of event to recall, participants in Study 3 were randomly assigned to 
recall a positive, negative or neutral personal event (i.e., positive, negative, and neutral 
emotion regulation conditions). Participants assigned to the positive and negative 
emotion regulation conditions were asked to recall a personal event that made them feel 
very proud and very guilty, respectively. Participants assigned to the neutral emotion 
regulation (control) condition were asked to describe the last time they went grocery 
shopping (Lench & Levine, 2005). Participants spent 10 minutes writing about their 
experiences. 
We chose pride as our positive emotion because prior work (e.g., Patrick et al., 
2009) and our own work has suggested that pride might be particularly beneficial for 
self-control. In addition, we chose guilt as our negative emotion because researchers 
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have been interested in how guilt influences self-control (e.g., Giner-Sorolla, 2001) and 
because guilt is often used as a comparison emotion with pride (e.g., Hofmann & 
Fisher, 2012). Moreover, even though our writing tasks in Study 2 and Study 3 both 
involved recalling a past event, we used different writing instructions to induce 
emotions in Study 3 (see Appendix 5). This is because we wanted the instructions for 
this task to be relatively short given that Study 3 was conducted online, and because the 
writing task we chose for Study 3 has been effective in inducing emotions in several 
prior studies (Forgas, 1999; Forgas, 2011; Lench & Levine, 2005).  
Self-control performance. We used a delay discounting task to measure self-
control performance. That is, participants were asked to choose between receiving a 
smaller hypothetical amount of money (e.g., $67) the next day or receiving a larger 
hypothetical amount of money (e.g., $85) later in time (e.g., in 70 days; Li, 2008; Tuk, 
Trampe, & Warlop, 2011). Consistent with prior work, we incentivized participants to 
express their true preferences by informing them that they could receive one of their 
choices at the end of the study (e.g., Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999; Li, 2008). 
Participants made eight choices in total (adapted from Li, 2008; Tuk et al., 2011; see 
Appendix 6).  
 Participants who choose smaller immediate rewards in this task are thought to 
lack self-control, because they fail to inhibit their desire for an immediate payoff in 
favor of a long-term more beneficial one. This task therefore requires a person to use 
inhibitory self-control (Tuk et al., 2015). Thus, the number of times participants chose 
the delayed reward over the immediate reward is our measure of self-control 
performance (Tuk, Zhang, & Sweldens, 2015). A score of zero indicates that the 
participant always chose the immediate reward and that he or she lacks self-control, 
whereas a score of eight indicates that the participant always chose the delayed reward 
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and that he or she exhibits great self-control. Thus, a higher score on this task indicates 
increased self-control performance.12   
Procedure 
The first part of the procedure was similar to the procedure used in Study 2. That 
is, participants completed demographics questions, current emotions, and trait self-
control. Participants were then told that they would practice a choice task, and that they 
would complete the actual choice task later. Thus, participants were presented with 
three (practice) choices, each asking them to choose between a small-immediate reward 
and a larger-delayed reward (e.g., they chose whether they would prefer to get $40 
tomorrow or $55 in 62 days). Participants were told that they were going to make very 
similar choices later in the study, and were asked to take the choices seriously given that 
they could receive one of their choices in the form of a payment after completing the 
study.13 After making their three choices, participants were told that they would 
complete a writing task, which would involve recalling a past event. Participants were 
then randomly assigned to either the positive, negative, or neutral emotion regulation 
conditions, in which they were instructed to write about a positive, negative, or neural 
personal event, respectively, for 10 minutes. This part differs from Study 2, in which 
participants chose which personal event they wanted to recall (and thus which emotion 
to regulate) before writing about their chosen event for 10 minutes. As in Study 2, 
participants then indicated their current emotions (i.e., manipulation check) and 
completed the self-control task, which asked them to make eight choices between a 
small-immediate reward and a large-delayed reward. Each pair of choices were 
presented on a separate page, and the small-immediate choice was presented on the left, 
and the large-delayed choice on the right. Participants made each choice by clicking on 
it, before proceeding to the next choice. After making their choices, participants were 
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thanked and dismissed. All tasks were completed online via Qualtrics and took about 20 
minutes to complete. After data collection was completed, three participants were 
randomly selected to receive one of their choices in the form of a payment. The specific 
choice they received was randomly determined, and the amount was added to their 
MTurk account at the corresponding time.  
Results and Discussion 
Choices of immediate versus delayed rewards 
In the current sample, participants' mean delayed discounting score was 3.34 
(SD = 2.15), indicating that people were generally more likely to choose immediate 
rewards over delayed rewards (see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1. Percentage of participants choosing immediate versus delayed rewards 
 
Condition 
 
 Immediate versus Delayed Monetary Choices   
 Choice 1 
$10   $12 
Choice 2 
$67   $85 
Choice 3 
$34   $35 
Choice 4 
$48   $55 
Choice 5 
$40   $70 
Choice 6 
$16   $30 
Choice 7 
$30   $35 
Choice 8 
$15   $35 
Positive 90 10 59 41  96 4 77 23 25 75 30 70 70 30 16 84 
Negative  82 19 71 29  94 6 80 20 26 74 29 71 82 19 20 80 
Neutral 86 15 70 30  93 7 75 25 17 83 26 74 79 21 9 91 
Total 86 14 67 33  94 6 77 23 22 78 29 71 77 23 15 85 
Note. Choice 1 = $10 tomorrow vs. $12 in 25 days; Choice 2 = $67 tomorrow vs. $85 in 70 days; Choice 
3= $34 tomorrow vs. $35 in 43 days; Choice 4 = $48 tomorrow vs. $55 in 45 days; Choice 5 = $40 
tomorrow vs. $70 in 20 days; Choice 6 = $16 tomorrow vs. $30 in 35 days; Choice 7 = $30 tomorrow 
vs. $35 in 20 days; Choice 8 = $15 tomorrow vs. $35 in 10 days.  
Preregistered analyses 
Manipulation check: how did emotion regulation condition influence 
subsequent emotions? As in Study 2, we conducted a MANCOVA to test this. 
Emotion regulation condition (positive, negative, neutral) was a between-subject factor, 
baseline positive and negative emotions were covariates, and experiences of positive 
and negative emotions after the emotion induction were dependent variables. Our 
preregistered hypotheses were that participants in the positive emotion regulation 
condition would experience more positive emotions than participants in the negative 
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and neutral emotion regulation conditions, and that participants in the negative emotion 
regulation condition would experience more negative emotions than participants in the 
positive and neutral emotion regulation conditions.  
The analysis revealed a significant multivariate effect of emotion regulation 
condition, F(4, 408) = 31.94, Wilks’ λ= .58, p < .001, 
2
p  = .24; there was a univariate 
effect of emotion regulation condition on positive emotions F(2, 205) = 42.21, p < .001, 
2
p  = .29, and a univariate effect of emotion regulation condition on negative emotions, 
F(2, 205) = 42.31, p < .001, 
2
p  = .29. Consistent with our predictions, simple effect 
tests showed that participants in the positive emotion regulation condition experienced 
more positive emotions (M = 4.84, SE = .11) than participants in the negative (M = 3.35, 
SE = .12; p < .001) and neutral (M = 4.20, SE = .11; p < .001) emotion regulation 
conditions. Participants in the neutral control condition experienced more positive 
emotions than participants in the negative emotion regulation condition (p < .001), 
although we did not preregister any predictions regarding this effect. Consistent with 
our predictions, participants in the negative emotion regulation condition experienced 
more negative emotions (M = 2.68, SE = .09) than participants in the positive (M = 1.69, 
SE = .09; p < .001) and neutral (M = 1.65, SE = .09; p < .001) emotion regulation 
conditions. Participants in the positive- and neutral emotion regulation conditions did 
not differ in negative emotions (p = .75), although we stated no predictions regarding 
this effect. These findings are shown in Figure 3.5 and suggest that participants 
experienced more of the emotion that they were instructed to regulate, suggesting that 
the emotion induction was successful. 
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Figure 3.5. Mean experiences of positive and negative emotions for participants 
assigned to the positive, negative, and neutral emotion regulation conditions. 
Did trait self-control moderate the effect of emotion regulation condition on 
subsequent emotions? As in Study 2, we conducted exploratory multiple regressions to 
examine whether trait self-control predicts differences in emotions after the emotion 
inductions. Two dummy variables were created; the first compared the negative emotion 
regulation condition (coded as 1) with the positive emotion regulation condition (coded 
as 0), and the second compared the neutral emotion regulation condition (coded as 1) 
with the positive emotion regulation condition (coded as 0). These dummy variables 
were entered into the regression along with trait self-control and their cross products to 
predict experiences of either positive or negative emotions, while controlling for 
baseline positive and negative emotions. To avoid repeating the results from the 
manipulation check above, below we report the effects that involve trait self-control 
only. 
Positive emotions. The multiple regression was significant, R2 = .70, F(7, 202) = 
67.50, p < .001. However, trait self-control did not predict positive emotions (β = -.08, p 
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= .24), when controlling for baseline emotions. This finding differs from Study 2 in 
which greater trait self-control generally predicted increased positive emotions after 
recalling the events. Moreover, the first dummy variable, which compared the negative 
emotion regulation condition with the positive emotion regulation condition, was not 
moderated by trait self-control to predict positive emotions, β = .15, p = .51, suggesting 
that the positive emotions of people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control did not 
differ in the negative vs. positive emotion regulation conditions. The second dummy 
variable, which compared the neutral emotion regulation condition with the positive 
emotion regulation condition, was marginally moderated by trait self-control, β = .42, p 
= .07, such that greater trait self-control was marginally related to greater positive 
emotions in the neutral emotion regulation condition compared to the positive emotion 
regulation condition.  
Negative emotions. The multiple regression was significant, R2 = .66, F(7, 202) 
= 56.71, p < .001. Nonetheless, trait self-control did not predict negative emotions, β = -
.02, p = .76, while controlling for baseline emotions. This finding is inconsistent with 
Study 2, which showed that greater trait self-control predicted less negative emotion 
after recalling negative events and when the expected task was high in self-control 
demand. Likewise, the first dummy variable, which compared the negative emotion 
regulation condition with the positive emotion regulation condition, was not moderated 
by trait self-control, β = .16, p = .51, and the second dummy variable, which compared 
the neutral emotion regulation condition with the positive emotion regulation condition, 
was also not moderated by trait self-control, β = .03, p = .92, suggesting that the 
negative emotions of participants higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control did not 
differ in the negative vs. positive emotion regulation conditions, or in the in the neutral 
vs. positive emotion regulation conditions.  
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Together, these findings generally suggest that people higher and lower in trait 
self-control experienced similar degrees of positive and negative emotions after being 
instructed to regulate their emotions to increase their positive, negative, and neutral 
emotions. 
How did emotion regulation condition influence self-control performance, 
and was this moderated by trait self-control? To test our preregistered hypotheses 
that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control would demonstrate increased 
self-control performance after taking part in the task intended to increase positive 
emotions, compared to after taking part in the task intended to increase negative 
emotions, we conducted a multiple regression. The same dummy variables as described 
above, along with trait self-control and their cross products, were entered as 
simultaneous predictors into a multiple regression to predict self-control performance.  
The multiple regression was not significant, R2 = .03, F(5, 204) = 1.20, p = .31. 
However, greater trait self-control predicted worse self-control performance, β = -.24, p 
= .047. Moreover, the first dummy variable, which compared the negative emotion 
regulation condition with the positive emotion regulation condition, was not significant, 
β = -.05, p = .54, and this effect was not moderated by trait self-control, β = .07, p = .48. 
Thus, inconsistent with our predictions, these findings suggest that participants in the 
negative- and positive emotion regulation conditions performed similarly on the self-
control task, independent of their level of trait self-control. Moreover, the second 
dummy variable, which compared the neutral emotion regulation condition with the 
positive emotion regulation condition, was not significant, β = -.006, p = .94, suggesting 
that participants in the neutral- and positive emotion regulation conditions performed 
similarly on the self-control task. However, this effect was moderated by trait self-
control, β = .19, p = .05, such that the slope of trait self-control was significantly steeper 
132 
(and increasing) in the neutral condition than the slope of trait self-control in the 
positive emotion regulation condition. These findings suggest that high trait self-control 
was related to worse self-control performance in the positive emotion regulation 
condition, relative to the neutral emotion regulation condition (in fact, the neutral 
condition was the only condition in which people with high trait self-control did not 
perform worse on the self-control task than people with low trait self-control; see Figure 
3.6).  
 
Figure 3.6. Estimated mean self-control performance for participants higher (+1 SD) 
and lower (-1 SD) in trait self-control in the positive, negative, and neutral emotion 
regulation conditions.  
These findings are inconsistent with our prediction that people higher, relative to 
lower, in trait self-control would demonstrate increased self-control performance after 
taking part in the task intended to increase positive emotions, compared to the task 
intended to increase negative emotions. Instead, Study 3 showed that greater trait self-
control predicted worse performance on the self-control task after taking part in the task 
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intended to increase positive emotion, compared to the neutral control task, suggesting 
that positive emotions were unhelpful to their self-control performance in Study 3.  
How did emotional experiences influence self-control performance, and was 
this moderated by trait self-control? Here we test the same research questions as 
above, although this time we use actual emotional experiences following the emotion 
induction as predictors, rather than emotion regulation condition. That is, to test the 
hypotheses that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control would demonstrate 
enhanced self-control performance when they experienced high levels of positive 
emotions and low levels of negative emotions, we entered trait self-control (centered), 
experiences of either positive or negative emotions (centered), and their cross products 
simultaneously into multiple regressions, to predict self-control performance.  
Positive emotions. The multiple regression was not significant for positive 
emotions, R2 = .01, F(3, 206) = 0.89, p = .45. That is, the simple effects of positive 
emotions β = -.08, p = .29, and trait self-control, β = -.06, p = .38, were not significant, 
and the interaction between positive emotions and trait self-control was also not 
significant, β = .04, p = .61. Thus, contrary to our hypotheses and the findings of Study 
2, these findings suggest that high levels of positive emotions do not help people higher, 
relative to lower, in trait self-control to succeed at self-control.  
Negative emotions. The multiple regression was not significant for negative 
emotions, R2 = .008, F(3, 206) = 0.54, p = .66. That is, the simple effects of negative 
emotions, β = .01, p = .85, and trait self-control, β = -.07, p = .37, were not significant, 
and the interaction between negative emotions and trait self-control was also not 
significant, β = .03, p = .72. Thus, inconsistent with our predictions and the findings of 
Study 2, these findings suggest that low levels of negative emotions do not help people 
higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control to succeed at self-control.  
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Inconsistent with Study 2, the findings obtained in Study 3 suggest that emotions 
(assessed through both emotion regulation condition and actual emotions experienced 
after the emotion induction) do not help people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-
control to succeed at self-control on a task that requires them to delay monetary 
rewards. Instead, it seems that being assigned to a positive emotion regulation condition 
might be detrimental to the performance of people with high trait self-control on this 
particular self-control task. 
General Discussion 
Building on insights from the instrumental theory of emotion regulation (Tamir, 
2009a), in three preregistered studies we examined whether people higher in trait self-
control regulate their emotions differently from those lower in trait self-control in the 
context of self-control, and whether this regulation and subsequent emotions facilitate 
self-control performance.  
Study 1 showed that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control 
considered positive emotions more useful and negative emotions less useful for their 
performance, although these beliefs did not translate into regulatory preferences. Study 
2 showed that, although trait self-control did not predict regulatory choice, trait self-
control predicted differences in emotions after the emotion regulation task; greater trait 
self-control predicted increased positive emotions overall and decreased negative 
emotions after the negative emotion regulation task in the high self-control demand 
situation. Study 2 further showed that people higher in trait self-control demonstrated 
enhanced self-control when they experienced increased positive and decreased negative 
emotions, though the latter was specific to the high self-control demand situation. 
However, a different pattern emerged when participants were randomly assigned to 
regulate emotions and performed another self-control task in Study 3; trait self-control 
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did not predict differences in emotions after the emotion regulation task, and emotions 
did not enhance the self-control performance of people higher in trait self-control.  
Expected emotion utility beliefs in the context of self-control 
Tornquist and Miles (2018) showed that people generally consider positive 
emotions more useful for their everyday self-control success than negative emotions, 
and that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control consider positive emotions 
more useful and negative emotions less useful in these situations. Study 1 extends this 
work by showing that these beliefs transfer to a laboratory self-control task, as well as a 
performance task that does not require self-control. In particular, Study 1 showed that 
participants considered positive emotions more useful to their performance on lab tasks 
that were both high and low in self-control demand, as compared to negative emotions, 
and that people higher in trait self-control considered positive emotions more useful and 
negative emotions less useful to their performance in these situations, as compared to 
people lower in trait self-control.  
Emotion regulation in the context of self-control 
In extending Tornquist and Miles’s (2018) study, our data allowed us to test 
whether beliefs about the utility of emotions translate into preferences and choice to 
regulate emotions. As such, we found that participants demonstrated greater preferences 
to engage in activities aimed at increasing their positive, compared to negative, 
emotions (i.e., recalling positive vs. negative events; Study 1 and 2), and that they were 
more likely to choose to engage in activities aimed at increasing their positive, 
compared to negative, emotions (i.e., recalling positive vs. negative events; Study 2), 
when expecting to perform tasks high and low in self-control demand. Together, our 
findings suggest that people’s beliefs that positive (vs. negative) emotions will enhance 
their performance in situations that are high and low in self-control demand do translate 
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into greater preferences and choice to regulate positive (vs. negative) emotions in these 
situations. These findings therefore support the view that people attempt to upregulate 
the emotions they consider useful in performance contexts (Tamir et al., 2015), although 
our findings do not support the view that these findings should be particularly evident in 
highly demanding situations.  
However, one may argue that these preferences and choices to engage in 
emotion-eliciting activities may reflect people’s general preferences to engage in these 
activities, rather than their preferences to engage in these activities because they are 
functional for the upcoming tasks. Prior research into instrumental emotion regulation 
has similarly assessed people’s preferences and choices to engage in emotion-eliciting 
activities (e.g., listen to music, recall a personal event, watch film clips, and read 
articles, that vary by emotion) in performance situations that are high vs. low in demand 
(Tamir, 2005; Tamir, 2009b; Tamir & Ford, 2012; Tamir et al., 2015; Tamir et al., 
2008), and have typically found that these preferences and choices are specific to 
situations that are highly demanding, ruling out the possibility that these preferences 
and choices reflect people’s general preferences to engage in these activities. 
In contrast, people’s preferences and choices were not moderated by self-control 
demand in the current studies. Hence, in order to rule out this alternative interpretation 
and to ensure that people’s preferences and choices reflect their preferences to engage in 
these emotion-eliciting activities because they are functional for the upcoming self-
control task, future research might benefit from providing participants with material that 
informs them that people sometimes decide to engage in activities that they believe will 
facilitate their performance, and that they should keep this in mind when making their 
own choices to engage in various activities before completing their assigned 
performance task. In a related vein, in addition to including items that measure people’s 
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preferences and choices to engage in emotion-eliciting activities, future studies should 
include items that ask participants whether they believe that engaging in these activities 
could help them to succeed on the upcoming self-control task. This approach would 
allow us to more directly assess whether people’s preferences and choices to engage in 
emotion-eliciting activities reflect their preferences to engage in these activities because 
they believe that these activities are functional for the upcoming self-control task. 
Important to our purposes, these preferences and choice to regulate emotions did 
not vary by trait self-control (Study 1 and 2), suggesting that, even though trait self-
control predicted differences in beliefs about the utility of emotions, these differences in 
beliefs did not translate into differences in preferences and choice to regulate emotions. 
Inconsistent with the instrumental emotion regulation framework, our findings therefore 
suggest that beliefs about the utility of emotions does not translate into attempts to 
regulate emotions for people with high trait self-control, indicating that individual 
differences in trait self-control might moderate the link between beliefs about the utility 
of emotions and attempts to regulate emotions.  
These findings raise the question of why people higher, relative to lower, in trait 
self-control rated positive emotions as more useful to their performance but were then 
not more likely to choose to regulate their emotions to increase their positive emotions. 
One possible explanation might be that people with high trait self-control regulate their 
emotions more implicitly, as opposed to making deliberate choices about how to 
regulate emotions. There is indeed growing evidence that suggests that emotion 
regulation can operate on automatic or implicit levels (Koole, Webb, & Sheeran, 2015). 
Specifically, implicit emotion regulation is the enactment of emotion regulation without 
the need for deliberation about how to regulate emotions. Implicit emotion regulation 
occurs when a person has consistently and frequently used an emotion regulation 
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strategy in a particular situation, and the use of this strategy in that situation has 
therefore become habitual and unconscious (Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011; Koole, 
Webb, & Sheeran, 2015). For example, a young boy who feels anxious and sad when 
his parents drop him off at preschool might deliberately and repeatedly seek to 
downregulate these emotions by distracting himself with a comforting toy in this 
situation. However, over time, he may enact distraction without conscious control to 
reduce these negative emotions (he may, for example, automatically look away when 
his parents leave), indicating implicit emotion regulation. Thus, given the evidence that 
emotion regulation can operate on automatic or implicit levels (Koole, Webb, & 
Sheeran, 2015) and that people higher in trait self-control are more likely than others to 
rely on habitual automatic behaviors to achieve their goals (de Ridder et al., 2012; 
Gillebaart & de Ridder, 2015), it is possible trait self-control failed to predict choice to 
regulate emotions because making such choices may not be a part of a high trait self-
control person’s daily routines, who may instead regulate emotions without awareness 
and conscious control. 
Based on these accounts, future studies should seek to further our understanding 
of whether people with high trait self-control are generally more likely than others to 
regulate their emotions habitually and implicitly, both in the lab and in real-life (see 
Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011, for an overview of habitual emotion regulation). 
Moreover, important to our purposes, future studies that aim to study people with high 
trait self-control using the instrumental emotion regulation framework should use a 
more implicit measure of emotion regulation to assess how people with high trait self-
control regulate their emotions when expecting to perform a self-control task. For 
example, given that primes are often used to implicitly elicit emotions in people (e.g., 
emotional prime words or pictures; Lench et al., 2011), researchers could present 
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participants with subtle pictures that vary in emotional content (e.g., a picture of an 
extended middle finger would represent anger), and ask participants to press the 
spacebar when they see a picture category that they want to see more of before 
completing the self-control task. More responses for pictures representing anger would 
indicate an (implicit) attempt to upregulate this emotion (see Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 
2011, for other implicit emotion regulation tasks). This approach would help us 
understand whether and how people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control 
regulate their emotions implicitly in the context of self-control.  
Another possibility that could explain why trait self-control failed to predict 
regulatory choice is that making choices can be difficult and taxing (Vohs et al., 2008). 
Indeed, the ego depletion model predicts that using self-control on a first task (e.g., a 
choice task) leads to self-control failure on a second task (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998). Hence, it is possible that people with high trait self-control in 
the current study refrained from making these difficult choices about emotion regulation 
to avoid failing on the upcoming performance task, resulting in these null findings. 
Again, using a more implicit measure of regulatory attempts that does not involve 
making deliberate choices might help to overcome this potential caveat given that 
implicit measures are thought to be effortless and thus non-depleting.  
Interestingly, rather than predicting preferences and choice to regulate emotions, 
Study 2 showed that trait self-control predicted differences in emotions immediately 
after the regulatory tasks and thus right before performing the self-control task. That is, 
greater trait self-control predicted increased positive emotions after recalling the events 
overall, and greater trait self-control also predicted decreased negative emotions after 
recalling negative events in the situation that was high (but not low) in self-control 
demand, after controlling for baseline emotions. Thus, it seems that trait self-control 
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predicts beliefs about the utility of emotions and that these beliefs translate into 
differences in emotions after completing a regulatory task.  
One potential explanation for why trait self-control predicted differences in 
emotions may be that people higher and lower in trait self-control regulated their 
emotions differently during the recall, resulting in differences in emotions. Specifically, 
it is possible that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control regulated their 
emotions in ways that led to increased positive emotions overall, and that they regulated 
their emotions in ways that led decreased negative emotions when recalling a negative 
event and when expecting to perform a task high in self-control demand. This 
interpretation that trait self-control predicted differences in emotion regulation, which 
then resulted in differences in emotions, in consistent with prior work that has shown 
that trait self-control predicts differences in emotion regulation, such that people high in 
trait self-control regulate emotions more effectively in the lab and use emotion 
regulation more frequently in real-life, as compared to people low in trait self-control 
(Hennecke et al., 2018; Paschke et al., 2016).  
Another possible interpretation is that, rather than regulating emotions 
differently, people higher and lower in trait self-control responded differently to the 
emotion inductions, resulting in differences in emotions. For example, prior research 
has shown that adolescents higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control respond 
differently (i.e., demonstrate less reactivity) to daily stressors (Galla & Wood, 2015), 
indicating that they better cope with negative experiences, which could help explain 
why people with high trait self-control felt less negative emotions after the negative 
recall in this study. Others have similarly examined individual differences in response to 
emotion inductions and have found that high extraversion predicts increased positive 
emotions after completing an induction aimed at increasing positive emotions, and that 
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high neuroticism predicts increased negative emotions after completing an induction 
aimed at increasing negative emotions (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; see also Blackburn, 
Cameron, & Deary, 1990; Scherrer & Dobson, 2009). These data underline the 
importance of considering individual differences when using emotion inductions to 
manipulate emotions and, more importantly, warrant continued research into whether 
trait self-control predicts emotions in response to emotion inductions. Such research 
could help disentangle whether the observed differences in emotions in this study are 
due to emotion regulation or reactivity to emotional events.  
It is, of course, also possible that greater trait self-control predicted more 
positive and less negative emotion after the recall (while controlling for baseline 
emotions) because people with high trait self-control had more positive and fewer 
negative experiences to write about, as compared to people with low trait self-control 
(given the link between high trait self-control and positive life outcomes: Tangney et al., 
2004). Nonetheless, exploratory analyses partially ruled out this possibility by showing 
that the positive and negative content in the essays did not vary by trait self-control.10 It 
therefore seems more plausible that the observed differences in emotions following the 
recall are due to differences in emotion regulation or differences in reactivity to 
emotional events. 
However, the findings that trait self-control predicted differences in emotions 
should be regarded cautiously as they failed to replicate in Study 3. That is, when 
participants were assigned to (rather than choosing) emotion regulation conditions in 
Study 3, trait self-control did not predict differences in emotions after recalling positive, 
negative, and neutral events, with one potential explanation being that they regulated 
their emotions similarly during the tasks, resulting in similar emotions. Based on these 
data, it is possible that whether trait self-control predicts differences in emotions after 
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recalling emotional events might depend on whether they choose or are instructed how 
to regulate emotions, such that trait self-control only predicts differences in emotions in 
the case of the former, perhaps because people higher and lower in trait self-control 
only regulate emotions differently in this situation.  
One potential reason for why trait self-control failed to predict differences in 
emotions after being instructed how to regulate emotions might be that people higher in 
trait self-control are more likely to stick to rules (e.g., keeping the speed limit, wearing 
seatbelts; de Ridder et al.,2012), which may suggest that, when receiving instructions 
about how to regulate, people higher in trait self-control may have focused on regulating 
their emotions consistent with these instructions, rather than consistent with their 
emotional preferences, resulting in similar emotions as people lower in trait self-control.  
An alternative explanation might be that people higher in trait self-control did 
not attempt to regulate emotions in this situation, perhaps because they believed that 
such attempts would be unhelpful to their self-control performance in Study 3, resulting 
in similar emotions as people lower in trait self-control. Thus, throughout this article we 
have argued that people with high trait self-control use emotions and emotion regulation 
as tools to succeed at self-control in general, but it actually seems more plausible that 
these tools may only be helpful in certain self-control situations, and that other tools 
may be more adaptive in these situations. Hence, perhaps the most effective way to 
succeed at the self-control task in Study 3 was to use other tools. If this is true, people 
higher in trait self-control may have recognized this and decided not to regulate 
emotions in this situation, resulting in similar emotions as those lower in trait self-
control. These speculations warrant further investigation; future studies could, for 
instance, explore which strategies people with high trait self-control might use in this 
situation, and test the effectiveness of these strategies in an experimental setting.  
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Hence, these data provide modest evidence that people higher in trait self-
control differ in emotions from those lower in trait self-control following an emotion 
regulation task, with one possible explanation being that they regulate their emotions 
differently during the task, although whether and how people with high trait self-control 
regulate emotions in the context of self-control seem to depend on contextual factors 
such as whether they expect to perform a task that is high or low in self-control demand, 
the nature of the expected self-control task (i.e., anagram vs. delay task), and whether 
they choose or are instructed how to regulate emotions.   
Trait self-control and self-control performance 
Consistent with research suggesting that people higher in trait self-control 
perform better on self-control tasks than people lower in trait self-control (e.g., Friese & 
Hofmann, 2009; Schmeichel & Zell, 2007), Study 2 found that greater trait self-control 
predicted better self-control performance. In contrast, Study 3 found that greater trait 
self-control predicted worse self-control performance, which is more consistent with 
work showing that people higher in trait self-control are more likely to fail at self-
control, as compared to people lower in trait self-control (e.g., Imhoff et al., 2014).  
One possible explanation for these contradictory findings is that the self-control 
performance of people with high trait self-control depends on the demands of the self-
control task. For example, Imhoff et al. (2014) suggested that people higher in trait self-
control might be bad at tasks that require them to inhibit temptations, and that they 
might be good at tasks that require them to initiate short-term efforts. The current data 
supports this idea, as we found that people higher in trait self-control demonstrated 
enhanced self-control performance on a task that required initiation (i.e., generate 
anagram solutions; Study 2), but that they demonstrated impaired self-control 
performance on a task that required inhibition (i.e., resist immediate rewards; Study 3). 
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These findings underline the importance of considering the self-control demands of the 
task (along with other plausible moderators) when examining whether trait self-control 
predict self-control performance (see also de Boer, van Hooft, & Bakker, 2011; 
Tornquist & Miles, 2018).  
Emotions and self-control performance 
Contrary to prior work showing that participants assigned to a positive emotion 
induction demonstrate better self-control performance than those assigned to a negative 
emotion induction (e.g., Winterich & Haws, 2011), in Study 2 we did not find that 
participants in the positive emotion regulation condition performed better on the self-
control task than participants in the negative emotion regulation condition, and this 
effect did also not vary by trait self-control, suggesting that the self-control performance 
of people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control was unaffected by whether they 
chose to recall positive or negative events.  
There was similarly no effect of emotion regulation condition on self-control in 
Study 3, suggesting that participants in the positive, negative, and neutral emotion 
regulation conditions demonstrated similar self-control performance, although, in 
contrast to Study 2, this effect varied by trait self-control in Study 3. That is, high trait 
self-control predicted worse self-control performance after being instructed to recall 
positive events, as compared to after being instructed to recall neutral events. However, 
inconsistent with our predictions, greater trait self-control did not predict enhanced self-
control performance after being instructed to recall positive events, compared to after 
being instructed to recall negative events. Thus, contrary to the view that positive 
emotions should boost the self-control performance of people higher, relative to lower, 
in trait self-control, these findings suggest that positive emotions are detrimental to the 
self-control performance of people with high trait self-control.  
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Interestingly, a different pattern emerged when regressing participants’ actual 
emotions, rather than their choice to regulate emotions, on self-control performance in 
Study 2. That is, we found that the effects of positive and negative emotions on self-
control performance varied by trait self-control; people higher, relative to lower, in trait 
self-control demonstrated better self-control performance when they were high in 
positive emotions across situations, and when they were low in negative emotions in the 
situation high in self-control demand. These data provide tentative evidence that, when 
using actual emotions as predictors, increased positive and decreased negative emotions 
help people with high trait self-control to succeed at self-control, as compared to people 
with low trait self-control. These findings might also provide clarity as to why people 
higher in trait self-control (presumably) regulated their emotions in ways that resulted in 
increased positive and decreased negative emotions after the recall; because these 
emotions facilitate their self-control. However, these findings should be accepted 
cautiously given that they failed to replicate when participants were instructed how to 
regulate emotions and when performing another self-control task in Study 3. Thus, more 
data is needed to confirm whether emotion regulation and emotions help people with 
high trait self-control to succeed at self-control.  
One possible reason for why positive emotions helped people higher, relative to 
lower, in trait self-control to succeed at self-control in Study 2 but not in Study 3 might 
be that it is more adaptive for people with high trait self-control to choose, rather than 
being instructed, how to regulate emotions. For example, given that participants in 
Study 2 were able to flexibly choose among various positive and negative regulatory 
options, rather than being assigned one emotion to regulate as in Study 3, the emotion 
regulation task in Study 2 may have allowed for more flexible emotion regulation (that 
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is, to choose the emotion regulation option that best fit that particular situation) which 
might be beneficial to the self-control performance of people with high trait self-control.  
Indirect support for this idea comes from research on emotion regulation 
flexibility and research that has linked psychological flexibility with self-control. That 
is, researchers have suggested that the most adaptive way to regulate emotions is being 
able to flexibly regulate emotions in ways that best fit the situation (Aldao, 2013; 
Bonanno & Burton, 2013). Others have suggested that people who score high in 
psychological flexibility (also called flexibility), which broadly refers to the ability to 
persist or change a behavior depending on what the situation affords (see Kashdan & 
Rottenberg, 2010, for an overview of this construct), persist longer on a cold pressor 
task (Feldner et al., 2006), indicating that greater flexibility predicts enhanced self-
control. It has further been suggested that people higher in trait self-control are 
generally more flexible than people lower in trait self-control (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 
2010). These lines of research may help explain why emotions boosted the self-control 
performance of people with high trait self-control in Study 2 but not in Study 3: because 
the flexible and autonomous nature of the regulatory task in Study 2 was a more 
adaptive and natural way for them to regulate emotions than the instructed regulatory 
task in Study 3, which then facilitated their self-control performance.  
One possible explanation for why flexibility (although not emotion regulation 
flexibility per se) might facilitate self-control comes from Kashdan and Rottenberg 
(2010) who argued that flexibility in the form of being able to shift from a present 
orientation (e.g., wanting fattening food now) to a future orientation (e.g., wanting to 
train properly for a marathon) is crucial for long-term goal pursuit (e.g., successfully 
complete a marathon). Nonetheless, given that these ideas are very speculative, future 
studies should directly test whether trait self-control predicts flexibility, particularly 
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emotion regulation flexibility, in the context of self-control and whether this flexibility 
leads to improvements in self-control. 
Another plausible explanation for why positive emotions helped people higher, 
relative to lower, in trait self-control to succeed at self-control in Study 2 but not in 
Study 3, is that the influence of positive emotions on self-control might depend on the 
self-control task. For example, the effect of positive emotions on self-control may 
depend on whether the task requires initiatory or inhibitory self-control, as we found 
that positive emotions were helpful to people’s performance on the anagram task in 
Study 2, which is assumed to involve initiatory self-control (Imhoff et al., 2014), but 
unhelpful to people’s performance on the delay discounting task in Study 3, which is 
assumed to involve inhibitory self-control (Tuk et al., 2015). This idea is consistent with 
prior work showing that people believe that positive emotions are more likely to help 
them succeed in initiatory than inhibitory self-control situations (Tornquist & Miles, 
2018), and other research providing evidence to link positive emotions with initiatory 
self-control (de Boer et al., 2011) or with initiation in general (Albarracin & Hart, 2011; 
Fredrickson, 2001). This could help explain why people higher in trait self-control 
performed particularly bad on the self-control task in the positive-regulatory condition 
in Study 3; because positive emotions might be unhelpful for this inhibitory self-control 
task. Future studies should therefore examine whether positive emotions enhance self-
control more when the task involves initiatory vs. inhibitory self-control, and how this 
vary by trait self-control. For example, researchers could induce positive emotions in 
participants and have them perform tasks that requires initiatory and inhibitory self-
control, and test whether positive emotions benefit the former more than the latter. 
Thus far, we have argued that the anagram task in Study 2 requires initiatory 
self-control and that the delay discounting task in Study 3 requires inhibitory self-
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control, that people with high trait self-control might be better at initiatory self-control 
than inhibitory self-control, and that positive emotions might benefit the former more 
than the latter. Broadly, this suggests that it is important to distinguish between these 
two types of self-control in the self-control literature (see also Davisson, 2013; de Boer, 
van Hooft, & Bakker, 2011), although it is also important to point out that this 
distinction may not always be clear-cut and that these self-control types may depend on 
each other (Davisson, 2013). Using the anagram task in Study 2 as an example, to 
succeed on this task a person may first need to inhibit a behavior (e.g., resist playing 
with their smartphone in the lab) in order to initiate another (e.g., generate as many 
anagram solutions as possible), suggesting that these self-control types rely on each 
other. In addition, it also seems equally important to further our understanding of 
whether there are additional types of self-control. For example, it seems plausible that 
initiating a behavior (e.g., go for a run) is somewhat different from persisting in a 
behavior (e.g., keep running when feeling tired), and that persistence may therefore be 
categorized as a separate, but related, form of self-control. These ideas provide 
interesting avenues for future research. Thus, in order to fully understand how self-
control operates, future studies should investigate whether people typically inhibit self-
control behaviors in order to initiate other self-control behaviors (or vice versa), and 
whether there are additional distinct forms of self-control (e.g., persistence). 
In a related vein, given that we used three different self-control tasks in this 
investigation, which are not only likely to vary in initiation and inhibition, but also in 
self-control demand, it is possible that the effects of positive emotions on self-control 
depend on the extent to which the tasks require a person to use self-control. For 
example, it might require a person to use more self-control to resist the opportunity to 
receive money the next day (delay discounting task; Study 3) than persisting on an 
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unsolvable task in the lab (anagram task; Study 2), which might indicate that positive 
emotions are more beneficial for performance on tasks that require moderate degrees of 
self-control, as compared to tasks that require a great deal of self-control. Thus, future 
research should test whether the extent to which a task requires self-control exertion 
moderates the links between positive emotions, trait self-control, and self-control 
performance. 
It is also possible that positive emotions failed to enhance self-control on the 
delay discounting task in Study 3 because our participants were U.S. Mturk workers, 
who have lower income than the general U.S. population and often use MTurk as a 
source of income (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Thus, it is possible that our 
participants in Study 3 were particularly motivated to make money fast and therefore 
chose the immediate rewards, independent of their positive emotions (i.e., the 
motivation to make money was too strong for positive emotions to be helpful), as 
compared to our undergraduates in Study 2 who were given course credit for 
participating regardless of their performance. Indeed, the mean delayed discounting 
score in the sample was 3.34 (SD = 2.15; scale 0-8, with a score of zero indicating that 
the person always chose immediate rewards), indicating that our participants were 
indeed motivated to receive money the next day.  
This idea is consistent with prior work showing that positive emotions only 
boost performance on this task when the delayed reward is much greater than the 
immediate reward (Pyone & Isen, 2011), confirming that positive emotions are only 
useful to performance on this task under certain circumstances (i.e., when the reward is 
large enough to be worth waiting for). This might suggest that the nature of the reward 
determine people’s attempts to regulate positive emotions, such that they may only 
attempt to upregulate positive emotions when the long-term rewards are much greater 
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than the short-term rewards. Thus, future studies could measure, and control for, 
participants income, and also seek to include more and larger monetary choices when 
examining how emotion regulation behaviors influence this particular self-control task.  
Thus, this suggests that positive emotions may indeed help people higher, 
relative to lower, in trait self-control to achieve self-control success, but that this is only 
true in certain self-control situations such as in the anagram situation in Study 2. That is, 
this was not observed in the delay discounting situation in Study 3, perhaps due to the 
particular sample used in this study, or because this task required inhibition, or because 
this task was too high in self-control demand, or because the reward was not large 
enough for positive emotions to be helpful.  
Conclusions 
We conclude that people generally believe that positive emotions are more 
useful to their performance than negative emotions across contexts, and that these 
beliefs translate into greater attempts to regulate emotions to increase their positive, 
compared to negative, emotions, in these situations. We further conclude that people 
higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control believe that positive emotions are more 
useful and that negative emotions are less useful to their performance across contexts, 
although these differences in beliefs do not translate into differences in attempts to 
regulate these emotions, perhaps because people with high trait self-control rely more 
on implicit emotion regulation or because making choices about emotion regulation is 
taxing and may have negative consequences on subsequent self-control. Notably, 
modest evidence was found that people higher in trait self-control experienced more 
positive and less negative emotion after a regulatory task, with one interpretation being 
that they regulated emotions differently. Tentative evidence was also found that 
increased positive and decreased negative emotions helped people higher in trait self-
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control to succeed at self-control, though these effects seem to depend on contextual 
factors.  
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Footnotes 
1 As described in the main text, the emotion x trait self-control interaction was 
significant without controlling for current affect, F(1, 208) = 28.26, p < .001, 
2
p  = .12; 
trait self-control predicted utility ratings for positive, β = .23, p = .001, and negative, β = 
-.28, p < .001, emotions across tasks. This interaction remained significant when 
controlling for current affect, F(1, 208) = 22.94, p < .001, 
2
p  = .10; trait self-control 
predicted utility ratings for positive, β = .17, p = .01, and negative, β = -.29, p < .001, 
emotions across the tasks. Thus, excluding current affect as a covariate from our 
analyses did not change our key conclusion that people higher in trait self-control 
consider positive emotions more useful and negative emotions less useful to their 
performance across situations. 
2 The typing tasks used in Study 1 were selected by presenting undergraduates 
(N = 26) with four potentially high self-control tasks that are often used as dependent 
measures of self-control in self-control research (i.e., retyping text while following 
complex rules, solving unsolvable anagrams, and tracing an unsolvable maze and an 
unsolvable figure) and four potentially low self-control tasks (i.e., retyping text, 
watching a video clip, playing Tetris, and listening to music) and asking them to rate the 
tasks for their self-control demand on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). The high 
self-control typing task in Study 1 (along with the anagram task) received a high mean 
self-control demand score relative to the other high self-control tasks, whereas the low 
self-control typing task in Study 1 (along with the music task) received a low mean self-
control demand score relative to the other low self-control tasks. Notably, participants 
judged the high self-control typing task to involve more self-control demand (M = 4.45, 
SD = .1.27) than the low self-control typing task (M = 2.78, SD = 1.14), t(25) = 5.39, p 
< .001, d = 1.06. 
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3 To ensure data quality on MTurk (Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014), in Study 
1 we included several instructional attention check questions that were embedded within 
the other surveys (these attention checks are available on the OSF website). Participants 
who failed to provide the correct answer were immediately thanked and dismissed. That 
is, they did not complete the remaining tasks and their provided data was automatically 
disregarded.  
4 Participants were dismissed after providing their utility ratings or regulatory 
preference ratings because Study 1 was designed to test the emotions people, 
particularly people higher in trait self-control, consider useful in performance situations 
that are high and low in self-control demand, and whether these beliefs translate into 
preferences to regulate emotions. Study 2 and Study 3 were, however, designed to test 
whether these beliefs and regulatory preferences translate into actual choice to regulate 
emotions and improvements in self-control performance.  
5 We included a personality measure in Study 1 for exploratory purposes, which 
is beyond the scope of the current investigation. That is, Goldberg’s (1999) Big Five 
International Personality Item Pool scales (this measure is available on the OSF 
website) were used to measure Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, 
Neuroticism, and Openness. 
6 We preregistered that we would conduct exploratory correlations to examine 
the relationships between trait self-control and utility ratings as well as regulatory 
preference ratings for pride, hope, guilt, anger, and worry, in situations that were high 
and low in self-control demand. These results are available online and were generally 
consistent with our overall findings that greater trait self-control predicted increased and 
decreased utility ratings for positive and negative emotions, respectively, but that trait 
self-control was unrelated to preferences to regulate these emotions.   
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7 Participants who selected to write about (1) pride (27%) wrote about 
achievement, (2) joy (8%) wrote about laughter and having fun, (3) serenity (20%) 
wrote about a spa experience, natural beauty, or meditation, (4) hope (19%) wrote about 
exam results, future events related to having a career, and moving abroad, (5) guilt (2%) 
wrote about social relationships, (6) anxiety (18%) wrote about other people being in 
danger, financial issues, health concerns, or the possible loss of a loved one, and (7) 
anger (6%) wrote about being unfairly accused of things by others. Average time spent 
on the writing task was 8.65 minutes (SD = 1.91). Time spent on the writing task did not 
differ for participants who wrote about a positive (M = 8.54, SD = 1.97) and a negative 
(M = 8.99, SD = 1.74) event, t(138) = 1.23, p = .22, d = .24, or for participants assigned 
to the high (M = 8.70, SD = 1.89) and low (M = 8.61, SD = 1.95) self-control demand 
conditions, t(138) = .25, p = .80, d = .05. Thus, it seems that participants actively 
engaged with the task. 
8 The supplemental study described in Footnote 2 also showed that participants 
judged the anagram task in Study 2 to involve more self-control demand (M = 4.86, SD 
= 1.33) than the music task (M = 2.07, SD = 1.08), t(25) = 7.99, p < .001, d = 1.58.  
9 Participants assigned to the low self-control demand (i.e., music) condition 
were told that they had been assigned to solve the remaining anagrams instead of 
listening to more music because this procedure allowed us to obtain comparable 
measures of self-control performance for participants who had regulated their emotions 
expecting self-control demand, compared to participants who had regulated their 
emotions not expecting self-control demand.  
10 Given the interesting finding that people higher and lower in trait self-control 
experienced emotions differently after the recall, we conducted non-preregistered 
exploratory content analyses (LIWC: Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007) to examine 
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whether these differences in emotions could be explained by the content people higher 
and lower in trait self-control wrote about. Thus, we analyzed whether trait self-control 
predicted the percentage of positive and negative words used in the essays. These data 
(available upon request) demonstrated no differences in content between people higher 
and lower in trait self-control, suggesting that differences in emotions after the recall 
cannot be explained by the content.  
11 We conducted non-preregistered analyses to examine whether the results 
obtained in Study 1 regarding people’s preferences to regulate emotions replicated in 
Study 2. Specifically, we conducted the equivalent ANOVA as in Study 1 to examine 
the emotions that people prefer to regulate in performance contexts that are high and 
low in self-control demand, and whether this vary by trait self-control. The findings of 
Study 2 were identical to the findings of Study 1 (with one minor exception, which was 
not relevant to our key tests) and thus suggesting that trait self-control does not predict 
differences in preferences to regulate emotions. These results are reported on the OSF 
website.  
12 As in Study 1, we included several instructional attention checks in Study 3, 
that were embedded within the other surveys and/or tasks. For example, participants 
were instructed to “answer a 4 on this statement”. Participants who failed to provide the 
correct answer were immediately thanked and dismissed. Thus, they did not complete 
the remaining tasks and their provided data was automatically disregarded.  
13 Participants practiced the choice task before recalling the events (and thus 
before regulating their emotions) in Study 3 to be consistent with our two previous 
studies which both used this procedure. The practice phase is an important aspect of the 
current framework given that it gives participants an idea about how challenging the 
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expected tasks will be, allowing them to regulate their emotions in ways that might be 
adaptive for this particular task. 
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Chapter 4: General Discussion 
As yet, little is known about the specific strategies that people higher in trait 
self-control might use to succeed at self-control and achieve their goals. Understanding 
how people can achieve self-control success has practical importance, given that this 
knowledge can be used to design interventions aimed at improving self-control in 
people who often fail at self-control, and thus help them to achieve their aspirations and 
goals. This thesis presented a programme of research aimed at understanding whether 
emotion regulation might be one strategy that people with high trait self-control use to 
achieve self-control success. In particular, this thesis aimed to combine research on self-
control, emotions, and instrumental emotion regulation, to examine whether people 
higher in trait self-control regulate their emotions differently from those lower in trait 
self-control in the context of self-control, and whether this regulation and subsequent 
emotions facilitate their self-control performance.  
In this chapter, I first summarize the findings obtained in Chapters 2 and 3. I 
then discuss my findings in the context of my overall research question, that is, whether 
people higher in trait self-control regulate their emotions differently from people lower 
in trait self-control in the context of self-control, and whether this regulation and 
subsequent emotions then help them to succeed at self-control. Following this, I provide 
a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of this research, and I then 
address the limitations of this research and make suggestions for future work.  
Summary of findings 
The studies presented in Chapter 2 demonstrated that people considered positive 
emotions more useful for their success in everyday self-control situations than negative 
emotions, but that this effect was moderated by the type of self-control required and 
trait self-control. Specifically, people considered positive emotions more useful for their 
success in situations that required them to use initiatory self-control compared to 
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situations that required them to use inhibitory self-control, whereas the opposite was 
found for negative emotions. Furthermore, people higher in trait self-control considered 
positive emotions more useful and negative emotions less useful for their success in 
everyday self-control situations that required both initiatory and inhibitory self-control, 
as compared to people lower in trait self-control.  
Chapter 3 then showed that people considered positive emotions more useful for 
their performance than negative emotions in laboratory performance situations that were 
both high and low in self-control demand, and that these beliefs translated into greater 
preferences and choice to regulate positive, as compared to negative, emotions. Chapter 
3 further showed that beliefs about the utility of emotions varied by trait self-control 
such that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control considered positive 
emotions more useful and negative emotions less useful for their performance in 
laboratory situations that were both high and low in self-control demand. However, 
these differences in beliefs did not translate into differences in preferences or choice to 
regulate emotions. Instead, modest evidence was found that people higher, relative to 
lower, in trait self-control experienced more positive and less negative emotion after a 
regulatory task, and that increased positive and decreased negative emotions helped 
them to succeed at self-control, although these findings did not replicate in a carefully 
controlled setting where participants were randomly assigned to regulate emotions and 
when using a different self-control task.  
Overall, this thesis finds consistent evidence that people consider positive 
emotions more useful to their performance than negative emotions in various self-
control situations and in one situation that does not require self-control, and that these 
beliefs translate into greater preferences and choice to regulate positive, as compared to 
negative, emotions in these situations. These beliefs and preferences did, however, not 
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translate into improvements in self-control performance, suggesting that these findings 
are more consistent with hedonic, as opposed to instrumental, views of emotion 
regulation, which hold that people generally regulate emotions to maximize positive and 
minimize negative emotions (e.g., Larsen, 2000).  
Crucially, this thesis also finds consistent evidence that people higher, relative to 
lower, in trait self-control consider positive emotions more useful and negative 
emotions less useful to their performance in various self-control situations and in one 
situation that does not require self-control, but that these differences in beliefs do not 
translate into differences in preferences and choice to regulate emotions. Rather, these 
differences in beliefs translate into differences in emotions after a regulatory task and, 
consistent with the instrumental theory of emotion regulation (Tamir, 2009a), 
improvements in self-control performance. That is, this thesis finds that greater trait 
self-control predicts more positive and less negative emotion after a regulatory task, and 
that increased positive and decreased negative emotions facilitate the self-control 
performance of people with high trait self-control, although these findings seem to be 
very likely to depend on contextual factors.  
Did people higher in trait self-control regulate their emotions differently 
from people lower in trait self-control in the context of self-control? Because beliefs 
about the utility of emotions have been used as an index of emotion regulation in prior 
work (as reviewed in Chapter 1) and that greater trait self-control consistently predicted 
differences in beliefs about the utility of emotions, at first glance it seems that trait self-
control indeed predicts differences in emotion regulation. However, my data failed to 
support this as trait self-control did not predict preferences or choice to regulate 
emotions by recalling emotional events, which served as measures of regulatory 
attempts in the current research. Thus, in light of the current theoretical perspective, 
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people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control differ in the emotions they consider 
useful in the context of self-control, but they do not seem to attempt to regulate their 
emotions differently in this context.   
However, stepping outside the current perspective, I unexpectedly found that 
trait self-control predicted differences in emotions after an emotion regulation task, and 
that these differences in emotions were consistent with their beliefs about the utility of 
emotions. Thus, it seems that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control differ 
in their beliefs about the utility of emotions, and that these differences in beliefs 
translate into differences in emotions after a regulatory task, rather than into their 
preferences and choice to regulate emotions as initially proposed. These findings 
therefore provide tentative evidence that people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-
control may indeed regulate their emotions differently in the context of self-control, as 
indicated by their emotional experiences following an emotion regulation task.  
The results further showed that trait self-control only predicted differences in 
emotions when participants could choose how to regulate emotions and when the 
expected self-control task involved solving anagrams, but not when participants were 
randomly assigned to regulate emotions and when the expected self-control task 
involved delaying gratification. Thus, I initially proposed that people higher, relative to 
lower, in trait self-control should regulate emotions differently in the context of self-
control in general, but based on these findings, I speculate that they may regulate their 
emotions differently in specific self-control contexts only. Specifically, I speculate that 
they may regulate their emotions differently in contexts where emotion regulation is 
adaptive, and that they might use alternative strategies in contexts where emotion 
regulation is less adaptive. Put differently, I propose that emotion regulation and 
emotions may not facilitate performance in all self-control situations (e.g., when 
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delaying gratification) and that people higher, compared to lower, in trait self-control 
may be better able to recognize this, and use emotion regulation accordingly.  
One possible explanation for why emotion regulation (and subsequent emotions) 
might be adaptive in some self-control situations (e.g., when persisting on an anagram 
task) but not in others (e.g., when delaying immediate gratification), is that the 
beneficial effects of emotion regulation on self-control may depend on the situation. For 
example, because solving anagrams requires initiation whereas delaying rewards 
requires inhibition (Imhoff et al., 2014; Tuk et al., 2015) and because this thesis showed 
that people believe that positive emotions are more useful for initiatory than inhibitory 
self-control, it is possible that upregulating positive emotions might be adaptive in 
situations that require initiation (e.g., when solving anagrams), but less adaptive in 
situations that require inhibition (e.g., when delaying gratification), in which other 
strategies might be more adaptive.  
This would not be surprising given that prior work has suggested that there is no 
“gold standard” regulatory strategy to achieve desired outcomes, but that it is most 
adaptive to choose a regulatory strategy depending on the demands required by the 
situation (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). Research into emotion regulation has similarly 
argued that there is not one emotion regulation strategy that fits all situations and that 
adaptive emotion regulation involves choosing an emotion regulation strategy that best 
fits that situation (see Aldao, 2013, for a review). To illustrate, a recent ESM study 
showed that the use of suppression, which is a common emotion regulation strategy, 
improved mood in students when they experienced exam-related anxiety, but not when 
they experienced non-exam-related anxiety. In contrast, the use of distraction, another 
common emotion regulation strategy, improved mood in students when they 
experienced non-exam-related anxiety, but not when they experienced exam-
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related anxiety (Rottweiler, Taxer, & Nett, 2018). These findings, along with my 
findings, illustrate the context dependency of emotion regulation, and could help 
explain why emotion regulation may have been adaptive in the anagram situation but 
not in the delay discounting situation. 
Moreover, I further speculate that people higher in trait self-control might use 
emotion regulation differently from those lower in trait self-control to succeed in other 
performance contexts, not just in contexts specific to self-control. I base this on the 
results showing that, as compared to people lower in trait self-control, people higher in 
trait self-control considered positive emotions more useful and negative emotions less 
useful to their performance in situations that were both high and low in self-control 
demand, that they experienced increased positive emotions across these situations after 
completing the regulatory task, and that they experienced decreased negative emotions 
in the high (but not low) self-control demand situation. Thus, it is possible that people 
with high trait self-control may use emotion regulation to increase positive emotions in 
performance situations that are both high and low in self-control demand, but that they 
might focus on using emotion regulation to decrease negative emotions in contexts that 
are specific to self-control, although these speculations need to be confirmed in future 
studies.  
One potential reason why people with high trait self-control might regulate their 
emotions in these ways might be because positive emotions may be beneficial in 
performance situations in general (as implied by the broaden-and-build theory: 
Fredrickson, 2001), whereas there might be more variability in how negative emotions 
influence performance. That is, it is possible that negative emotions might be 
detrimental in self-control situations (as reviewed in Chapter 1) but might be beneficial 
in certain performance situations that does not require self-control per se (e.g., anger 
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improves negotiation performance; Tamir & Ford, 2012), although this possibility 
remains speculative.  
As such, the answer to the question whether people higher in trait self-control 
regulate their emotions differently from people lower in trait self-control in the context 
of self-control is far more complex than initially proposed. That is, the findings reported 
within this thesis can only provide suggestive evidence that people higher, relative to 
lower, in trait self-control might be more likely to upregulate positive and downregulate 
negative emotions in a self-control situation that requires persistence (but not in a 
situation that requires delaying gratification), although the upregulation of positive 
emotions may also generalize to a performance situation that is lower in self-control 
demand.  
Did emotion regulation and subsequent emotions help people higher in trait 
self-control to succeed at self-control? I initially suggested that positive emotions 
would help people with high trait self-control to succeed at self-control, as compared to 
people with low trait self-control. I found partial support for this hypothesis. That is, 
consistent with their beliefs that positive emotions would help them to succeed at self-
control, I found that increased experiences of positive emotions enhanced the self-
control performance of people higher in trait self-control on an anagram task that 
involved persistence, but not on a delay discounting task that involved choosing 
between immediate and delayed rewards. Based on these findings, it seems reasonable 
to argue that whether positive emotions help people with high trait self-control to 
succeed at self-control might depend on the specific self-control task, although other 
moderators are, of course, plausible. 
I also initially argued that lower levels of negative emotions might help people 
higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control to succeed at self-control, although I 
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acknowledged that evidence in support of this claim is currently scarce, given that prior 
work has concentrated on examining how increased (rather than decreased) levels of 
various emotions enhance performance. As such, consistent with the beliefs of people 
higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control that negative emotions would be unhelpful 
to their self-control success, I found that lower levels of negative emotions improved 
the self-control performance of people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control on 
an anagram task that involved persistence, but not on a delay discounting task that 
involved choosing between immediate and delayed rewards. Thus, as with positive 
emotions, these findings suggest that lower levels of negative emotions may help people 
with high trait self-control to succeed in certain (but not all) self-control situations, as 
compared to people with low trait self-control.  
These findings were, however, not observed when using regulatory choice or 
emotion-eliciting condition as predictors of self-control performance. That is, I initially 
expected that greater trait self-control would predict increased self-control performance 
after choosing or being assigned to recall a positive, as compared to a negative, event. I 
did not find support for these hypotheses (instead, I found modest evidence that people 
high in trait self-control performed badly on the delay task after being assigned to recall 
a positive event). Thus, it seems that increased positive and decreased negative 
emotions help people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control to succeed on a self-
control task such as the anagram task, but only when analyzing their actual emotions 
and not when analyzing their regulatory choice or emotion-eliciting condition assigned 
to (the implications of these discrepancies are discussed in the next section). 
In sum, this thesis found tentative answers to the question whether emotion 
regulation and subsequent emotions help people higher in trait self-control to succeed at 
self-control, suggesting that more positive and less negative emotions facilitate the self-
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control performance of people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control on an 
anagram task that involves persistence, but not on a delay discounting task that involves 
choosing between immediate and delayed rewards. However, this thesis did not find 
support for the notion that greater trait self-control would predict increased self-control 
performance after choosing or being assigned to recall a positive event, compared to 
after choosing or being assigned to recall a negative event, suggesting that it is the 
actual emotions of people with high trait self-control, rather than the event they choose 
or are assigned to recall, that matters for their self-control performance. 
Implications of findings 
The research presented in this thesis demonstrates a first attempt to combine 
theories and research from self-control, emotion, and emotion regulation research to 
further our understanding of how people can achieve self-control success. The findings 
of this thesis therefore have theoretical and practical implications for these three areas 
of research, and in particular, for self-control success, which are discussed below.  
Theoretical implications. First, this investigation has implications for self-
control research. In particular, this investigation is one of the first that attempts to test 
how people with high trait self-control succeed at behavioral measures of self-control, 
providing some tentative evidence that they might use emotion regulation and emotions 
as tools to achieve this. Researchers have generally assumed that people with high trait 
self-control achieve positive life outcomes through their superior ability to override 
impulses and to persist in disliked activity, although only a few studies have actually 
tested this assumption. In contrast, others have suggested that people with high trait 
self-control succeed at achieving their goals because they actively avoid tempting 
situations, suggesting that they rarely need to use self-control (Ent, Baumeister, & Tice, 
2010). However, given that it is impossible to always avoid tempting situations, this 
prior work does not reveal whether people with high trait self-control do succeed when 
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they are faced with a situation that require them to use self-control, and which strategies 
they might use to achieve this self-control success. This thesis contributes to our 
understanding of these issues.  
Consider, for example, a situation where a person with high trait self-control is 
offered delicious cake for dessert at a dinner party. Avoidance would be impossible in 
this scenario and a strategy must therefore be employed if he or she would like to stick 
to their health goals and say no to the dessert (i.e., succeed at self-control). The work 
presented within this thesis provides tentative evidence that greater trait self-control 
predicts self-control success, and that they might use emotion regulation and their 
emotions as tools to achieve self-control success. These findings are consistent with 
prior work that has shown that people with high trait self-control regulate their emotions 
more effectively in laboratory settings, as compared to people low trait self-control 
(Paschke et al., 2016), although the current investigation also extends this prior work by 
showing that the emotions they experience following an emotion regulation task also 
translate into improvements in self-control on a task that requires persistence.  
Nevertheless, given that greater trait self-control only predicted self-control 
success on the anagram task but not on the delay discounting task, this thesis further 
suggests that trait self-control only predicts self-control success in situations that require 
persistence, and not in situations that require overriding impulses. Thus, I cannot be 
sure that greater trait self-control would predict self-control success in the dinner party 
example provided above. These findings are therefore consistent with the idea 
postulated by Imhoff et al. (2014) that people higher in trait self-control might be good 
at tasks that require them to initiate short-term efforts, but that they might be bad at 
tasks that require them to resist temptations. Thus, the research presented within this 
thesis adds to the self-control literature as it may suggest that people with high trait self-
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control might achieve positive life outcomes through their superior ability to persist in 
disliked (but desired) activities, rather than through their ability to override impulses. 
Furthermore, this investigation adds to the growing body of self-control research 
that has advocated for a conceptual distinction between inhibitory and initiatory self-
control, generally suggesting that people can achieve their goals by inhibiting and 
initiating behaviors (e.g., de Ridder et al., 2011). Specifically, this thesis showed that 
people believed that positive emotions would be more useful for initiatory than 
inhibitory self-control, whereas negative emotions would be more useful for inhibitory 
than initiatory self-control, suggesting that people distinguish between situations that 
require them to enact or prevent behaviors in their everyday lives. Thus, this thesis 
demonstrates differential findings across situations that require initiation and inhibition 
and therefore provides further supporting evidence for a distinction between initiatory 
and inhibitory self-control.  
Specifically, these findings disagree with prior work that has emphasized that 
self-control is mostly an inhibitory mechanism and agree with the line of work that has 
suggested that self-control is both an inhibitory and initiatory mechanism (Davisson, 
2013; de Ridder et al., 2011; de Boer et al., 2011), and suggests that people with high 
trait self-control might be particularly good at the latter. This emphasizes the 
importance of including an initiatory component of self-control in current definitions of 
self-control as suggested by de Ridder and colleagues (2011). This further highlights the 
importance of distinguishing between measures of initiatory and inhibitory self-control 
when measuring self-control outcomes in the laboratory and in real-life, and the 
importance of adding more items to existing self-control scales that tap initiation (given 
that most items currently tap inhibition: de Ridder et al., 201l), in order to capture the 
full spectrum of the self-control construct. Finally, in parallel to distinguishing between 
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initiatory and inhibitory self-control, it seems equally important to also furthering our 
understanding of the interplay between these two mechanisms, and to also consider 
other forms of self-control, in order to fully understand how self-control operates.   
Moreover, given these differences in beliefs in initiatory and inhibitory self-
control situations, and that the instrumental theory of emotion regulation suggests 
positive links between beliefs, emotion regulation, and successful performance (e.g., 
Tamir et al., 2015), these findings might further suggest that positive emotions (and the 
upregulation of these emotions) might best function to successfully initiate (vs. inhibit) 
self-control behaviors and that negative emotions (and the upregulation of these 
emotions) might best function to successfully inhibit (vs. initiate) self-control behaviors, 
although future studies need to confirm whether these beliefs translate into actual 
emotion regulation and successful performance in these situations.  
Second, this investigation has implications for emotion research. Many 
definitions of emotion suggest that emotions are automatic responses to emotional 
events (e.g., Ekman & Cordaro, 2011) and there is a long-standing notion that emotions 
are something that just happen to people rather than something that people do 
voluntarily. However, this thesis provides further evidence to prior emotion research 
that has proposed that people can voluntarily influence their emotions by choosing to 
engage in various emotion-eliciting activities, suggesting that emotions do not always 
arise as automatic responses to emotional events (e.g., Tamir et al., 2015; Tamir & 
Ford, 2012). This thesis also adds to this prior work by showing that people can also 
voluntarily influence their emotions in the context of self-control. For instance, I found 
that, when presented with various recall options that were positive and negative in 
valence, some participants chose to recall a negative event, and that these participants 
then experienced more negative emotions after recalling the event as compared to 
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before. This replicates previous work (e.g., Tamir & Ford, 2012) and extends this work 
by showing that people can voluntarily choose how to influence their emotions in the 
context of self-control, and that they can make themselves experience these emotions by 
engaging in emotional activities in this context.  
Furthermore, it is also commonly argued, particularly among laypeople, that 
emotions are irrational, disruptive, and that they make people lose control, but this 
thesis agrees with other research that has argued that emotions are functional and 
adaptive (see Karnaze & Levine, 2017, for an overview), which was reflected in 
people’s favorable utility beliefs about positive emotions and in the beneficial influence 
that positive emotions had on the self-control performance of people with high trait self-
control. Nonetheless, people, and particularly those with high trait self-control, 
generally had unfavorable beliefs about negative emotions, suggesting that the view of 
emotions as being irrational and disruptive might be specific to negative emotions 
(though people who expect to confront another person have favorable beliefs about 
anger: Tamir & Ford, 2012) and that this view might be particularly evident in certain 
people (e.g., in those with high trait self-control). Thus, it seems that certain people 
view certain emotions as functional whereas they view other emotions as disruptive and 
that this might depend on the situation.   
Third, this investigation has implications for emotion regulation research. That 
is, the research presented within this thesis is the first to test key predictions made by 
the instrumental theory of emotion regulation in the context of self-control, and thus the 
first to combine the instrumental theory of emotion regulation with self-control 
research. My findings provide modest evidence that people with high trait self-control 
might regulate their emotions instrumentally to achieve self-control success, suggesting 
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that the instrumental emotion regulation framework may also be used in performance 
contexts that require self-control exertion. 
However, one may argue that prior work into instrumental emotion regulation 
has used performance tasks that may require some degree on self-control. For example, 
Tamir (2005) assessed how anxiety influenced anagram performance for people high in 
neuroticism. Even though that study also used an anagram task, the task in that study 
differed from mine in that the anagrams were solvable and thus measured the number of 
anagrams solved, whereas my anagrams were unsolvable and thus measured persistence 
(i.e., time spent on the task). These differences are of great importance because the 
ability to persist in aversive activities is a key feature of self-control (Carver, 2010), 
making my anagram task a more clear-cut example of a measure of self-control. 
However, regardless of whether one judge prior performance tasks used in instrumental 
emotion regulation research to be similar to tasks aimed at measuring self-control 
performance specifically, the studies included in this thesis are still novel and still 
contribute to the literature given that they are the first to test the moderating role of trait 
self-control on the relations between instrumental emotion regulation, emotions, and 
performance.  
Moreover, even though the instrumental theory of emotion regulation mostly 
emphasizes the emotions people consider useful and upregulate in performance 
contexts, and how this regulation influence subsequent performance, a few studies have 
also suggested that people sometimes attempt to decrease emotions in themselves and in 
others if this can help them to achieve their goals (e.g., Netzer et al., 2015; Tamir & 
Ford, 2012). This thesis provides further evidence that the emotions people consider 
unhelpful to their performance in a particular situation may also predict their regulatory 
attempts and success in this situation. Specifically, in several studies I found that people 
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higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control judged negative emotions to be less useful 
to their performance, and in one study I found that they experienced less negative 
emotions immediately after completing a regulatory task and when expecting to perform 
a self-control task, and that lower levels of negative emotions then helped them to 
succeed at this task. Hence, these findings suggest that it might be important to also 
incorporate clear predictions into the model of instrumental emotion regulation 
regarding people’s attempts to downregulate unhelpful emotions in performance 
contexts and how this might influence subsequent performance.  
In addition, even though I generally found that people believed that positive 
emotions could help them to succeed in performance situations as compared to negative 
emotions, and that these beliefs translated into greater preferences and choice to 
regulate positive, as compared to negative, emotions, these patterns of results were not 
evident in people higher and lower in trait self-control. That is, I did not find that 
differences in beliefs about the utility of emotions among people higher and lower in 
trait self-control translated into differences in preferences and choice to regulate 
emotions. These findings suggest that beliefs about the utility of emotions does not 
translate into attempts to regulate emotions for everybody and therefore underscore the 
importance of investigating under exactly which circumstances people’s beliefs about 
the utility of emotions predict preferences and choice to regulate emotions.   
One potential explanation for why trait self-control did not predict preferences 
and choice to regulate emotions might be that people higher in trait self-control are 
more likely than others to rely on automatic behaviors to achieve their goals (de Ridder 
et al., 2012; Gillebaart & de Ridder, 2015). Specifically, it is possible that people with 
high trait self-control may be particularly inclined to regulate their emotions implicitly 
and may therefore not be consciously aware of the most adaptive way to regulate 
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emotions in the context of self-control, resulting in null findings when asked to make a 
deliberate choice about how to regulate their emotions. Another possibility that might 
explain these null findings is that people with high trait self-control may refrain from 
choosing how to regulate emotions because making deliberate choices such as these can 
be taxing and thus detrimental to subsequent self-control performance (as predicted by 
the ego depletion model: Baumeister et al., 1998; Vohs et al., 2008). To protect against 
both of these possibilities, researchers taking an instrumental approach to emotion 
regulation might benefit from including implicit measures of emotion regulation, which 
tend to be more effortless. 
A third potential explanation might be that people high in trait self-control (and 
people in general) do not typically regulate their emotions to succeed at self-control, 
resulting in null findings when asked to choose how to regulate emotions in a self-
control situation. To date, only one study has demonstrated that people regulate their 
emotions in daily self-control situations, and that the use of emotion regulation predicts 
people’s success in these situations. Specifically, in one study Hennecke et al. (2018) 
instructed participants to imagine themselves carrying out different self-control 
behaviors (e.g., vigorously exercising on a treadmill, studying boring exam material), 
and to write down strategies that they typically use to succeed at performing these 
behaviors. One frequent strategy that participants reported using was emotion 
regulation, providing initial evidence that people use emotion regulation in self-control 
situations in real-life. More convincingly, in an ambulatory assessment study, the 
researchers found that people reported using emotion regulation in daily self-control 
situations, and that the use of emotion regulation predicted their success in these 
situations, providing evidence that people can regulate emotions to achieve self-control 
success in real-life. However, given that only a few studies have found support for the 
173 
hypothesis that people regulate emotions to succeed at self-control, and given that my 
studies only found modest support for this hypothesis, more research is needed to 
confirm whether people, and particularly people high in trait self-control, use emotion 
regulation to achieve self-control success. 
Practical implications. The research presented in this thesis contributes to our 
understanding of how emotions and emotion regulation might shape self-control success 
for people with high trait self-control and has the potential to inform the design of 
interventions to improve people’s self-control and help them to attain positive life 
outcomes.  
For example, if increased positive emotions indeed help people higher (but not 
lower) in trait self-control to succeed at self-control as the results within this thesis 
suggest, one way to help people who are less good at self-control to better self-control 
might be to teach them easy-to-use positive-inducing regulatory strategies, which could, 
in turn, enhance their self-control. For example, research shows that music can alter 
people’s emotions (for a review, see Västfjäll, 2002), and that people listen to music in 
their everyday lives to regulate their emotions (Thoma, Ryf, Mohiyeddini, Ehlert, & 
Nater, 2012). Thus, if people would employ music in their everyday lives for the 
purpose of upregulating their positive emotions, it is possible that these emotions would 
help them to succeed at self-control and to achieve desirable goals.   
Another way to help people to better self-control through the upregulation of 
positive emotions might be through priming. Indeed, prior work has suggested that 
situated interventions such as goal priming can be effective in helping people to achieve 
their long-term goals (Papies, 2016). Thus, given that primes can be used to elicit 
emotions (Lench et al., 2011) and because the findings presented in this thesis suggest 
that positive emotions might be particularly beneficial to initiate self-control behaviors, 
174 
it seems plausible that a prime intervention aimed at increasing positive emotions might 
help people to succeed at initiating self-control behaviors. For example, integrating 
positive prime words (e.g., happy, joyful, and proud) into a poster displayed outside the 
campus gym that describes the exercise classes offered that day might increase positive 
emotions in students who are deciding between taking an exercise class or going home 
and thus help them to choose the former, indicating self-control success (though this 
prime may only be effective in people who have an exercise goal; see Papies & 
Hamstra, 2010; Stöckli, Stämpfli, Messner, & Brunner, 2016, for similar methods).  
In a related vein, based on the finding that lower levels of negative emotions 
helped people higher in trait self-control to succeed at self-control in one of my studies, 
it also seems important to teach people methods aimed at downregulating negative 
emotions in order to improve their ability to self-control. For example, one of the most 
adaptive emotion regulation strategy to decrease negative feelings is cognitive 
reappraisal (Gross, 1998) such as distancing oneself from the negative situation or 
reinterpreting the negative situation as positive. Thus, teaching people who often fail at 
self-control how to use reappraisal to downregulate negative emotions in the context of 
self-control (e.g., reappraising studying as an opportunity for growth rather than boring) 
may have great potential to improve their self-control.  
For instance, one study found that participants who were trained to use 
distancing and reinterpretation while watching negative images demonstrated reductions 
in negative emotions over time, which was particularly evident in participants who were 
trained to use distancing (Denny & Ochsner, 2014). Likewise, in another recent study 
(Giles et al., 2018), endurance runners were trained how to regulate their emotions to 
feel less negative emotions through reappraisal, distraction, and no training, before 
completing a 90 min run on three different occasions. Broadly, the results showed that 
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participants felt lower emotional arousal and physical exertion after learning how to use 
reappraisal (vs. no emotion regulation training), suggesting that reappraisal benefited 
their running experience. Together, these findings suggest that training participants to 
use cognitive reappraisal might be successful in reducing negative emotions, and also 
seems to have beneficial influences on a self-control behavior such as exercising. Thus, 
it might indeed be fruitful to teach these strategies to people who often fail at self-
control in order to reduce their negative emotions and improve their self-control as a 
consequence.   
Another (and simpler) way to help people to better self-control might be to 
merely educate them and thus change their beliefs about which emotions that are 
adaptive for various self-control behaviors, which is likely to then guide their regulatory 
attempts to increase these emotions and facilitate their success at performing these 
behaviors. For example, if positive emotions are more useful for enacting behaviors 
than for preventing behaviors as my results indicate, educating people about how 
positive emotions influence these two types of self-control behaviors might change their 
beliefs about these emotions and lead to greater regulatory attempts to increase positive 
emotions in situations that require initiatory self-control (e.g., when trying to initiate 
studying behaviors) but not in situations that require inhibitory self-control (e.g., when 
trying to resist ordering junk food) and thus help them succeed in these situations. Put 
differently, I am suggesting that an intervention aimed at changing people’s beliefs 
about the utility of emotions might result in adaptive emotion regulation and self-
control success.  
Consistent with this idea, Tamir et al. (2015) found that participants who were 
led to believe that anxiety or anger would be useful to their performance on an 
upcoming task were more likely to attempt to increase their anxiety or anger before 
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performing the task, as compared to those who did not receive such instructions. Thus, 
given that these beliefs were manipulated in a relatively simple manner (e.g., by having 
participants read tips or information that implied that a particular emotion would be 
useful for performance, or implicitly through a prime task), it suggests that people’s 
beliefs about the utility of emotions can be changed, which should then guide their 
regulatory attempts and facilitate their performance. Furthermore, given that this thesis 
showed that a personality trait such as trait self-control predicts the degree to which 
people believe that emotions can help them to succeed at self-control, it might be 
particularly beneficial to design interventions aimed at changing beliefs in people who 
do not consider emotions to be useful to their performance such as people with low trait 
self-control. These changes in beliefs may then guide their regulatory attempts and 
facilitate their self-control. 
From a more general point of view, theory and intervention development would 
further benefit from an increased understanding of the specific self-control situations in 
which increased positive and decreased negative emotions benefit self-control, as the 
findings herein suggest that these emotional experiences only benefit self-control 
performance in certain self-control contexts, and that positive emotions might be more 
useful for initiation than inhibition whereas the opposite might be true for negative 
emotions. As such, it might be beneficial to combine interventions that target people’s 
regulatory attempts with interventions that target people’s beliefs about the utility of 
emotions. For example, it might be beneficial to develop an intervention aimed at 
teaching people how to increase positive emotions in situations that require persistence 
in aversive activities (i.e., initiate behaviors such as studying, cleaning, exercising) and 
to also try to change their beliefs by educating them that these techniques may not be 
useful in situations that require them to make trade-off decisions between immediate 
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pleasures and long-term rewards (i.e., inhibit behaviors such as choosing between 
ordering pizza or salad), in which other strategies might be more adaptive.  
Methodological implications. The findings presented in this thesis also have 
methodological implications that are worth discussing separately. First, I suggest that 
my findings have implications for experimental research that wish to employ an 
emotion induction to test how emotions influence a particular outcome. Specifically, 
this thesis showed that trait self-control predicted differences in emotional experiences 
following an emotion induction, suggesting that people higher and lower in trait self-
control may regulate emotions or respond differently to emotion inductions. These 
findings are on a par with prior studies that have similarly demonstrated that emotional 
experiences after an emotion induction depends on personality. For example, Larsen 
and Ketelaar (1991) demonstrated that high extraversion predicted increased positive 
emotions after a positive-eliciting induction, and that high neuroticism predicted 
increased negative emotions after a negative-eliciting induction. Together, these 
findings suggest that emotion inductions influence emotions differently for different 
people. Hence, experimental research that wish to employ an emotion induction might 
want to include (and perhaps control for) personality measures of self-control, 
neuroticism, and extraversion, if they wish to isolate the effects of an emotion on a 
particular outcome.  
In a related vein, this thesis showed that using emotion induction as a categorical 
variable vs. actual emotions as continuous variables to predict self-control performance 
produced different results, perhaps because people regulated or responded differently to 
the emotion inductions. Thus, from a methodological standpoint, rather than doing a 
manipulation check after an emotion induction and then use emotion-eliciting condition 
as a categorical variable to predict an outcome, this investigation suggests that it might 
178 
be important to distinguish between emotion-eliciting condition and actual emotions 
when analyzing the data, in order to fully understand whether and how emotions 
influence an outcome.  
Second, I further suggest that the research presented herein has implications for 
experimental self-control research that intends to use tasks and real-life behavioral 
outcomes as dependent measures (or manipulations) of self-control. Specifically, even 
though the self-control tasks and self-control behaviors included in this thesis are 
common measures of self-control in the literature, I conducted numerous supplemental 
studies to ensure that I included tasks and behaviors that were relatively high in self-
control demand (as described in Chapter 1). This procedure was not employed because I 
believe that the tasks and behaviors that have been used in prior self-control research are 
invalid measures of self-control, but rather to complement this prior work given that 
some researchers have disputed whether certain self-control tasks actually require self-
control (e.g., Barber et al., 2012; Shenhav, 2017). I also argued that it was particularly 
important to ensure that participants generally agreed that the tasks and behaviors 
required self-control, given that they were then asked questions about their own beliefs 
and behaviors in these self-control situations, suggesting they needed to be able to relate 
to these situations.  
I believe that this approach (i.e., ensuring that the self-control tasks require self-
control) will continue to be valuable moving forward, and that it will encourage the 
development of new better approaches that does not only rely on participants’ ratings, 
ensuring that the tasks and behaviors used to measure self-control actually require a 
person to use self-control. I also hope that this approach will shed light on the 
importance of testing one’s hypotheses in settings that are situated in the laboratory and 
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in settings that better approximates real-life situations, and thus increasing the 
generalizability of the findings.   
Lastly, the studies reported in this thesis employed preregistration procedures. 
One strength of this procedure is that it increases the confidence in my findings, as it 
prevents HARKing (i.e., hypothesizing after the results are known; Kerr, 1998) and 
other practices that are generally considered bad science (e.g., p-hacking; Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012), and fosters reproducibility and transparency given that 
the method and obtained data are shared with other researchers and the general 
population.  
Limitations and future directions 
In this section, I discuss the potential limitations to this thesis, and I discuss 
interesting ideas for future research. When discussing potential limitations, I focus on 
the thesis as a whole rather than discussing the specific limitations for each of the five 
key studies presented in this thesis, which can be found in the General Discussion in 
each empirical chapter.  
One potential limitation is that trait self-control and emotions were measured 
through self-reports, which can be vulnerable to social desirability. Even though these 
self-reports are valid measures of trait self-control and emotions, respectively (de 
Ridder et al., 2012; Mauss & Robinson, 2009), future research would benefit from 
combining these self-reports with behavioral measures when measuring trait self-control 
(Duckworth & Kern, 2011), and with physiological measures when measuring emotions 
(Mauss & Robinson, 2009). In the case of trait self-control, this approach might be 
beneficial because prior work has shown that a combined measure of self-control better 
predicts objective measures of performance (e.g., academic performance) than a single 
measure of self-control (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005). Thus, using a combined 
measure of self-control might help clarify the inconsistent findings regarding the link 
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between trait self-control and self-control performance obtained herein. Moreover, 
using multiple measures of emotions might be beneficial because some people are 
unwilling to report on their emotional states (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). This suggests 
that assessing emotions through self-reports and physiological measures may increase 
our confidence that people actually experience the emotions they report experiencing, 
and thus contribute even more to our understanding of how emotions influence self-
control performance among people higher and lower in trait self-control.  
Another potential limitation of this thesis might be that autobiographical recall 
was used to measure regulatory attempts and to induce emotions across studies. Even 
though autobiographical recall is effective in inducing emotions (Lench et al., 2011) and 
has been widely used in prior studies on instrumental emotion regulation as reviewed in 
Chapter 1, there might also be some disadvantages associated with this task. For 
example, research has shown that writing about a past negative event in an expressive 
writing paradigm reduces negative emotions in the long-term (see Baikie & Wilhelm, 
2005, for an overview of how expressive writing influence health outcomes). It is 
therefore possible that participants in my studies chose to write about a negative event 
as a coping mechanism aimed at lessening negative emotions in the long-term, instead 
of an emotion regulation mechanism aimed at increasing these emotions in the short-
term, which was of interest in this thesis. Future studies that adapt an instrumental 
approach to emotion regulation in the context of self-control could use other types of 
tasks to measure regulatory attempts and to induce emotions such as music and video 
inductions. Such approach would allow researchers to test whether the findings obtained 
in this thesis replicate when using another task to measure regulatory attempts and to 
induce emotions.  
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Moreover, given that emotions can be classified in many different ways, not just 
according to their valence (as reviewed in Chapter 1), a further potential critique of this 
thesis might be that I limited my investigation to broadly comparing states of positive 
with states of negative emotions (although some analyses of specific emotions were 
conducted). For example, there are many subtypes of positive and negative emotions 
that could be examined separately, and positive and negative emotions can also vary in 
arousal and whether they are basic or self-conscious. However, I initially chose to limit 
my analyses to positive vs. negative emotions because much less is known about how 
other specific emotions (e.g., serenity, hate) and emotional arousal (high, low) influence 
self-control, and I therefore argued that I did not have enough theoretical or 
experimental evidence to state any a priori hypotheses regarding these emotional 
dimensions. 
Considering this gap in the literature, I encourage researchers to unravel how 
specific emotions that vary in arousal influence self-control performance, and to 
examine how people with high trait self-control might regulate these emotions in the 
context of self-control and whether this regulation leads to improvements in self-
control. For example, perhaps people with high trait self-control upregulate positive 
emotions that are high in arousal (e.g., excitement) when getting ready to go to the gym 
or when exercising but upregulate positive emotions that are low in arousal (e.g., 
serenity) when trying to resist dessert, and perhaps these emotions help them to succeed 
in these situations. This idea is somewhat consistent with prior work that has found that 
participants who are instructed to state “I am excited” rather than “I am calm” report 
feeling more excited and perform better on performance tasks such as karaoke singing 
and public speaking (Brooks, 2014), indicating that positive emotions that are high (but 
not low) in arousal might indeed be beneficial in various performance situations 
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(including exercising). These questions and others provide interesting avenues for future 
research.  
A further potential limitation of this research is that, even though thorough 
attempts were made at ensuring that all self-control tasks included in this thesis were 
high in self-control demand, these tasks could have been even higher in self-control 
demand. That is, as reviewed in Chapter 1, the instrumental theory of emotion 
regulation holds that beliefs about the utility of emotions and regulatory attempts should 
be particularly evident in highly demanding situations, but I did not find support for this 
claim in this thesis, perhaps because the self-control tasks were not “high enough” in 
self-control demand. One challenge for future self-control researchers therefore involves 
identifying tasks that are even higher in self-control demand than the self-control tasks 
used herein (the self-control demand means ranged from 4.50 to 5.00 on 7-point scales), 
and then test whether the self-control demands of the situation moderate the findings 
obtained in this thesis.  
Another possible critique of this thesis is that I only found modest and 
suggestive evidence that people with high trait self-control use emotion regulation as a 
strategy to succeed at self-control (i.e., Study 2 in Chapter 3 found indirect support for 
this whereas Study 3 in the same chapter did not), and research is therefore needed to 
confirm whether people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control regulate their 
emotions differently in the context of self-control, and whether this facilitates self-
control. For instance, rather than using regulatory preferences, regulatory choice, and 
emotions after an emotion regulation task as indicators of emotion regulation, future 
studies could use an implicit measure of emotion regulation (for reasons described 
previously), and test whether this predicts self-control performance and how this is 
moderated by trait self-control. Relatedly, future studies could assess emotion 
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regulation by having participants choose among various well-established emotion 
regulation strategies (such as those put forward in the process model of emotion 
regulation: Gross, 1998) in the context of self-control, and test which strategies that 
predict self-control performance and how this is moderated by trait self-control. 
Furthermore, based on the findings obtained in this thesis, it also seems crucial to 
examine the specific self-control circumstances under which trait self-control predicts 
emotion regulation, as it seems likely that this relationship depends on multiple 
moderators such as the self-control task (e.g., the extent to which the task is high in self-
control demand, whether the task requires initiation or inhibition), whether emotion 
regulation is useful in that particular situation, and whether people choose or are 
instructed how to regulate, and others.  
In a related vein, future research should examine alternative strategies that 
people with high trait self-control might use in self-control situations, particularly in 
situations where emotion regulation might be unhelpful. For example, given that 
making plans that link an opportunity with a suitable goal-directed response (i.e., 
implementation intentions; Gollwitzer, 1999; see also Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006) 
have proven to facilitate many types of behaviors that are related to self-control, one 
interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate whether people with high 
trait self-control make adaptive plans that are similar to implementation intentions to 
succeed at self-control and to achieve their goals. Moreover, research has shown that 
trait self-control is positively linked with trait mindfulness (i.e., the tendency to be 
mindful in daily life; Bowlin & Baer, 2012), that mindfulness meditation can be helpful 
in overcoming ego depletion (Friese et al., 2012; Yusainy & Lawrence, 2015), and that 
mindfulness interventions are effective in improving self-control behaviors such as 
smoking cessation (Brewer et al., 2011) and unhealthy food consumption (see Keesman, 
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Aarts, Häfner & Papies, 2017, for a review). Hence, another interesting avenue for 
future research would be to investigate whether people with high trait self-control 
employ mindfulness strategies to succeed at self-control and to achieve their goals. 
Furthermore, Hennecke et al. (2018) recently found that people higher, relative 
to lower, in trait self-control were not only more likely to use emotion regulation 
strategies in aversive self-regulatory activities, but they were also more likely to focus 
on the positive consequences of performing these activities and to set goals. There was 
also some evidence that their tendency to focus on the positive consequences could, to 
some extent, explain their self-reported success at persisting in these activities. Thus, 
future work would benefit from further examining how focusing on the positive 
consequences of performing a self-control behavior influence objective measures of 
self-control performance in people with high trait self-control. For example, given the 
link between anticipated positive emotions and enhanced self-control (e.g., Winterich & 
Haws, 2011), it might be particularly fruitful to examine whether focusing on the future 
positive emotions one might feel if he or she succeed at a self-control behavior might 
function as a strategy to achieve self-control success in people with high trait self-
control.  
Another potential limitation of this thesis is that I only found tentative evidence 
that emotions helped people with high trait self-control to succeed at self-control. 
Specifically, I found that increased positive and decreased negative emotions boosted 
the performance of people higher in trait self-control on an anagram task that involved 
persistence, but not on a delay discounting task that involved choosing between 
immediate and delayed rewards. Prior research has similarly found mixed evidence 
regarding the effects of emotions on self-control. Using a self-control behavior such as 
food consumption as an example, studies have found that people who experience 
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positive, compared to negative, emotions consume less unhealthy and more healthy 
food (Garg et al., 2007). They have similarly found that positive emotions increase the 
salience of long-term goals (e.g., health), leading to greater preferences for healthy 
compared to unhealthy food, whereas negative emotions have the opposite effect 
(Gardner et al., 2014). In contrast, research has found that people who experience 
positive emotions consume more unhealthy food compared to controls, and that they 
consume similar amounts as those who experience negative emotions (Evers et al., 
2013), suggesting that positive emotions are not always good for self-control behaviors. 
Thus, these data underscore the importance for future studies to examine exactly when 
and how positive emotions facilitate self-control (several potential moderators have 
been discussed in this section), and how this is moderated by trait self-control. 
Although not a limitation per se, due to time constraints I did not test my 
hypotheses regarding the links between trait self-control, emotion regulation, 
subsequent emotions, and self-control performance in real-life. Thus, I cannot draw 
conclusions about whether people higher, relative to lower, in trait self-control regulate 
their emotions consistent with their beliefs about the utility of emotions and whether 
this leads to improvements in everyday situations that require initiatory and inhibitory 
self-control. This is therefore an area of research I would like to investigate next. For 
example, an interesting starting point would be to conduct a study that employs the 
experience sampling method (ESM) to assess the emotions that people with high trait 
self-control report experiencing in conjunction with initiating and inhibiting various 
everyday self-control behaviors, and test which emotions that predict their success in 
these situations. Another possibility would be to ask them whether they used various 
emotion regulation strategies in conjunction with initiating and inhibiting various self-
control behaviors, and test which strategies that predict self-control success.  
186 
Conclusions 
By integrating research into self-control, emotions, and instrumental emotion 
regulation, the current research has shed some new light on how people with high trait 
self-control might achieve self-control success: through the use of emotion regulation 
and their emotions, although it is crucial for future studies to confirm these initial 
findings and to further examine plausible moderators in the links between trait self-
control, emotion regulation, and emotions, on self-control success. This research has 
significant practical implications as it has the potential to inform the design of emotion 
regulation interventions to improve people’s self-control and to help them to attain 
positive outcomes. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Self-Control Vignettes, Domains and Self-Control Type  
Food domain. 
Inhibition. I recently decided to stop eating sweets for a while. It took self-
control to resist the urge because I normally eat candy at least once a day. I get physical 
cravings for something sweet after I've eaten "normal" food and especially in the 
evening. I like to eat something sweet while I'm watching TV and so I guess I've 
associated relaxation in the evening with candy. I also tend to eat a lot when I'm stressed 
and tend to eat as part of a procrastination process before starting on important school 
work. So, what was difficult for me was to change this behavior and not reach for the 
"usual" chocolate after lunch or dinner and whenever I didn't feel like doing school 
work. 
Work domain. 
Initiation. It was a Monday morning and I had just worked a night shift and I 
had a difficult university assignment to complete that was due in in 3 days. After work I 
went home and went to bed for about 3 hours. I told myself that after a couple of hours 
sleep I then had to get up and go to the university to meet some friends and work on my 
assignment. I knew I had to force myself out of bed to work on my assignment 
otherwise I would be behind and I would struggle to complete it. 
Relationship domain. 
Inhibition. I recently broke up with my boyfriend. He said some really hurtful 
and spiteful things to me and accused me of things that he knew not to be true. I 
exhibited self-control as I tried not to retaliate or indulge him in an argument. 
Sex domain. 
Inhibition. Me and my girlfriend had woken up in the morning and we had to 
leave her house in under an hour to get in time for a football game. We were already 
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only in our underwear and we started making out, and it started to turn into something 
more, and it took self-control to stop and get ready instead of carry on, but I knew that if 
we did we wouldn't make it back in time for the match. I had to be responsible because 
I'm the captain of the team and couldn't really be late, but I really didn't want to be 
responsible in that situation at all. 
Exercise domain. 
Initiation. I recently decided to get back into an old exercise routine. As an 
undergraduate student I had a good exercise routine as I had a big bedroom and a lot of 
free time. Soon after leaving university this routine changed and my fitness decreased. 
Recently, I decided that I needed to try and get back into an exercise routine to improve 
my level of fitness and general well-being. Getting back into this exercise routine was, 
however, difficult as I now have a much smaller room and I have nowhere near as much 
free time as I used to. Trying to find the time and space to exercise was difficult as I am 
now busy working and studying so I am often tired and have no motivation to exercise. 
It takes self-control to force myself to exercise when I am tired. 
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Appendix 2. Sample Self-Control Behaviors, Domains and Self-Control Type  
Food domain. 
Initiation. Please imagine that you are trying to get yourself to make healthy 
food choices when eating out at a cafe or restaurant (e.g., order a healthy side dish such 
as a salad or a vegetable soup).  
Inhibition. Please imagine that you are trying to resist the temptation to eat late 
at night.  
Work domain. 
Initiation. Please imagine that you are trying to get yourself to study for a test or 
quiz.  
Inhibition. Please imagine that you are trying to resist the temptation to 
procrastinate.  
Relationship domain.  
Initiation. Please imagine that you are trying to get yourself to tell someone how 
you feel (e.g., tell someone they hurt you, tell someone you love them).  
Inhibition. Please imagine that you are trying to resist the temptation to say 
something you may later regret when you are angry.  
Sleep domain.  
Initiation. Please imagine that you are trying to get yourself to wake up early 
every morning.  
Inhibition. Please imagine that you are trying to resist the temptation to take a 
nap when you are tired (e.g., you try to resist napping or falling asleep in the daytime or 
early evenings).  
Exercise domain. 
Initiation. Please imagine that you are trying to get yourself to exercise (e.g., go 
to the gym, go for a run).  
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Appendix 3. Emotional Events  
Pride. Please write a short description of a personal event in which you 
succeeded at something that you had worked hard for (you invested long hours, physical 
exertion, mental effort etc.)  
Serenity. Please write a short description of a personal event in which you 
experienced physical calmness (as a result of a massage, taking a bath etc.) 
Joy. Please write a short description of a personal event in which you saw 
something very funny (stand-up comedian, a funny movie, a sitcom etc.) 
Hope. Please write a short description of a personal event in which you were 
optimistic about the future (graduating and getting a job, getting married and starting a 
family etc.) 
Guilt. Please write a short description of a personal event in which you said 
something that hurt someone close to you (partner, family, friend etc.) 
Anxiety. Please write a short description of a personal event in which you 
experienced a stressful life situation (marriage, accident, illness, financial problems, 
moving house etc.) 
Anger. Please write a short description of a personal event in which you were 
blamed for a mistake for which you were not responsible (at work, in school, with 
friends etc.) 
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Appendix 4. Instructions for Regulatory Writing Task 
You will now write about your chosen event. Please begin by writing down what 
you remember of the situation, and continue by writing as detailed a description of the 
situation as is possible, and try to vividly imagine yourself in this situation while doing 
so. In the space below, write your description in as much detail as possible, so that 
someone reading this might feel as you felt when it happened to you. What is it like to 
be in this situation? Why does it make you feel this way? 
Do not rush through this task. Take your time and describe the situation in 
detail. You will have 10 minutes to complete the task, but please write for at least 5 
minutes (see timer above).  
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Appendix 5. Instructions for Regulatory Writing Task  
Remember a specific event that has occurred in your life that has made you very 
pride [or guilty] . . . imagine the situation as vividly as you can. Picture the event 
actually happening to you. Try to experience all the details of the situation. . . think 
through the thoughts that occurred to you. . . feel the same feelings you felt - . . . 
describe the event you remembered as vividly as you can including all the important 
details. 
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Appendix 6. Choices used in Discounting Task  
Please click on your preferred choice  
Choice 1. 
A. I prefer to get $10 tomorrow   B. I prefer to get $12 in 25 days 
Choice 2. 
A. I prefer to get $67 tomorrow   B. I prefer to get $85 in 70 days 
Choice 3. 
A. I prefer to get $34 tomorrow   B. I prefer to get $35 in 43 days 
Choice 4. 
A. I prefer to get $48 tomorrow   B. I prefer to get $55 in 45 days 
Choice 5. 
A. I prefer to get $40 tomorrow   B. I prefer to get $70 in 20 days 
Choice 6. 
A. I prefer to get $16 tomorrow   B. I prefer to get $30 in 35 days 
Choice 7. 
A. I prefer to get $30 tomorrow   B. I prefer to get $35 in 20 days 
Choice 8. 
A. I prefer to get $15 tomorrow   B. I prefer to get $35 in 10 days 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
